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The European integration process introduced many changes that were intended to 
bring peace, prosperity and freedom of movement to a growing number of mem-
ber states and their inhabitants. The Schengen Agreement led to the abolition of 
border controls, the internal market stimulated the trade of goods within Europe 
and the single currency unified and simplified capital and payments for businesses 
and individuals, both within and between countries. Touted as blessings of the 
European Union, these changes have increasingly become the subject of massive 
public criticism in the wake of the European economic and financial crisis and the 
high level of flight migration in the course of the 2010s. The Schengen Area is 
blamed for problems of uncontrolled immigration and public security, the internal 
market and the euro for cut-throat competition at the expense of weaker econo-
mies, for rising national debt and for reforms leading to social cutbacks. Now 
more than ever there is a dispute about the future shape of the EU because parties 
and groups critical of Europe are mobilising very successfully against the EU and 
against pro-European governments in the various member states. 
This book is devoted to an analysis of this increased contentiousness. It wishes 
to add insights to the debate about the constant “politicisation” of the European 
citizenry (Hooghe and Marks 2009; de Wilde and Zürn 2012; Kriesi 2016b). Its 
main aim is to engage in a systematic analysis of the relationship between social 
inequalities and political attitudes, making use of datasets from 2015 to 2016 that 
mirror the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis. The objective is to take 
European integration seriously by highlighting that this process is not only affect-
ing the political opinions citizens have about the European Union but also the way 
they perceive and assess the social and political reality in their own country. The 
focus is on social inequalities within and between countries, which are known to 
be a driver of political contentions about the EU, but also about national politics. 
In fact, research has already provided insights into the gradual politicisation of 
the EU, which nurtures political cleavages between pro-Europeans and a grow-
ing share of Eurosceptics (e.g., Krouwel and Abts 2007; Lubbers and Scheepers 
2005; Treib 2014; Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Baute, Abts and Meuleman 2019). 
Many studies have shown, in particular, that social inequalities both within and 
between countries matter when understanding pro-European and Eurosceptic 
attitudes (e.g., Kuhn, van Elsas, Hakhverdian and van der Brug 2016; Ritzen, 
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Wehner and Zimmermann 2016; Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Dotti Sani and Magistro 
2016; Schaff 2019; Lauterbach and de Vries 2020). Additionally, scholars tend 
to converge in the conviction that the various crises and the growing divisions 
between privileged and non-privileged countries and citizens are contributing to 
the emergence of a new political cleavage that runs across the EU’s member states, 
even though this cleavage might not be the only one with which the EU is con-
fronted (Kriesi 2016b; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Zeitlin, Nicoli and Laffan 2019). 
Findings, however, are incomplete and inconclusive and do not take into account 
the Europe-wide disparities and related perceptions among the citizenry that have 
a direct bearing on the degree of support for national government politics. 
In the following chapters, I wish to provide a more systematic account of the 
effect of social inequalities on political attitudes towards the EU and its member 
states by addressing different dimensions of social inequalities. On the one hand, I 
wish to assess the relevance of “objective” social inequalities by dealing with both 
social stratifications and spatial disparities. This differentiation is necessary to 
better understand political divisions within the European citizenry because politi-
cal attitudes can often differ among citizens with diverging social backgrounds 
(e.g., in terms of education, income, occupational status or social class affiliation) 
and thus along different positions within the hierarchical system of social strati-
fication. At the same time, they could also be influenced by the socio-economic 
situation of the country and region they live in, given that citizens live in a more 
or less favourable social context (Lubbers and Scheepers 2005; Schraff 2019; 
Lauterbach and de Vries 2020). On the other hand, I will focus on the “subjective” 
dimension of social inequalities because research has convincingly demonstrated 
that political attitudes are also determined by the way citizens perceive social ine-
qualities (Mause and Schlipphak 2016; Ritzen et al. 2016; Simpson 2019). In this 
regard, it will be necessary to differentiate between the perceptions of the citizens’ 
own household situations and their stratificational position. It is to be expected 
that citizens who see themselves in an inferior position might be less satisfied with 
the current political situation. At the same time, however, we also have to deal 
with the subjective perception of spatial disparities. In this regard, it is very likely 
that citizens who perceive unequal living conditions between European countries, 
and who see themselves worse off when compared to other Europeans, will be 
more critical of the social and political conditions they live in. 
The analyses follow the assumption that the European integration process 
should have influenced the political attitudes of European citizens by forming and 
consolidating a shared social and political reality for the European population. 
Following a sociological approach indebted to the analysis of social spaces and 
fields (Bourdieu 1985; 1996; 1998), it seems plausible to assume that the politi-
cal attitudes of European citizens not only reflect their personal situation within 
a nationally contained system of inequalities but also their position within the 
larger European social space in its objective and subjective dimensions. In regard 
to the objective dimension, I will demonstrate that social inequalities affect sup-
portive and critical attitudes toward national and European politics across coun-
tries in a similar way and that the relations of inequality between less and more 
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privileged social strata do translate into a political cleavage between support-
ers and opponents of the EU. Irrespective of persistent national divisions, cross-
national cleavages seem to be a relevant driving force in public opinion-shaping. 
In terms of subjective inequalities, I will show that European citizens assess liv-
ing conditions (both their own and the ones in other countries) within a shared 
European frame of reference. “Europe” provides Europeans with a social map 
or compass that allows them to identify the position various peoples occupy in 
Europe, as well as their own specific reference point within the larger framework. 
These cognitive maps have significant effects on political attitudes, particularly in 
the way Europeans perceive and assess national politics and the extent to which 
they support the EU. 
The findings of this book aim to contribute to a research debate within the 
social sciences that stresses the specificity of the European Union as a multilevel 
governance system within a multiscalar social space. The European Union con-
sists of supranational, national and sub-national institutions and arenas of policy-
making, and this multilevel structure is mirrored in the individual opinions and 
political attitudes European citizens hold. Surveys accurately testify that citizens 
have opinions about political institutions, policies and politicians at the local, 
national and European level. Yet more revealing is the fact that these attitudes are 
mutually interrelated. European citizens, for instance, perceive and assess the EU 
very often from their own country’s perspective (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Ares, 
Ceka and Kriesi 2017). The support of the EU depends, for instance, on levels 
of national prosperity and the evaluation of this prosperity (e.g., Rohrschneider 
and Loveless 2010; Ritzen et al. 2016), as well as on how citizens evaluate the 
institutional performance of national governments (e.g., Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; 
Kritzinger 2003; Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas and de Vreese 2011; de Vries 
2018). 
This book seeks to give insight into this relational perspective by introduc-
ing a sociological element to it that focuses more systematically on unequal 
living conditions and perceptions of inequality across Europe. Moreover, while 
research has tended to centre on the importance of national proxies, yard-
sticks, cues or benchmarks to form and voice political opinions about the EU 
(Anderson 1998; Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet 2011; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; 
Guinjoan and Rico 2018), I wish to highlight that the inverse effect is very 
likely, given that citizens are apt to apply a European yardstick when assessing 
national politics. In relational terms, the analysis is not only devoted to exam-
ining whether pro-European and Eurosceptic attitudes reflect the respondents’ 
specific living conditions and the way they perceive their social position within 
a system of social stratification, it will also focus on whether political attitudes 
towards the nation state mirror the respondents’ perceptions of social inequali-
ties, in particular, unequal living conditions across Europe. In this sense, we 
might expect that the perception of social conditions in a country and the degree 
of public support of national governments depends on how citizens perceive and 
assess European living conditions and whether they develop a sense of relative 
deprivation. 
4 Introduction 
The (partial) relevance of the European Union
as opinion shaper: available knowledge 
Research has provided ample evidence of the fact that European integration is 
fuelling the contentiousness of European and national politics. Particular empha-
sis has been placed on the growing contentiousness of European and national 
politics. Particular emphasis has been placed on the constant “politicisation” 
of European integration and the EU itself (Hooghe and Marks 2009; de Wilde 
and Zürn 2012; Kriesi 2016b). The EU is being politicised because of diverg-
ing national interests and growing public concerns about threats to national cul-
tures and identities (Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz 2012; Kuhn and Stoeckel 
2014; Hutter and Grande 2014; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Otjes and Katsanidou 
2017). The contentiousness is also attributed to an expanding social cleavage that 
confronts the winners and losers of societal developments that are believed to be 
rooted in the European integration process and/or globalisation. In particular, the 
Great Recession has deepened these cleavages, thus fuelling populist sentiment 
and in part the rise of anti-European groups and parties (Kriesi and Pappas 2015; 
Hutter 2014; Kriesi 2016b; Treib 2020). The dividing line has also been drawn 
between the privileged and non-privileged, between the elites and the socially 
disadvantaged population groups (Hooghe 2003; Fligstein 2008; Haller 2008). 
The strengthening of Eurosceptic positions is also viewed against this back-
drop (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey 2006; Kuhn et al. 
2016). Analyses show that these populist views do not necessarily need to mirror 
objective vulnerabilities and economic hardships, but very often imply percep-
tions and feelings of deprivation and exposure to collective grievances (Rico and 
Anduiza 2016; Ritzen et al. 2016). Euroscepticism is becoming increasingly pop-
ulist and thus takes on an anti-elitist orientation that merges two lines of conflict. 
The populist mobilisation against the political establishment is also increasingly 
becoming a Europe-critical mobilisation against Brussels’ rule (Stockemer and 
Barisione 2016). 
These research findings sensitise us to the fact that the politicisation of the 
EU is driven by societal developments that increase inequalities and cleavages 
and thus lead citizens to voice pro-European or Eurosceptic opinions that largely 
mirror social privileges and vulnerabilities. This argument is qualified, however, 
by references to the national “filter” that seems to mediate the political attitudes 
citizens have towards the European Union. Assuming that citizens might have 
less knowledge about the EU and might feel less comfortable in developing sound 
judgements, they seem to use national politics as a proxy, yardstick or benchmark 
for the formation of EU-related opinions (Anderson 1998; Kritzinger 2003; de 
Vries 2018). Additionally, it has been shown that citizens tend to “queue” behind 
national elites in their support or criticism of the EU when public debates are 
controversial (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Ares, Ceka and Kriesi 2017) and when 
right-wing populist parties influence public perceptions (Armingeon and Ceka 
2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014). Furthermore, public opinion within the vari-
ous member states affects political attitudes towards the EU, thus hinting at the 
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important mediating role of the mass media in the formation of individual percep-
tions and assessments (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Maier and Rittberger 
2008; Conti and Memoli 2017). Finally, support for the European Union is also 
mediated by the strength of European and/or national identities (Fligstein 2008; 
Fligstein et al. 2012; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014). 
Overall, there is large consensus about the fact that European citizens perceive 
and assess the EU through the lens of their countries and their specific socio-eco-
nomic, political and cultural reality. Citizens’ support of the EU seems to depend, 
for instance, on how they evaluate the economic performance of their country 
(van Erkel and van der Meer 2016; Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010; Ritzen 
et al. 2016) and the political performance of their governments (e.g., Hobolt and 
de Vries 2016; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Desmet, van Spanje and de Vreese 2012). 
Trust in political institutions, to add a further example, is also strongly interrelated 
when comparing national and European levels, given that citizens tend to use 
national institutions as a yardstick to develop more or less confidence in European 
institutions (Muñoz et al. 2011; Armingeon and Ceka 2014). Finally, support for 
the EU also mirrors the extent by which citizens perceive the EU, the euro or the 
European market as a threat to their national economy or cultural identity (Kuhn 
and Stoeckel 2014; Braun and Tausendpfund 2014; Fligstein et al. 2012). 
In sum, there is strong agreement about the priority of the national over the 
European, and the prevalence of national proxies, benchmarks or cues (Anderson 
1998; Desmet et al. 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2005; de Vries 2018). In the forma-
tion of public opinions about the EU, the national level seems to be the first frame 
of reference, and political institutions are primarily conceived of as second-order 
institutions. This conclusion is echoed by research that deals with other areas of 
study. We find similar references to the importance of the “national” in studies 
examining the participation of the population in the European elections (Reiff and 
Schmitt 1980: Hix and Marsh 2007; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011; Boomgaarden, 
Johann and Kritzinger 2016) and the participation of the population in pro-
tests oriented towards European policy (Imig and Tarrow 2001; della Porta and 
Mattoni 2014). It is present in studies analysing the field of civic organisations 
and volunteer organisations (Ruzza and Bozzini 2008; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 
2013; Sanchez Salgado 2017), in research about public debates and mass media 
coverage of European issues (Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Statham and Trenz 2013; 
Caiani and Guerra 2017; Galpin and Trenz 2019; Adam et al. 2019) and scholarly 
writing on European feelings of belonging (Green 2000; Fligstein 2008; Risse 
2010; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011). 
These findings are puzzling if we consider the considerable impact of the EU 
on national politics. Social science research has provided ample evidence that the 
EU is a politically relevant community in legal, political and administrative terms, 
but findings suggest that the EU is not an active opinion former on its own that 
influences and moulds political attitudes down to the level of the citizen. From a 
legal point of view, it is known that the European treaties have become a constitu-
tive reference point for national legal systems, that the total number of legal texts 
(laws, regulations and directives, decrees, etc.) has created a dense regulatory 
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carpet in a variety of policy domains and that the case law of the European Courts 
influences legal reality in the member states (Burley and Mattli 1993; Münch 
2008; Augenstein 2012). From a political point of view, it is known that a large 
proportion of the legislative projects in national ministries and parliaments is 
based on European initiatives or decisions and that European negotiation and 
discussion forums also shape the decision-making process in the member states 
with regard to the ideas discussed during the identification and evaluation of the 
problems at hand and the proposed solutions (Kohler-Koch 2003; Featherstone 
and Radaelli 2003; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). From an administrative point of 
view, it is known that the EU invests a great deal of energy in the establishment 
of European administrative agencies, staff and networks, and supports administra-
tive cooperation by promoting corresponding measures (exchange of experience, 
training programmes, mutual administrative assistance, etc.) and the establish-
ment of cross-border procedures, databases and communication platforms to 
adapt and harmonise local administrative practice across countries (Siedentopf 
and Speer 2003; Hofmann 2008). Finally, it is known that interest groups and 
protest groups have become pan-European in most subject areas, joining associa-
tions, networks and platforms active in Brussels, forming lobbying alliances or 
organising transnational information and protest campaigns (Balme and Chabanet 
2008; Monforte 2014; della Porta 2015; Lahusen, Zschache and Kousis 2020). 
Against this backdrop, it is highly probable that the EU will have influenced the 
political opinions and practices of European citizens, but scholars disagree about 
the extent by which this will occur. There is some evidence of European influ-
ences on national politics. Citizens might have national agendas in mind when 
participating in European elections (Reiff and Schmitt 1980; Heath, McLean, 
Taylor and Curtice 1999; Boomgaarden et al. 2016), but European agendas and 
representational questions influence electoral choices in their own right, too 
(Clark and Rohrschneider 2009; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011). Additionally, the 
institutional and political context of the EU has had an impact on voter turn-
out and party choice within member states (van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh 
1996), and European politics seem to shape citizens’ voting decisions in national 
election campaigns, for instance by providing smaller, populist and Eurosceptic 
parties with contentious issues aimed at mobilising voters and coordinating elec-
toral campaigning cross-nationally (Krouwel and Abts 2007; Kriesi and Pappas 
2015; Hong 2015; Kneuer 2019). Also in regard to unconventional political par-
ticipation, studies witness the establishment of a European field of civil society 
organisations and citizens’ initiatives (della Porta and Caiani 2009; Kohler-Koch 
and Quittkat 2013). People might continue to be primarily active in their local and 
national environment (e.g., Imig and Tarrow 1999; Roose, Kanellopoulos and 
Sommer 2017) but the European field of organised civil society is enmeshing 
local activities into transnational waves of protest (Ruzza and Bozzini 2008; della 
Porta and Mattoni 2014; Lahusen, Kousis, Zschache and Loukakis 2018). Finally, 
while public discourses in the media might be segmented into different language 
areas, nation states and mass media systems (Gerhards 2001; Brüggemann and 
Schulz-Forberg 2009; Schulz-Forberg and Stråth 2010), this does not rule out 
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pan-European debates. EU institutions and policies provide repeated occasions 
for public discussions in the various countries, and this alters public debates by 
either increasing their contentiousness or leading to complementary or interlocked 
discourses (Pfetsch, Adam and Berkel 2006; Lahusen 2009; Statham and Trenz 
2013; Segesten and Bossetta 2019). 
If we look at these observations as a whole, the EU’s political relevance to the 
European population is probable, but not obvious. Research findings urge us to be 
cautious in not overemphasising the role of the EU. At the same time, however, 
studies encourage us not to overlook the potential influences of the European 
Union on citizens’ opinions and views. European integration might be responsible 
for converging public agendas, concerns and ideas, but it might also fed public 
contentions and political conflicts (Eder and Giessen 2001; de Wilde and Zürn 
2012; Heidenreich, Rice and Zimmermann 2015). 
Europe as a shared space of political
experiences: the research agenda 
The analyses and reflections of this book build on this extensive knowledge and 
aim to advance evidence in two areas. On the one hand, social inequalities are 
known to be important determinants of political opinions about the EU, which 
means that closer inspection is warranted. As elicited above, “social inequalities” 
need to be disaggregated into their different components, the vertical and hori-
zontal dimensions (social stratifications and spatial inequalities) and the objective 
and subjective dimensions (the socio-economic resources and individual percep-
tions and evaluations). Following a research agenda committed to a sociological 
framework of analysis, I aim to identify those inequalities and divisions within 
the European social space that impact on the political opinion citizens have about 
national and European politics. On the other hand, it is well known that politi-
cal attitudes within Europe diverge considerably depending on which perspec-
tive citizens view the European Union. In this regard, it is well known that the 
European population perceives and assesses the EU through their national lenses, 
and this means that pro-European and Eurosceptic opinions often mirror national 
susceptibilities (e.g., citizens’ satisfaction with economic and institutional perfor-
mance, trust or distrust). However, more care needs to be given to the inverse per-
spective, namely to the question of whether Europeans also perceive and assess 
national politics through a European lens, in particular through the way citizens 
perceive and assess Europe in terms of social inequalities. Following the socio-
logical research agenda proposed above, I am particularly interested in validat-
ing whether Europeans are aware of unequal living conditions across European 
member states and whether they perceive Europe as a clearly patterned space of 
social inequalities. Moreover, I will try to validate whether this European map 
fuels perceptions of potential deprivations that might impact on the way citizens 
perceive and judge political institutions and policies in their own country. 
These research aims and assumptions require systematic examination and vali-
dation. For this purpose, the book is organised into different chapters that deal 
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with distinct conceptual and empirical tasks. In the second chapter, I will present 
a theoretical framework of analysis that is indebted to a field-theoretical approach 
(Bourdieu 1985; 1996; Cohen 2011; Georgakakis and Rowell 2013; Fligstein 
and McAdam 2012). This approach seems well equipped to unravel the potential 
interrelations between social inequalities in Europe (the social space) and politi-
cal attitudes within the multilevel system of European governance (the political 
field). The advantage of a field-theoretical anchoring is that it makes it possible 
to conceptualise “Europe” as a field of power in which not only governments, 
parties or associations, but also its people, with their specific social and political 
positions, are involved. Understanding Europe as a political field thus means put-
ting the relativity and relationality of people’s social and political positions at the 
centre of the investigation. 
The guiding assumption of this book is that the political field is nested within 
the social space, which means that political cleavages should be embedded – and 
thus influenced by – social divisions. In positional terms, it is assumed that peo-
ple’s political attitudes are shaped by their social positions within the European 
social space, i.e., their political views should reflect where and how they live. 
In “relational” terms, it is expected that divergent political attitudes also mirror 
social relations of inequality. Field theory assumes that social inequalities entail 
“objective” relations of advantages and disadvantages when considering the une-
qual access to social resources (e.g., income, education, contacts). These “objec-
tive” relations translate into “subjectively” perceived relations of superiority and 
inferiority, given that people tend to perceive and evaluate social positions of 
the self and others in relation to each other. In the field-theoretic vein, it makes a 
big difference whether Europeans perceive and evaluate social inequalities only 
within a national frame of reference or whether they consider Europe as a shared 
social space with relations of superiority and inferiority. Citizens who consider 
themselves as less privileged, when compared to other Europeans, might be 
inclined to develop political opinions that are more critical of the social situation 
in their country and the political work of their governments. In the perception and 
evaluation of “local” politics, it should, therefore, make a big difference in how 
people perceive the social conditions in Europe and how they assess their own 
situation within these. 
The aim of this book is to provide empirical evidence about “public opin-
ion” that substantiates these assumptions. For this purpose, I will devote myself 
(Chapter 3) to an analysis of public debates with the mass media in a number 
of European countries in order to corroborate the assumption that publicised 
“public opinion” is transcending national borders and becoming part of a pan-
European sphere of communication, thus providing an extended frame of refer-
ence for the formation of “public opinions” by the citizenry. The analysis will be 
devoted to public discourses about the European financial and economic crisis in 
the mass media of nine countries (Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). The chapter builds on a well-
established field of research that has corroborated the ability of the EU to furnish 
(national) mass media and public debates with recurrent topics, events and mutual 
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interventions that affect the formation of public opinion (Eder 2004; 2014; Trenz 
2004; Pfetsch et al. 2006; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Boomgaarden et al. 
2013; Caiani and Guerra 2017). Even though these public debates are nationally 
segmented, we seem to witness common debates in which actors from differ-
ent countries refer to each other (in positive or critical terms), thus consolidating 
horizontal, cross-national references that position nation states within a common 
cognitive and evaluative framework, with considerable implications for the politi-
cal opinions and preferences that European citizens voice. This chapter relies on 
a dataset of public claims extracted through standardised media content analysis 
in the context of an EU-funded project (Livewhat1), as explained in more detail in 
Chapter 3 (see also Cinalli and Giugni 2016). 
Chapter 4 moves from public debates about the economic crisis and takes a 
closer look at the perceptions and opinions of European citizens. Its aim is to 
validate whether citizens have internalised an extended cognitive and evaluative 
frame of reference that transcends national borders and takes the situation in other 
European countries into consideration when forming political opinions and atti-
tudes, as mass-mediated “publicised” debates and opinions have done. In particu-
lar, I wish to corroborate whether citizens are used to assessing European living 
conditions, spotting social inequalities and identifying their own place within this 
cognitive map of Europe. The implications of these findings will be the central 
theme of Chapters 5 and 6. Here, I will determine the extent to which the percep-
tions of social inequalities have an effect on the way citizens view and assess 
politics at the national and European levels. Making use of survey data from nine 
countries (Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom), I will look at the way people perceived and assessed 
the social and political reality in their own country in the year 2015 (Chapter 5). 
In particular, I will deal with the citizens’ perceptions of the economic crisis, their 
satisfaction with their national governments, their likelihood of sharing popu-
list attitudes and their readiness to participate in political protest actions and test 
whether objective exposure to social inequalities and their subjective perceptions 
have an impact on crisis sensitivity, political dissatisfaction, populist orientations 
and protest participation. In particular, I am interested in validating the extent to 
which the perception of unequal living conditions in Europe increases dissatisfac-
tion and alienation. 
In Chapter 6, I will move on to the European Union as a target of political atti-
tudes, asking the same questions in regard to the readiness of Europeans to support 
the membership of their country in the EU. The effect of objective and subjec-
tive vulnerabilities on the readiness to support the EU membership will be central 
when analysing survey data from eight European countries (Denmark, Germany, 
1 The project has the title “Living With Hard Times: How Citizens React to Economic Crises and 
Their Social and Political Consequences” and was funded by the EU Commission in the seventh 
research framework programme (contract number: 613237). Sourced materials and reports of the 
survey data used here can be found on the project’s homepage: http://www.livewhat.unige.ch/ 
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France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) for the year 
2016, gathered by the EU-funded TransSOL-project.2 A major objective will be to 
ask whether the perception of divergent living standards in Europe has an impact 
on EU-related attitudes. As the survey data used by this chapter is restricted to eight 
countries, I will widen the focus of analysis (latter part of Chapter 6) to the EU 
of 28 member states, making use of Eurobarometer data for the same year. The 
objective is, on the one hand, to check whether findings from eight countries can 
be generalised to the full EU 28 and, on the other hand, to differentiate the analysis, 
taking into consideration that the socio-economic situation in countries diverges 
strongly between regions. A multilevel analysis will help to understand the impact 
of individual, regional and national factors on the formation of EU-related attitudes. 
In particular, it will help to better understand the relationship between spatial and 
stratificational inequalities and their additive effect on the respondents’ readiness to 
express Eurosceptic views. The analysis will show that support of the EU depends 
on social divides that are placed at the individual, regional and national levels alike. 
The social divisions between privileged and disadvantaged citizens and regions 
translate into a political conflict between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics, hinting 
at homologies or congruencies between social and political positions, between the 
social space and Europe’s political field. 
The empirical analyses of these two chapters make use of survey data from 
three sources. I rely on survey data collected by two EU-funded research pro-
jects that followed a very similar methodology and used a similar questionnaire, 
bar its diverging foci of attention. The first survey, from the Livewhat project, 
was conducted in nine countries (Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). It will be used for the analy-
sis in Chapter 5 because its focal point was on people’s attitudes about national 
politics. The second survey comes from a different project (TransSOL) but pro-
vides data for a similar sample of countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Poland, Switzerland, United Kingdom). Given that its questionnaire placed 
more attention on the EU, it will be used to answer the empirical questions posed 
in Chapter 6. Both questionnaires employed similar items to measure social 
structural traits and political orientations, and both included a battery of ques-
tions measuring perceptions of living conditions in other countries. In terms of 
methodology, each national sample contained about 2,000 respondents. Sampling 
used quotas to ensure that data is representative of adults in terms of age, gen-
der, education and social class, and thus matches Eurostat population statistics 
for these countries (see Livewhat 2016; TransSOL 2018). Data retrieval used the 
computer-assisted web-interviewing (CAWI) method. 
2 This project was devoted to the analysis of “European Paths to Transnational Solidarity at Times 
of Crisis: Conditions, Forms, Role-models and Policy Responses” (TransSOL) and was funded by 
the EU Commission in the Horizon2020 research and innovation programme (contract number: 
649435). Sourced materials and reports of the survey data used here can be found on the project 
homepage: https://transsol.eu/ 
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Chapter 6 additionally relies on data from a Eurobarometer survey from late 
2016 (ZA6697, Eurobarometer 86.1). The use of this data requires caution, given 
that the Eurobarometer has been justifiably criticised, from the outset, both for 
being instrumentalised by the EU and methodological flaws, among them the 
untransparent methodological documentation, low response rates and simple 
operationalisations (Katz 1985; Schmitt 2003; Nissen 2014; Höpner and Jurczyk 
2015). In spite of these limitations, it has been widely used, albeit with prudence, 
largely because it offers systematic data that other surveys do not provide. For my 
purposes, I rely on this dataset because other standard surveys (e.g., European 
Value Study or the World Values Survey, the European Social Survey, the 
European Elections Study or EU-Silc) do not fulfil the necessary criteria defined 
by the research objectives of this book; for instance, they fail to provide data for 
the years 2015–2017, comprise the full set of member states, ask pertinent ques-
tions about the support of EU membership and/or ensure better response rates for 
some countries. As will be discussed, Eurobarometer data paint a more positive 
picture about the support of EU membership when compared to other opinion 
polls (e.g., Pew Research Centre 2012; YouGov 2016) and the TransSOL data 
used as a main source of information. However, Eurobarometer data provide an 
important added value to my analysis, as it allows us to look at the EU 28 and 
disaggregate the findings by countries and regions. Its use is justified because the 
aim is not to paint an accurate picture of the exact level of public support of the 
EU membership but to engage in an additional explanatory analysis of correlates 
and predictors of EU-related attitudes that allow us to check the validity of the 
findings generated on the basis of the TransSOL data in regard to the full EU 28. 
As will be seen, the findings are quite robust. 
Chapter 7 will summarise and discuss the main findings presented in this book 
by highlighting a number of implications and conclusions. In particular, I will 
argue that the process of European integration makes people consider “society” 
and “politics” in European dimensions. It establishes a European frame of refer-
ence – the European Union or simply “Europe” – which provides a new hori-
zon for the perception and assessment of social reality and political conditions. 
This assumption does not entail more political agreement and consensus among 
European citizens. On the contrary, I propose that the political integration of 
Europe will have integrative and disintegrative effects on the European popu-
lation. In fact, the political integration of the EU has intensified public debates 
within and across nation states in regard to shared occasions, issues or demands, 
which will impact on political debates, public opinions, individual preferences 
and attitudes within each country. This political integration seems to unleash dis-
integrative forces because joint public debates do not necessarily translate into 
political agreement; more often than not, it triggers social dissent and conflict. 
In this regard, special attention needs to be given to the sociologists’ concern for 
social inequalities because societal cleavages within the EU – between citizens 
and regions – translate into political conflicts about established politics, both at EU 
and national levels. The European Union has institutionalised a European politi-
cal field that, as a political community, has become a reference point for people’s 
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political thinking. The EU has also fundamentally politicised the European social 
space by giving it a political contour and structure. The EU seems to “politicise” 
social cleavages along social class stratifications and regional disparities. In fact, 
the aim of the European integration process may well have been to develop com-
parable living conditions in Europe and also to defuse potential lines of conflict 
in order to assure both social cohesion and political consensus. But since the eco-
nomic and financial crisis that ensued after 2008, it is not only the inequalities of 
living conditions in Europe that have increased. The EU’s crisis of acceptance has 
also shifted the lines of conflict between supporters and opponents at the centre 
of public life throughout Europe, also affecting the support or criticism citizens 
address to their national governments. Under these circumstances, it is highly 
probable that the homologies between social divisions and political cleavages will 
continue to feed political contentions and conflicts at the national and European 
levels. 
2
2 Towards a political 
sociology of Europe 
Theoretical localisations 
The discussion about the European integration process with its political and 
social implications is not short of diagnoses, interpretations and explanations. It is 
largely undisputed that the integration process has shaped and changed the social 
and political situation in all member states. However, opinions differ on the ques-
tion of how noticeable these changes are and what forces are behind them. Put 
simply, the debate revolves around the question of whether European integra -
tion is forming a European society or whether it is merely changing coexisting 
national societies. On the one side, there are those who expect a higher degree of 
European integration and a structural change in societal reality. According to this 
perspective, the development is heading towards a European society (Outhwaite 
2008; Beck and Grande 2007), even if its structure cannot be compared with its 
national predecessors (Delanty 1998; Trenz 2008). The constitutive conditions of 
such a European society are clearly thought of politically because the European 
integration process is a political unification project that establishes pan-European 
fields of power that have an effect on social reality and influence the choices of 
citizens (Fligstein 2008; Vobruba 2012; Eder 2014). On the other side, there are 
those who affirm the continuing relevance of the national element, the continuity 
of nationally segmented societies and the need to analyse them in comparative 
terms (Therborn 1995; Crouch 1999). Even if they identify significant changes 
and assume an increasing Europeanisation and transnationalisation of European 
societies, the social structures and contours remain strongly shaped by a national 
framework. Here, too, the relevance of a nationally segmented social space is 
thought of politically, as it is the nation state that asserts itself against the political 
union of Europe and thus leaves societal living conditions, solidarities and identi-
ties within the national framework of social order (Fossum and Schlesinger 2007; 
Crouch 2016: 1–28). 
This fundamental debate is of decisive relevance for the objective of this book 
because it wants to establish whether Europe has also taken root in people’s minds 
as a reference for their perceptions and opinions. The fact that citizens compre-
hend social reality and political matters in national categories is beyond doubt, 
but citizens are also inclined to grasp Europe as a social and political reality and 
thus as a social space with diverse living conditions and as an institutionalised 
field of contentious politics. This implies that European citizens will be able to 
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form and voice opinions about national and European politics at the same time. 

Additionally, it is to be expected that these opinions will reflect not only national 
concerns and orientations but also European viewpoints and evaluations that help 
to identify, for instance, where the public’s own country stands within the social 
reality and political fabric of the EU. The political dissent between pro-Europeans 
and Eurosceptics might thus reflect not only objective social cleavages within 
Europe but also the way citizens perceive and assess living conditions within this 
European social space. 
These research objectives require conceptual and theoretical clarifications. In 
analytic terms, it is necessary to disentangle the conceptual and theoretical debate 
introduced before in order to ascertain whether social reality in its objective and 
subjective dimensions is transcending national borders and is merging into a fairly 
integrated European social space. The available diagnoses and interpretations are 
based on different notions of the nature of Europe’s societal reality, which is why 
it is not always clear where there is a contradiction and where there is consensus. 
Antipodes and correlates: the European and the national sphere 
The social science debate can be differentiated along two dimensions or axes. On 
the one hand, opinions differ as soon as the relevance of the European integration 
process is assessed. As already described, there is as much convincing evidence 
and explanation for the path-breaking force of the European integration process as 
for the continued effectiveness of the nation state. However, the dissent sparked by 
this question is not the only relevant difference of opinion. On the other hand, the 
debate is also structured along disciplinary perspectives and priorities. European 
research in political science and sociology has always led independent research 
debates. While one debate was more interested in the political-institutional aspects 
of the European integration project, the other focused its attention on the social 
and cultural dimensions of the integration process. Both research perspectives are 
important for the present study because an analysis of people’s political thinking 
and actions must take into account the institutional opportunities and constraints 
of the political structure as well as the social structures of societal reality. If these 
two axes are followed, European social science research can be divided into four 
sub-debates, which will be presented in the following. 
Firstly, European studies research has been interested in the impressive pro-
gress of the European integration process. While it is true that the long history 
of this integration project was and remains marked by stagnation and ruptures, 
many authors were however of the opinion that the establishment of the EC 
and EU went hand in hand with such far-reaching changes in political and 
societal reality in Europe that suitable explanations had to be found for pre-
cisely this extraordinary change (Favell and Guiraudon 2009; Outhwaite 2008). 
Institutions play a very important role in these explanations. According to this 
interpretation, the European integration process was so momentous because it 
established new supranational and intergovernmental institutions (Schmitter 
1969; 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2008). Institutions lay down norms, rules and 
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missions, with which they also have a transformative character because they 
introduce new incentives and constraints, expose actors to new orders of inter-
action and negotiation, channel common socialisation processes and promote 
discourse and learning processes (Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener 2001). 
Once this process of institutionalisation is underway, it develops a momentum 
of its own because the establishment of the EU not only creates new actors 
(the EU institutions, European associations, the political groups in the European 
Parliament, etc.) but also forces national and sub-national actors (governments, 
private companies, interest groups, political parties, etc.) to reposition their 
problem perceptions and interpretations, interests and strategies of action within 
a European framework (Eder 2004; Trenz and Eder 2004), thus generating new 
conflict lines (Fligstein 2008; Vobruba 2014). Even in areas where the EU does 
not have its own legislative powers with “hard” rights of intervention, the expan-
sion logic is not invalidated, as research on Europe has indicated that the EU 
has developed “soft” management and coordination instruments to achieve uni-
fication and harmonisation goals also in these fields (Hodson and Maher 2001; 
Mosher and Trubek 2003; Jessoula 2015). In this context, it was noted that the 
EU is very successful in the diffusion and creeping convergence of political 
problem diagnoses, proposed solutions and regulatory ideas (Featherstone and 
Radaelli 2003). 
Secondly, research has provided ample evidence on considerable transforma-
tions of European societies, which have been noted, for example, in regard to demo-
graphic structures (birth rates, ageing), labour markets (tertiarisation, knowledge 
base and digitisation), education systems (expansion of education, participation 
of women) or social values (de-traditionalisation, individualisation and pluralisa-
tion). These changes are understood not only as separate developments but as ele-
ments of a common process of modernisation (Eisenstadt 1964; Therborn 1995; 
Münch 1996; Beck 2000; Beck and Grande 2007) that is partly enforced by the 
European integration process (Favell and Guiraudon 2011) due to the modernisa-
tion script promoted by the EU in many areas (for example, work, education and 
private life). However, these transformations are driven by endogenous forces 
that tend to overcome national divisions. As modernity prevails, societal real-
ity increasingly detaches itself – in particular through its functional systems – 
from the national “container” in order to become increasingly Europeanised and 
globalised (Luhmann 1977; Münch 2008). Modernisation is described as a two-
fold process: it releases people from traditional models of social order, and it 
implements new forms of social differentiation (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994; 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). Individual life chances and lifestyles become 
individualised out of necessity since individuals must find and consolidate their 
societal position in a more competitive (European and global) social space, which 
is less cushioned by social rights and redistribution measures fixed by the nation 
state (Münch 2012; van Gerven and Ossewaarde 2012). In this respect, societal 
living conditions can be expected to converge and drift apart at the same time; life 
opportunities and lifestyles are likely to converge across Europe, but at the same 
time inequalities between people are expected to increase. Political opinions and 
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orientations would become clearly individualised or might follow cross-border 
milieus with similar living conditions and preferences. 
These diagnoses and explanations have not gone unchallenged (Pollack 2001). 
According to a third strand of research, nation states have in no way lost rel-
evance, meaning that the process of European integration continues to be medi-
ated and ruptured by them (Moravcsik 1998). On the one hand, steps towards 
European integration always require approval and therefore remain open-ended. 
On the other hand, transformations unleashed by the European integration process 
are always mediated or filtered by the nation states. Political and social changes 
at the local level are path-dependent, which is why European directives or recom-
mendations are “processed” at the national level along historically grown struc-
tures, customs and priorities, i.e., either slowed down, diluted or adapted (Pierson 
2000). Processes of “vertical Europeanisation”, based on a mutual transfer of 
political ideas or measures between the national and European levels, can there-
fore succeed only if the institutional, legal or political conditions at both levels are 
compatible (Börzel 1999; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). According to this interpre-
tation, a de facto convergence of political conditions is to be questioned; rather, 
the focus is on “differential” forms of integration and convergence (Héritier et al. 
2001; Leruth and Lord 2016). This research direction thus highlights the continu-
ity of political differences between the member states. It is no coincidence that 
this approach is committed to country comparison as a methodological perspec-
tive because, in this manner, it is necessary to show that political systems make 
a difference. It is also argued with regard to the political attitudes and behaviour 
of the population that the nation state continues to be the primary “container” of 
political life insofar as it offers the central opportunities, procedures, resources 
and identifications of political participation, which is why the political attitudes of 
the citizens are ultimately always shaped and communicated with a national bias 
(Hobolt and de Vries 2016). 
Such a position is also adopted within the sociological debate, our final strand 
of research relevant to this study. Sociology, since its beginnings, has considered 
societal reality from a national perspective, which is why societies are equated 
with countries. This position has been criticised as “methodological national-
ism” (Beck 2003; Beck and Grande 2007), but the self-image of this sociological 
analysis has not necessarily suffered. A study of national societies continues to 
be advocated as a legitimate and empirically validated option. Research interests 
in the welfare state also contribute to this, as the latter is ascribed an important 
role in the constitution of societal orders in many areas of society (Esping-
Anderson 1990; Castles and Mitchell 1992). Societal transformations relating to 
the European integration process are not ignored but qualified with reference to 
the inertia of grown structures of everyday life. This position essentially uses the 
conceptual distinction between systemic and social integration (Lockwood 1964; 
Archer 1996). In this reading, the European integration process can be presented 
as a two-track development that changes much and little at the same time. On the 
one hand, the European integration project establishes systemic functional spheres 
in the form of state bodies and economic markets that essentially act through law, 
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power and money (Münch 2008; Streeck 2012; 2017). The spatial expansion of 
these functional systems changes people’s everyday social reality only periph-
erally, as it remains tied to local lifeworlds and national communities (Berezin 
and Díez-Medrano 2008; Fligstein et al. 2012). Europeanised “systems” and local 
living environments not only stand side by side as “parallel worlds”. Rather, it is 
assumed that the systemic integration project establishes a “Europe” that is man-
aged without “society” (Sissenich 2007; Bach 2006). According to this diagnosis, 
the dual logic of European integration must necessarily lead to an alienation of 
people from the European project. Such alienation is likely to increase particu-
larly in times of economic and political crises because the European economic 
and financial crisis of the years after 2008 and the political crisis of European 
asylum and immigration policy since 2015 have grown into a far-reaching crisis 
of acceptance for the EU. It seems to combine both a critique of Europe’s “sys-
temic” integration project and a return to national societies and ideologies (Braun 
and Tausendpfund 2014; Polyakova and Fligstein 2016). 
The research debates discussed here provide a number of assumptions that 
help us to better understand the forces impinging on people’s perceptions and 
attitudes. Paying heed to those who stress the deep transformations induced by 
European integration, it is to be expected that political attitudes and preferences 
are “disembedded” from the national container. While local and national politics 
might continue to be decisive for the people, the fact that Europe is providing an 
additional point of reference for political attitudes cannot be ignored. This inter-
pretation implies, in the first instance, an “additive expansion” of the political 
horizon. According to this assumption, people no longer see themselves merely 
as members of a local and national community, but as part of a pan-European 
political association. In a more far-reaching way, this process might contribute to 
“disembedding” public opinion from the national “container”. One would assume 
that the European population either develops highly individualised attitudes or 
produces cross-border opinion profiles along with common characteristics (gen-
eration, social strata or milieus). 
The sceptical voices would contradict the previous assumptions since they pos-
tulate the undiminished importance of national frames of reference for people’s 
political thinking. These approaches would concede that the establishment of the 
EU has introduced a new arena of political decision-making and participation 
that has expanded people’s thinking and actions towards the European arena of 
policy-making. However, since the nation state is still the central arena for politi-
cal decision-making and identification, the likelihood of the EU being regarded 
as second tier cannot be excluded. According to this view, citizens essentially 
remain embedded within a societal reality shaped by the nation state. It may 
well be that the European integration process is changing the living conditions 
of people in Europe in view of liberalised markets, common legal systems and 
bureaucratic regulatory structures. However, people’s circumstances still differ 
considerably between the EU member states. In addition, people’s everyday lives 
are still clearly marked by local group ties and national affiliations. These ties 
and affiliations are likely to be much more decisive for the formation of political 
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opinions and political attitudes than the integration of markets, legal and admin-
istrative systems. When analysing political attitudes towards the EU, it should, 
therefore, be expected that approval and rejection rates will vary primarily among 
member states. 
The discussion of opposing assumptions should not stop at this point because 
the contraposition of the two perspectives outlined before overstretches the dis-
sent within scholarly debates. In fact, research on public opinion has been inter-
ested in analysing the European and national levels in a more integrated way 
because the social and political reality formed in the process of European integra-
tion and institutionally constituted by the European Union has both national and 
European components. People are not only part of a national and European polity 
through citizenship and residence; their perceptions and assessments of the politi-
cal communities are likely to be intertwined. It can be assumed that people always 
perceive and evaluate the EU from the local and national perspectives of their 
environment, but at the same time, it is likely that they also observe and assess the 
political situation in their country from a pan-European perspective. This has to 
do with the fact that the European Union is an institutionalised multilevel system 
consisting of local, national and European arenas for political decision-making. 
Politics is pursued at the local, regional, national, European or global level, which 
is why there are also multiple arenas for political decision-making and participa-
tion (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996; Scharpf 1997; Bache and Flinders 2004) 
and thus also various frames of reference for shaping political attitudes (Hobolt 
and Tilley 2014). As already demonstrated, there is less agreement on which of 
these multiple arenas and frames of reference is the most relevant. For some, 
politics is shaped to a growing degree by the EU; for others, it is still subordinate 
to the national level. 
The relational approach has been applied extensively to the study of political 
attitudes because there is ample evidence that the political thinking of European 
citizens is patterned by national and European references and orientations alike. 
Particularly telling are findings from research devoted to the public support 
for the EU and the growing importance of Euroscepticism (e.g., Hooghe and 
Marks 2007; Krouwel and Abts 2007; McLaren 2007; Boomgaarden et al. 2011; 
Braun and Tausendpfund 2014; de Vries 2018). Political opinions and attitudes 
towards the EU not only deviate between the different member states (Lubbers 
and Scheepers 2005; 2010). Citizens also tend to perceive and assess the EU, its 
institutions and policies from the national perspective. The support is thus deter-
mined by the perceived performance of the national economy and the satisfaction 
with national politics (Kitzinger 2003; Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010; Hobolt 
and de Vries 2016), the established political party system, the prevailing political 
ideologies and the attachment to national identities (Anderson 1998; Hooghe and 
Marks 2005; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Ares et al. 2017). It could be shown that 
the primacy of the “national” element is much stronger in times of crisis, as dis-
satisfaction with the EU increases and at the same time leads to a renationalisation 
of people’s political orientations (Fligstein et al. 2012; Polyakova and Fligstein 
2016; Ritzen et al. 2016). 
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Much less attention was granted to the “inverse” interaction between the 
European and national frame of reference, given that the main objective was to 
explain diverging rates of public support for the EU. However, there is evidence 
suggesting that citizens also have formed an opinion about the EU and that these 
views have an influence on how they perceive and assess political and social con-
ditions in their own country or their own surroundings. Studies show, for instance, 
that well-informed people have their own opinions about Europe and develop 
EU-specific confidence or mistrust (Karp, Banducci and Bowler 2003; Clark and 
Rohrschneider 2009; Armingeon and Ceka 2014). In terms of electoral behaviour 
at the national level, it has been shown that the political context of the EU affects 
voter turnout and party choice within member states (van der Eijk et al. 1996). 
Moreover, there is ample evidence about the indirect effect of European politics 
on citizens’ voting behaviour. The electoral success of populist and Eurosceptic 
parties shows that the EU is contributing to altering the citizens’ party preferences 
and affiliation within their own countries (Krouwel and Abts 2007; Kriesi and 
Pappas 2015; Hong 2015; Kneuer 2019). 
In regard to the analysis of collective identities, a relational element is present 
as well, given that most studies refer to the multiple identities most European 
citizens share (Green 2000; Risse, Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Fuchs and 
Klingemann 2011). While most studies highlight that European identifications 
are a secondary source of collective identities, when compared to the nation state 
or the region, there are also indications that the European integration process 
is having an impact on national identities (Eder and Giesen 2001; Risse 2001). 
The majority of Europeans feel attached to their own country and Europe, which 
means that many share multiple identities that will infuse national identities with 
a sense of “Europeanness”. However, the European integration process will not 
only promote shared feelings of belonging to Europe, but also the inverse effect 
is very likely. In fact, even in the event of a renaissance of national sentiments, 
it must be assumed that the European integration process is involved (Polyakova 
and Fligstein 2016) since the European Union institutionalised the idea of “unity 
in diversity” and thus of cultural (national or regional) differences (D’haen and 
Goerlandt 2009; Karaca 2010). The reawakening of nationalism and anti-Euro-
pean parties and groups is thus also a reflection of the contentious politics of iden-
tity within the EU and the growing cultural cleavages it mobilises (Fligstein et al. 
2012; Kriesi 2016b; Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). The production or reproduction 
of a national collective seems, therefore, to be a necessary consequence of the 
efforts of the member states to position and assert themselves as an independent 
economic, political or cultural force in the pan-European fabric of the EU. The 
Europeanisation and the renationalisation of European policy might thus be cor-
relates of the same development. 
Less evidence is available on the relation between European living conditions, 
the perception of inequalities and deprivations and political attitudes. There are 
indications that confidence or mistrust in the EU influences how satisfied people 
are with their lives (Hudson 2006). Moreover, the comparison of living condi-
tions between countries also influences life satisfaction, i.e., feelings of relative 
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deprivation are associated with lower levels of satisfaction (Delhey, Böhnke, 
Habich and Zapf 2002; Delhey and Dragolov 2014; Lahusen and Kiess 2019). It 
is also suspected that social inequalities are now perceived and assessed within 
a pan-European framework, with potential effects on the satisfaction with one’s 
own situation (Heidenreich 2016c). This could have political consequences 
because the residents of the member states may experience the unequal living 
conditions in Europe as unfair. Furthermore, the European economic and financial 
crisis has led to an increase in the proportion of people who are dissatisfied with 
politics as a whole. This may be evidence that the European acceptance crisis is 
also having an impact on national politics. 
The political Europe: field-theoretical adjustments 
Previous research teaches that political attitudes involve national and European 
references and orientations at the same time. Citizens perceive and evaluate the 
EU from the angle of their political and social reality, meaning that their political 
attitudes are localised. At the same time, however, we should expect that European 
integration has had an impact on the living conditions of European citizens and 
the way they look at them. Additionally, it is to be expected that they should have 
developed a sense of what Europe (as a social space) and the EU (as a political 
field) is about. In particular, citizens should be able to assess comparatively the 
living conditions in Europe, and they should be inclined to localise and concep-
tualise themselves and their country as part of this cognitive map. Their ability to 
situate themselves within this larger map thus involves relational considerations 
that might impact on their perceptions and evaluations of national and European 
politics. 
The sociological research agenda followed in this book is interested in vali-
dating both assumptions. On the one hand, it wishes to corroborate whether 
European citizens have altered the perceptions of social inequalities by expanding 
the implicit frame of reference from the national to the European. On the other 
hand, it strives to ascertain whether social cleavages translate into political divi-
sions or conflicts and whether the Europeanised perception of social inequalities 
is thus translating into political divisions that transcend national borders. In par-
ticular, it aims to unveil whether social divisions between vulnerable and privi-
leged strata of the population are cutting across countries and are thus nurturing 
political antagonisms cross-nationally in scope, e.g., in terms of political divi-
sions between pro-European and Eurosceptic citizens and between proponents 
and opponents of the political establishment at the national level. 
These assumptions build on field theory, as was developed in continuation 
of Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory (1990 and 1998) and his analysis of power 
(Bourdieu 1987; 1996). Its advantage resides in the conceptual differentiation 
between spaces and fields. This distinction allows us to conceptualise the relation 
between social living conditions (social space) and political attitudes (political 
field) by ascertaining a relation of congruity or homology, for instance, between 
structures of social inequality (social space) and structures of political conflicts 
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(political fields). This theoretical approach needs to be described and developed in 
more detail, particularly in regard to the concepts of social space and social field, 
in order to delineate more clearly the assumptions driving the empirical analyses. 
The concept of “space” has been introduced to demarcate people’s situated-
ness in society. In the first instance, people’s places are defined in terms of their 
resources, activities, contacts or cognitions, and these positions will diverge, given 
that individuals have different types and amounts of resources, engage in different 
activities, maintain diverging contacts and voice diverse beliefs. According to this 
conceptualisation, societal reality is a “space” of diverging positions marked by 
inequalities of resources, activities, contacts and beliefs. The concept of “space” 
highlights that these positions are related to one another when considering the 
distribution of scarce resources, social relations and perceptions. The internal 
structure has to do with the fact that “spaces” are, to some extent, bounded. In this 
regard, institutions play a decisive role, given that they intervene by providing 
resources, directing activities, moulding contacts and shaping beliefs. We might, 
for instance, consider the role of the nation state in providing civic, political and 
social rights to their citizens, affecting their resources, activities, contacts and 
beliefs and setting them apart from other “nationals”. However, national borders 
do not terminate social spaces, given that people can exchange resources, engage 
in activities and maintain contacts across borders, thus expanding the social space 
beyond the institutional borders of the nation state. Opportunities for engaging 
in cross-border relations should have increased during the course of European 
integration because the EC/EU has been actively committed to disembedding the 
social space from its national borders. However, the EU is also impacting on the 
spatial contours of the social space, given that it assigns rights to its citizens while 
dissociating them from third country members. In this sense, it seems appropri-
ate to speak about a “European social space” comprising myriad social positions 
taken by its “members”. 
The notion of a “European social space” assumes that the resources, activities, 
contacts and beliefs of people have gained a European scope. And it presupposes 
that the people are situated – and situate themselves – within this wider social 
space, with considerable consequences for their living conditions. In fact, the 
wider space should alter (e.g., limit or expand) the type and range of resources, 
activities, contacts or beliefs people have. Citizens living in a transnationally-
knit space should thus be exposed to different structures of inequality, and these 
structures should be formative for the living conditions of people, the experiences 
they have and the opinions they form. In this regard, three factors or mechanisms 
have to be highlighted as they are constitutive for the formation of social spaces: 
interdependencies, interactions and shared perceptions. 
Firstly, social spaces are formed on the basis of objective interdependencies 
between positions. The internal market is regarded as a prime example here, as 
economies and economic actors compete with each other, which is why growth 
and unemployment rates, income and consumption levels in the various countries 
depend on each other. Profits on one side easily turn into losses on the other. These 
(macrosocial) interdependencies have a direct impact on the reality of people’s 
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lives, for instance, in terms of income or educational inequalities (Beckfield 2006; 
Streeck 2012; Petmesidou and Guillén 2015; Gerhards, Hans and Carlson 2017). 
They change people’s opportunity structures, scopes of action and the way peo-
ple perceive and evaluate their situation (Heidenreich 2016b). A Europe of open 
borders and integrated markets, for example, means that people might see their 
own opportunities on the labour market in relation to the opportunities of others 
who now also directly or indirectly belong to or have access to this labour market. 
This will have an impact on people’s actions and attitudes, for example, on the 
educational decisions of families, the mobility of workers or political demands for 
the protection of national labour markets. 
Secondly, Europe is a shared social space because of the scope and structure 
of interactions when looking at cross-border relationships and practices (Favell 
2008; Kuhn 2011; Delhey, Deutschmann, Graf and Richter 2014). The contours 
of this space cannot be delimited precisely because space is constituted on the 
basis of people’s social relations and social networks, meaning that the breadth 
and structure of social spaces are determined by the patterns and scopes of real 
interactions. The social interactions are more often than not supra-local and are 
also very often cross-border. People not only have contacts with “locals” but also 
with people from other regions or countries (Mau 2009). Additionally, it has been 
shown that people build spatially extended spaces also on the basis of their eve-
ryday practices. People are mobile or migrate; they consume products from dif-
ferent countries of origin or are networked through the media (Delhey et al. 2014; 
Deutschman and Delhey 2015). The data show that people travel within Europe, 
have family members in other European countries or buy products from these 
countries. These practices are not always accompanied by cross-border attitudes 
and identities, but the frame of reference for many of these people is extended 
transnationally (Kuhn 2011). The geographical structure of these practices and 
attitudes thus paints the picture of a “horizontally” open European social space 
(Beck and Grande 2007). It should be added, however, that the geographical 
boundaries of these “lived-in” social spaces are variable. They are smaller than the 
EU because contacts and practices are limited to certain member states or groups 
of countries; they are larger than the EU because they also include non-European 
countries and continents. In this respect, authors prefer to speak of transnation-
alisation processes, which are not necessarily processes of Europeanisation (Mau 
2009; Gerhards and Hans 2013; Deutschmann and Delhey 2015). 
Thirdly, social spaces are constituted not only on the basis of interdependen-
cies and interactions but also through subjective perceptions, ideas and beliefs. 
The European social space may already be “real” due to objective interdepend-
encies, cross-border networks and practices. But the European social space only 
becomes directly relevant once people recognise it as a meaningful frame of refer-
ence and thus as an implicit or explicit point of reference for their thoughts and 
actions, regardless of whether they have a good or bad impression of “Europe” 
or whether they regard the EU as a useful or reprehensible institution. In addi-
tion to an “objective construction” of Europe, a “subjective construction” of the 
European social space is essential to justify it as a socially relevant reality. This 
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proposition is subscribed by previous studies that centred on the perceptions, 
attitudes and identifications of European citizens. Political sciences, for instance, 
have collected data to determine whether people take note of the EU, European 
policy and Europe at all, have the necessary knowledge, show interest in these 
topics and share them in their environment (Faas 2007; Hobolt and Tilley 2014). 
The findings show that the EU has stepped out of the slipstream of the nation state. 
People form their own opinions about the EU and develop their own type of trust 
and distrust, which do not have to be congruent with attitudes towards the country 
(Karp et al. 2003; Armingeon and Ceka 2014). And these attitudes also seem to 
have consequences for people’s satisfaction with their lives and politics (Hudson 
2006). Additionally, Europeans have developed a shared sense of European sol-
idarity that involves common norms of mutual responsibility, cooperation and 
wealth distribution (Gerhards, Lengfeld, Ignácz, Kley and Priem 2019; Lahusen 
2020). Finally, the subjective relevance of Europe is apparent when focusing on 
identities and identifications. Europeans have developed a sense of belonging and 
associate this group membership with expectations about their own behaviour 
(Green 2000; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011). While national and local identi-
ties are more widely diffused, it is well-known that Europeans share a sense of 
multiple identities (Risse et al. 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2005). These collective 
identities do not require “identical” identifications because Europeans will have 
a different vision and understanding of what “Europe” and “European identity” 
means. However, subscribing to a European identity should also impact on the 
meaning of national identities, once individuals define them as part of a shared 
European identity. 
In sum, there are strong arguments justifying the idea of a “European social 
space”, even though it is necessary to highlight that this space is not simply given 
but constructed and reshaped constantly. This is not only the case because inter-
dependencies and interactions change constantly and will most probably not be 
identical to what we conceive of being “European”. Ultimately, Europe is an 
“imagined community”, and even if it shares this fate with all other collective 
identities, such as the national one (Anderson 1991), it is a particularly diffuse 
and complex “imagined community”. The “European social space” is not a given 
objective social reality but a contested construct. These lessons are drawn from the 
theoretical arguments developed by spatial and boundary-sociological research in 
regard to the European experience (Berezin and Schain 2003; Rumford 2006). 
Here too, it is argued that the EU has created arenas of communication and con-
flict in which “Europe” is symbolically constructed through narratives, myths, 
images and identities. This symbolically constructed “Europe” becomes socially 
relevant only because it is institutionalised within the architecture of the EU (e.g., 
the European treaties, institutions and policy domains) and reasserted by the dom-
inant discourse of European politics (Eder and Giesen 2001; Eder 2004; 2014; 
Vobruba 2012; Trenz 2016). 
The “reality” of the European social space is thus the product of endogenous 
and exogenous forces. In regard to internal processes, Europe is a social space 
only in relative terms. It is a densely populated area that gradually stands out from 
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the wider “environment” through a substantially higher number of trade flows and 
economic dependencies, personal contacts and spatial practices, communication 
flows and identifications. The contours of the European social space are thus the 
product of internal compression, but also of external closure (Münch 1996; 2006). 
And in this sense, social fields play a particularly important role. 
Conceptually, it is thus necessary to take up the conceptual dyad of spaces 
and fields introduced before. A social field is a societal sphere of action formal -
ised and institutionalised along specific missions, rules and discourses (Bourdieu 
1987; 1990; Cohen 2011). In regard to the constitution of a European social field, 
this conceptualisation would thus highlight that the building of the EC/EU has 
involved the formation of joint institutions that created a “joint situation” for a 
defined “membership” by introducing binding problem definitions and purposes, 
rules and principles. European integration is a process of institutionalisation, 
which is in itself highly differentiated into different spheres (markets, legal or 
political systems, science, etc.). If one, therefore, wants to comprehend Europe as 
a social space, one cannot avoid the concept of social fields, because the contours 
and the structure of the European social space are shaped primarily by the insti-
tutionalisation of (diverse) social fields. Sociological theories of societal differ-
entiation (Parsons 1964; Eisenstadt 1964; Luhmann 1977; Münch 2012; Lepsius 
2017) sensitise us to the fact that the European integration project has created 
a social space that not only generates internally different, sector-specific “con-
centrations” of economic, political, cultural, educational or scientific activities 
involved, but also establishes a variable geometry with different expansions and 
boundaries (Beck and Grande 2007; Outhwaite 2008: 95; Heidenreich 2019). The 
“situation” (economic, political, cultural, educational, etc.) in which people live is 
not the same for everyone. Rather, it depends on where they reside, work or live. 
Indeed, EU citizens live in the same and different social reality because they are 
exposed to shared issues and problems, opportunities and constraints. But their 
living conditions are not identical because their countries are not all members of 
all social fields (e.g., the euro, Schengen, the European Economic Community, 
higher education area) and are not situated necessarily in a homologous position 
across them. 
Field theory has proven beneficial for sociological research on Europe 
(Georgakakis and Weisbein 2010; Cohen 2011; Kauppi and Madsen 2013), and 
it is also of great advantage for the present study with its much more specific 
objective, for two reasons. On the one hand, this book is intended to examine peo-
ple’s political attitudes towards politics in Europe. According to the sociological 
agenda, it is interested in unravelling the relationship between the population’s 
living conditions (the social space) and institutionalised politics (the social field). 
Here, a specifically sociological explanation strategy resonates because it follows 
the sociological suspicion that political attitudes are pre-formed by society and 
must, therefore, be explained with reference to precisely this social space and the 
location of the individual within. By establishing a field of institutionalised poli-
tics, the EU has not only incorporated different societies into a new political order, 
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but it has also given an integrated social space a political contour and structure, 
meaning that social divisions will most probably be translated into political divi-
sions. The sociological approach proposed here thus assumes that people’s politi-
cal attitudes towards the EU and national governments can only be understood 
under consideration of the positions these people occupy in a pan-European social 
space with its respective differentiations and divisional structures. As citizens, 
they are socially located in the political field, and this should influence the experi-
ences and perspectives from which they perceive and assess political conditions 
and events in their immediate environment and Europe. 
On the other hand, field theory is also crucial in order to sufficiently sensitise 
the sociological analysis of politics to the dynamics of the European integration 
process, as previous theoretical premises can easily be misunderstood as static 
definitions. The establishment of the EU does not necessarily impose a binding 
“situation” that structures and determines the actions of its “members” (govern-
ments, parties, interest groups but also the individual citizens). This determinis-
tic formulation contradicts the basic field-theoretical premise because according 
to Bourdieu’s theory, these fields are arenas of social negotiations and disputes 
(Bourdieu 1996; 1998). In fact, the EU cannot determine or remotely control the 
thinking and actions of its “members”. What the establishment of the EU has done 
is to institutionalise fields in which the actors vie to shape societal and political 
conditions (Cohen 2011; Georgakakis and Rowell 2013). 
Fields are sector-specific arenas in which the production and distribution of 
scarce goods (e.g., money, profits, prosperity, power, binding decisions, political 
order) are at stake and in which actors fight over the production and distribution 
of scarce goods (Bourdieu 1987; 1996). There is no doubt that the establishment 
of the EU has institutionalised such a field, particularly in the area of politics, and 
that this field has also changed the political reality for the actors. At least it can 
be said that social science research shows little difference of opinion with regard 
to these two general observations. Disagreement arises more on the question of 
whether the EU is transferring political powers from the national to the European 
arena, or whether the nation state ultimately remains the linchpin of European pol-
itics. The field-theoretical approach suggests overcoming the assumed opposition 
of European and national politics and understanding them as part of a shared field. 
According to this approach, the EU can be understood as a communitised field of 
national fields. This interpretation is close to the concept of the EU as a “multi -
level system” (Marks et al., 1996; Bache and Flinders 2004). The field-theoretical 
approach goes beyond the concept of the multilevel system because it argues 
that political deliberations, negotiations and conflicts become part of a common 
European field. The EU not only “vertically” adds a new political entity that 
transfers powers to the supranational level and enmeshes nation states into pan-
European politics. Sociological field theory argues that the EU has established a 
political field that incorporates European and national actors indirectly or directly 
into common deliberations, negotiations and conflicts and thus opens national 
arenas “horizontally” (Georgakakis and Weisbein 2010; Cohen 2011; Kauppi and 
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Madsen 2013). National actors carefully monitor legislative processes within the 
EU institutions because they will be affected by these decisions directly. And this 
means that they vie with each other over the outcome of European legislative 
procedures because the preferences and positions of other national governments 
will have an impact on the joint decisions taken jointly. The European political 
field, therefore, intertwines political disputes across national borders and arenas. 
This implies that the European political field will have an influence on the politi-
cal positions of nation state actors, for instance, when the latter start to define their 
“national” interests in view of EU-specific policy debates and decisions and with 
reference to the interests of other actors from other member states. 
Political science research offers vivid accounts of this system of interlocked 
competences and provides rich material for the interdependent processes of 
political decision-making and implementation (Scharpf 1997; Kohler-Koch 
2005). Many scholars have provided ample evidence that speaks to the fact that 
European issues and disputes have had a strong impact on the public opinion 
and the electoral behaviour in European member states (de Vries and Edwards 
2009; Hutter and Grande 2014; Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; Sommer, Roose, 
Scholl and Papanikopoulos 2016). The same is true for research about public dis-
courses within the mass media, which have provided insights that are particularly 
important when analysing “public opinion”. These studies have been interested in 
identifying the extent to which the public spheres at the national level have been 
“Europeanised” in regard to actors, issues and events linked to the EU (Gerhards 
2001; Trenz 2004; Machill, Beiler and Fischer 2006; Brüggemann and Schulz-
Forberg 2009; Eisele 2017; Caiani and Guerra 2017; Segesten and Bossetta 2019). 
The focus was primarily the question of whether the discussions reproduced in the 
national mass media are at all European and thus open across borders. Scepticism 
was appropriate because public discourses are conveyed linguistically and by the 
mass media, which means that even shared European events or topics are trans-
lated into the national language and dealt with according to the working routines 
and preference structures of the national media systems. Research has primarily 
concerned with the “degree of Europeanisation” of national discourses, which 
was determined, for example, by the proportion of contributions with a European 
reference (for example, with regard to EU-specific actors or topics) and thus ulti-
mately took into account the “vertical” relationship of the national and European 
arenas of political communication. Less attention was paid to “horizontal” rela-
tionships, which are just as important for a field-theoretical view (Eder 2004; 
Trenz and Eder 2004). This concerned the assumption that national discourses, 
even if they have to be conveyed through a national “filter” in terms of language 
and mass media, can nevertheless be “horizontally” interwoven or “synchro-
nised”. These debates would provide an indication of a European field of politics 
in which political actors from different member states vie for interpretations, solu-
tions and loyalties, even beyond the borders of their own audience. 
An analysis of European “public opinion” must take these findings seriously 
for two different reasons. On the one hand, evidence suggests that public opinions 
within European countries need to be analysed comparatively and cross-nationally 
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because political opinions seem to be formed within and beyond national are-
nas. Public spheres are still segmented along national divisions when consider-
ing mass media systems, political institutions or language areas. But these public 
spheres are nested within a broader, European arena that facilitates the flow of 
communication across borders. On the other hand, previous reflections consider 
the fact that “public opinions” are formed within specific fields (in particular, the 
political system, the mass media) and this means that the analysis of individual 
citizens’ opinions and attitudes has to take the field-specific contexts into account 
when engaging in data analysis. This warning is relevant for the purposes of this 
book, which is mainly interested in addressing the political attitudes of European 
citizens. This study follows familiar conceptualisations, as it defines political atti-
tudes as beliefs, preferences and orientations of people towards a political issue, a 
political person or institution that unite emotional and cognitive elements (Easton 
1975; Dalton 1999). This understanding is shared by research on EU-related atti-
tudes, which has been interested in determining whether or not citizens support 
the European integration process and the institutions and persons entrusted with it 
(Hooghe 2003; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Fuchs and Schneider 2011; Hobolt 
and de Vries 2016). My own research agenda conforms to this understanding, 
given that I wish to empirically delineate the perceptions and opinions European 
citizens have formed in regard to European and national politics. The field-theo-
retical agenda adds an empirical objective because I wish to validate the role of 
an expanded arena of public opinion formation. In particular, the aim is to iden-
tify the extent to which citizens form their opinions within a spatially expanded 
arena that transcends national borders “horizontally”, takes the situation in other 
European countries into consideration and thus makes implicit use of a European 
frame of reference. 
In order to do justice to the complexity of “European public opinion”, I thus 
see the need to embark on an analysis that takes into consideration the political 
positions of policy actors before addressing the people’s political opinions and 
attitudes. Both sides are involved in the formation of “public opinion”, the polit-
ical elites through public statements published in the mass media and the people 
through recurrently published opinion polls. This extended analysis is required 
because the analysis of “public opinion” demands cautious interpretation to 
avoid reification. According to Bourdieu, there is no “public opinion” out there 
(Bourdieu 1979), which means that public opinion research is wrong to affirm 
that it is able to objectively determine the opinion of the population. Opinion 
research presupposes “opinions” among people, although it is to be expected 
that social inequalities and existing power relations in the field of politics pro -
duce both mobilising and de-mobilising effects. Bourdieu (1979) argues that 
there is a systematic exclusion of those who do not have a firm opinion, which 
is why the relationship of opinions and omitted statements (“don’t know” or 
missing values) must remain in the focus of the analysis. At the same time, pub-
lic opinion is a “mobilised” and thus highly selective social opinion (Bourdieu 
1991). This applies particularly to “publicised public opinion”, i.e., public dis-
courses conveyed by the mass media, which serves as a public sounding board 
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for institutionalised politics (Luhmann 1996). As the relevant research has 
shown, this mass-mediated “public sphere” consists essentially of representa-
tives of politically influential organisations and thus ultimately of members of 
the political elite. Weak or unorganised interests of the population hardly appear 
in these discourses (Bennett 1990; Koopmans 2007). 
These reflections show that an analysis of “public opinion” is an insightful 
venture if adequately conducted. The inquiry into the political attitudes of the 
people has to consider the footprint of social positions, inequalities and cleavages 
in order to get a sense of how “public opinion” is mobilised and formed. It also 
has to consider that opinion formation at the level of citizens is situated within a 
public sphere strongly shaped by political actors providing “political opinions” 
and the mass media placing and interrelating these “publicised opinions” both 
within and across countries. Against this backdrop, the following analyses will 
need to embark, in the first instance, on the analysis of mass-mediated public 
discourses in order to uncover the national and cross-national constellations guid-
ing the formation of publicised “public opinion”. For one thing, the analysis can 
disclose the internal structure of “publicised public opinion” and thus reach a 
better understanding of the role of political elites in the constitution of public 
debates and opinions. Within this context, the inquiry should be able to explore 
the “European dimension” of this political field, particularly by identifying the 
extent to which public statements transcend national borders and contribute to the 
formation of pan-European public debates. 
The analysis will then move to the citizen level and take a look at their polit-
ical perceptions and opinions, with back-references to the role of mass media 
consumption and use. With the findings of the cross-nationally expanded public 
debates in mind, it will be our mission to validate whether European citizens’ 
perceptions and opinions are embedded in a pan-European frame of reference. In 
field theoretic terms, I assume that European citizens are used to situating them-
selves in a European social space, that they are also ready to identify the positions 
of other fellow Europeans within it and that they consider this expanded European 
cognitive map as a highly relevant proxy, yardstick or benchmark to form opin-
ions about the social and political reality around them. 
These assumptions will require validation. In the first step, the investiga -
tion will centre on the way people perceive and assess national politics. People 
should perceive and assess national politics in accordance with the way they place 
themselves and others within this cognitive map of European living conditions. 
People who feel less well-positioned when they compare themselves with other 
Europeans, for instance, should also perceive grievances and problems much 
more frequently than people who see their own social situation more positively. 
People who feel less well-positioned when they compare themselves with other 
Europeans should be more critical of their own government and more involved in 
political protests than people who see their own social situation more positively. 
In the second step, I will examine the attitudes of citizens towards the EU. The 
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aim is to validate field theory in its assumption that the structure of the European 
social space, in terms of stratificational and spatial as well as objective and subjec-
tive inequality structures, strongly shapes and forms public opinion about the EU. 
In particular, I will be interested in identifying the extent to which citizens have 
formed opinions about the EU that mirror their situatedness in the European social 
space and the way they perceive their own situation in relation to other Europeans. 
3
3 Constructing a social space
in troubled times 
Public spheres and cross-border debates 
The European institutions and the Council of Europe have for many years stressed 
that the European integration process must combat and reduce economic devel-
opment disparities and social inequalities within Europe (EU Commission 2009; 
Council of Europe 2000; 2004; 2010). This challenge is directed in part against 
spatial inequalities (EU Commission 2008) and focuses on support programmes 
for the improvement of infrastructure (transport routes, telecommunications), rural 
development and the creation of jobs in structurally weak regions. Furthermore, 
it aims to tackle social inequalities within the member states and regions, pri-
marily by improving the situation of marginalised groups (e.g., the unemployed, 
migrants, single parents, the elderly). In these areas, the EU is mainly active 
through the establishment of fundamental rights (e.g., the European Convention 
on Human Rights or the European Social Charter) and the financing of support 
programmes (e.g., the European Social Fund). Additionally, there are soft regu-
latory instruments, because in the absence of independent legislative powers in 
the field of labour market policy and social policy, the EU has been relying for 
decades on coordination instruments (e.g., the Open Method of Coordination 
or the European Semester of the Europe 2020 Strategy). These efforts are also 
aimed at improving and harmonising working and living conditions in the mem-
ber states. Member states are included in many regulatory areas in a continuous 
process of measurement, benchmarking and evaluation of existing national action 
plans (Hodson and Maher 2001; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Jessoula 2015; 
Copeland and Daly 2018). This process is organised as a continuous learning 
process because this method conceives Europe as an integrated social space that 
makes it possible to compare people, regions and nations. More than that, with 
the goal of a convergence of social living conditions, these people, regions and 
countries must be systematically compared with one another in order to identify 
and initiate recommendations for action. 
The European Union thus specifically promotes political debates across 
national borders. Political decisions and legal provisions in individual countries 
are to be compared with others and evaluated with a view to the common objec-
tives. In this sense, the EU establishes a pan-European communication area that 
provokes debates in the individual countries with a view to the political “per-
formance record” of the EU and its member states. This does not mean that the 
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European integration process is gradually transforming the national media and 
audiences into a pan-European public sphere, for Europe is too clearly divided 
into different language areas and media systems. However, this does not rule out 
talking about each other within the EU, setting common topics, discussing similar 
problems and potential solutions. National public spheres are not dismissed but 
mutually intertwined since socio-economic developments and political decisions 
from the member states are observed, reflected upon and evaluated in the other 
states (Eder 2004; Eriksen 2005; Trenz and Eder 2004). The EU has established 
arenas and procedures for political opinion-forming and decision-making that 
create a sufficiently integrated space for communication and discourse to relate 
national audiences to each other. In such a framework of discourse, the mem-
ber state actors not only perceive each other but also assign positions to each 
other. Actual or supposed similarities and differences between the populations 
and the countries of Europe thus become more virulent. They give rise to inter-
woven debates that can generate consensus or dissent – and thus also shape public 
opinion. 
In this chapter, I wish to empirically validate whether such transnational 
debates have emerged, given that they have the potential to “Europeanise” public 
opinion not only about the European Union but also about national governments 
and domestic politics. Previous research has already dealt intensively with the 
European public sphere, and the guiding question here has been whether and to 
what extent (national) media audiences have been penetrated by Europe. This 
“degree of Europeanisation” was determined by establishing the extent to which 
actors, topics and statements belonging to the EU (EU institutions and other mem-
ber states) are heard in national media. The findings vary. A sceptical position pre-
vailed for the 1990s because scholars argued that public debates imparted by the 
mass media only had a weak European focus (Gerhards 2001; Machill et al., 2006; 
Fossum and Schlesinger 2007). The presence of EU-specific actors and issues 
within national reporting barely kept pace with the growing scope of political 
decisions within the EU and the actual deepening and expansion of the European 
integration process. This weak Europeanisation was generally explained by the 
lack of a strong political governing body at European level, the multitude of lan-
guages and media systems, the relevance of national politics and the observable 
alienation of the EU from its citizens (Bijsmans and Altides 2007; Brüggemann 
and Schulz-Forberg 2009; Schulz-Forberg and Stråth 2010; Zschache 2016). 
Another interpretation saw a greater scope for opening up national media coverage 
in Europe. These scholars stressed that the Europeanisation of national debates is 
not dependent on a pan-European public sphere (Eder 2014; Trenz 2016). Mass-
mediated public debates might be linked to linguistic regions and national media 
systems, but cross-border communication, even pan-European debates, can also 
take place even within spatially segmented public spheres (Eriksen 2005; Pfetsch 
et al. 2006; de Vreese 2007; Lahusen 2009). Such cross-border discourses can 
emerge on the basis of common events and occasions, shared topics and inter-
related interventions. Spatially divided but interconnected debates will arise in 
such a communication space, leading both to consensus and dissent (Trenz 2004; 
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Statham 2007; Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Galpin and Trenz 2019; Segesten and 
Bossetta 2019). 
The fact that cross-border, discursively interlinked debate takes place has 
already been shown at key milestones in the European integration process 
(Statham and Trenz 2013; de Wilde, Michailidou and Trenz 2013; Zschache 
2016). However, the importance of cross-border debates has been, above all, 
confirmed since the outbreak of the European economic and financial crisis in 
2008, as national mass media reported quite intensively on relevant events and 
information. Although the situation at home was the first priority (Monza and 
Anduiza 2016), European actors and issues were also discussed. Reports on other 
countries increased in particular, especially Greece. They provided an opportu-
nity to publicly address the European dimension of the crisis (Mylonas 2012; 
Papathanassopoulos 2015). These debates show astonishing parallels, although 
this did not necessarily benefit the EU and the member states concerned, as a tone 
critical of Europe and Greece dominated the climate of opinion (Statham and 
Trenz 2013; Papathanassopoulos 2015). 
The following will build on these findings. The aim is to clarify whether the 
debate conveyed by the mass media in the countries – under the impression of the 
crisis – was actually “opened up” in European terms. The aim is also to identify 
how these national debates are interlinked. In particular, the focus is on whether 
Europeanisation follows a vertical penetration of national media reporting (e.g., 
through the inclusion of EU institutions or other international and global actors) and/ 
or a horizontal intertwining of debates across national borders (e.g., by opening up to 
actors from other member states). The analyses will be particularly interested in the 
actors involved in such a discursive Europeanisation. According to the tenor of pre-
vious media and European studies research, media coverage is clearly determined 
by social elites, especially the political and state elites (Bennett 1990; Skogerbo, 
Bruns, Quodling and Ingebretsen 2016). With regard to the European communica-
tion space, it is also assumed that the “public opinion” on Europe, which is circulated 
and mobilised in the mass media of the various member states, is primarily shaped 
by these elites (Eder and Giesen 2001; Koopmans 2007). This will also apply to 
horizontally intertwined debates because national elites of the different countries 
will most probably perceive and observe each other, talk about each other and refer 
to each other. This way they contribute to stimulating transnational debates, which 
should have an opinion-forming effect on the populations of the countries. 
This Europeanisation of public discourses will be empirically examined on the 
basis of data from a European project (Livewhat) that focused on media report-
ing in nine countries: Germany, France, Greece, the UK, Italy, Poland, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Spain. Five newspapers per country were selected as the data 
source;1 care was taken to include at least one tabloid in addition to the quality 
1 Germany (Bild, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung), France (Le Figaro, La Tribune, Le Monde, Le Parisien, Libération), Greece (Eleythero-
typia, Kathimerini, Rizospastis, Ta Nea, To Vima), the UK (Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, The Guardian, 
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press. The special feature of this data set is that it did not use the article as an 
investigation unit but the claims identifiable in the articles. The newspapers were 
therefore used as an “archive” of public claims and positions of social actors 
(Franzosi 1987). The interest was not directed primarily at the journalists them-
selves, although they also had a say in the articles. Rather, statements and actions 
of the quoted actors (governments, parties, associations, experts, non-govern-
mental organisations, individuals, etc.) were extracted in order to reconstruct the 
public debates on the crisis. Following the guidelines of this “claims-making” 
approach (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Giugni and Statham 2002; Cinalli and 
Giugni 2016), a data set was generated from these newspapers consisting of 9,000 
claims for the period between 2008 and 2014.2 
Debates on the economic and financial 
crisis: national and European issues 
The global economic and financial crisis, which began in 2007, had a noticeable 
impact on the European Economic Area from 2008 onwards, as it resulted in 
massive economic slumps, growing indebtedness of banks and public budgets, 
rising unemployment figures and increasing poverty. The public reacted to these 
developments with concern, as the mass media reported more and more on the 
crisis, its causes and consequences. The following graphs illustrate the course 
of the debate for the nine countries examined (Figure 3.1). As a similar number 
of claims were evaluated in the nine countries, it is not possible to say in which 
countries the public discourses were more intensive and in which they were less 
developed. What the data show, however, is the intensity of the public debate over 
time, which varies from country to country. In one group of countries (Germany, 
Sweden, Switzerland and Poland), public attention very quickly increased to over 
300 claims a year, only to gradually lose momentum. Another slight increase in 
2014 was only observed in Poland. In the other countries (UK, Greece, Italy and 
Spain), public interest in the economic crisis after 2008 remains fairly constant 
until 2013 and only dropped noticeably afterwards. 
The Sun, The Times), Italy (Corriere della Sera, La Stampa, Repubblica, Secolo XIX, Sole 24 Ore), 
Poland (Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, Super Express, Gazeta Polska Codziennie, Gazeta Wyborcza, 
Rzeczpospolita), Spain (ABC, El País, El Peridico de Catalunya, La Vanguardia, El Mundo), Swe-
den (Aftonbladet, Dagen Nyheter, Göterborgs Posten, Norbottens Kuriren, Svenska Dagbladet) and 
Switzerland (Blick, Le Matin, Le Temps, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Tages Anzeiger) 
2 The extraction of claims from the articles of these national newspapers followed a three-step proce-
dure. In the first step, the research teams used the electronic archives of the newspapers mentioned 
to identify all articles in the period in question that belonged to the subject matter of the study. 
Following the objectives of the project, media coverage of the (European) economic and financial 
crisis was to be examined, which is why all articles were identified that contained the keywords 
“crisis”, “recession” or “austerity” in the full text search. From this (adjusted) total number, articles 
were then taken at random step by step from the total population until the desired number of 1,000 
claims per country had been determined. These claims were analysed and coded on the basis of a 
common codebook. 
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Figure 3.2	 Real GDP growth rate – change compared to the previous year (%). Source: 
Eurostat. 
If this is compared with economic developments – for the sake of clarity only 
for Germany and Greece – it can be seen from Figure 3.2 that these discourses 
follow actual economic developments. Measured in terms of the development 
of gross domestic product compared to the respective previous year, economic 
growth in Germany slumped by 5.9% in 2009. The economy had already calmed 
down again in the following year. In Greece, however, the low point was not 
reached until 2011 – and was a full 9.1%. It was not until 2013 that the Greek 
government emerged from the recession. 
As shown in Table 3.1, public claims covered a variety of topics. However, 
economic issues were at the centre of public discourses. Half of all the state-
ments were about the overall economic situation, and one in five discussed trade 
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Table 3.1 Main topics of the debates (multiple answers, number of cases: 9,000) 
N % 
Economics 4499 49.99 
Trade and finance 1917 21.30 
Work and employment 1723 19.14 
State, public service and administration 589 6.54 
Environment, energy, transport 550 6.11 
Health and social affairs 441 4.90 
Education and science 358 3.98 
Home affairs, immigration 331 3.68 
International relations 346 3.84 
Urban and regional policy 331 3.68 
Other 1121 12.46 
Total no. of answers 12206 
Source: Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset.

Note: The percentages result in more than 100% as multiple answers can be given.

and financial issues. Immediately following is the area of work and employment, 
with almost every fifth statement. Several other topics only emerge at a greater 
distance; these include the role of the state, administration and public services, 
health and social policy issues and aspects such as the environment, energy and 
natural resources, transport and public transport. The list of topics shows that 
hardly any policy area was left out because in all these areas the causes, effects or 
implications of the economic and financial crisis were identified and discussed. 
On balance, however, public discourses remained committed to an economic and 
fiscal agenda. 
As can be seen from Table 3.2, the focal topics vary only slightly between 
countries. For each of the nine countries, the discourses were also dominated 
by economic issues, while health and social issues played a subordinate role. 
Differences occurred in the relative weighting. The economic situation was the 
focus of particular attention in the UK, Sweden and Germany, while trade and 
finance were of particular importance in Switzerland and Germany. Labour and 
employment were more important in France, Poland and Italy than in other coun-
tries, and in Poland, Greece and Spain this was the case for the topics of health 
and social affairs. 
The debates on these topics have barely changed over time, which is why 
they are not presented in graphical or tabular form here. Indeed, these thematic 
debates followed the pattern identified above for the overall debate (Figure 3.1). 
For those countries less affected by the economic and financial crisis, the intensity 
of the debates after 2010 levelled off considerably. In Greece, public discourses 
on the economic situation gathered momentum until 2012, and in Italy, work and 
employment also became the focus of the debate in that year. But beyond these 
striking features, the topic-specific course of the debate corresponded to the gen-
eral trend already described. 
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Table 3.2 Topics by country (selection, multiple answers, number of cases: 8960)

Economy Trade/finance Work/ employment Health/ social affairs 








































































Source: Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset.

Note: The percentages result in more than 100% as multiple answers can be given.

However, these representations leave us in the dark as to whether the pub-
lic discourses on the crisis contain a European component at all. Was the crisis 
addressed as a “European” issue, or did a primarily national reference horizon 
dominate? Following the assumption expressed at the start of this chapter, public 
debates in Europe are likely to remain structured in segments along national dis-
course spaces (languages, media systems, political arenas, etc.). However, it can 
be assumed that these national discourses are embedded in a pan-European frame 
of reference that should be empirically comprehensible through common events, 
topics and mutual interventions between the actors themselves. The course of the 
public discourse on the crisis has already provided us with such an indication. The 
debates began in all nine countries with the economic slump, the imminent bank-
ruptcy of banks and the rise in unemployment in 2008. It is also significant that the 
debates have not only remained lively for years in those countries most affected 
by the global economic and financial crisis but have also continued in those states 
that announced a lessening or even end of the crisis in their own countries. 
The economic and financial crisis was thus a common cause for debate. 
However, this is only a weak indication of a pan-European discourse space, as the 
figures only show that the countries were affected (indirectly or directly) by the 
crisis at the same time. It is unclear as to whether the crisis was also perceived as 
a common topic or whether the actors rather referred to “own” (national or local) 
crisis problems. After all, the economic and financial crisis was multifaceted; it 
had global repercussions, which is why it was also addressed as a global economic 
crisis; it affected the European economic and monetary area as a whole, but ulti-
mately it also affected the countries (and different regions within them) to varying 
degrees. This raises the question of how the crisis was perceived and addressed in 
the scrutinised public debates. Is the crisis “framed” and defined more as a global 
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or a European, national or local issue? This question can be clarified on the basis 
of the discourse data used because during the evaluation of the reporting of the 
national print media, care was taken to also include these spatial “frameworks” 
and problem horizons. 
Table 3.3 shows the spatial problem horizon of the crisis debates for the nine 
countries. The national frame of reference dominates for most of the claims, i.e., 
the crisis-relevant issues were addressed by the claimants as topics and prob-
lems linked to the own country. Only one in ten claims discussed the issues in 
a European framework, i.e., referred to the EU as a whole or to the situation 
in other European countries. This is followed by the global, regional and local 
levels. However, the differences between the countries are particularly striking. 
The European dimension was more in the focus of debate in Germany, Greece 
and Italy, while it played a lesser role in the other countries. Compared to the 
European dimension, the global thematic horizon was particularly dominant in 
Switzerland, but the situation was similar in Sweden and the UK. In contrast, the 
national frame of reference was particularly decisive in the UK and Greece. 
The development of the debates reveals that the European problem horizon was 
addressed more frequently by the actors involved as time progressed. Figure 3.3 
compiles the changes between 2006 and 2014, although for simplicity’s sake a 
distinction is only made between three reference areas; in addition to the global 
and European problem horizon, the national, regional and local references have 
been combined. The figure contains two diagrams, one showing the evolution of 
the debates in absolute terms and the other in percentage terms. The top diagram 
reflects the already familiar picture, as the vast majority of claims on the crisis 
were made in the years between 2008 and 2009, while the intensity of the debates 
gradually decreased after 2010. The “hot phase” was determined by a nation-
ally framed crisis discourse, which is why the global and European reference 
point remained subordinate in this period. However, the relationship between the 
debates changes when moving towards 2010. The focus on the national reference 
horizon is continuously decreasing; the global perspective is being replaced by 
the European perspective. This observation is underpinned as soon as one looks at 
percentage shares. Over the period, the share of national framing of the discourse 
remained quite stable at a high level, while the subordinate spatial references 
changed. A global problem horizon became a European one. 
This moderate reorientation is confirmed as soon as the changes are broken 
down by country. Figure 3.4 only shows the development in absolute figures, as 
this breakdown takes the intensity of the debates into account more reliably. The 
figure initially underpins the observation that public discourses in all countries 
placed the crisis in a dominant, national problem horizon. This does not mean 
that these debates were completely devoid of European or global references. It 
will become evident that national discourses are implicitly interwoven into such 
a framework. However, explicit references to the European and global problem 
dimension remained marginal. 
Differences between countries should be taken into account when looking 
at these developments. For Switzerland, in particular, the global reference area 
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European global national 
Figure 3.3	 Problem horizon of the debates (multiple answers). Source: Livewhat WP3 
political claims dataset. 
was consistently more important than the European one. Everywhere else, how-
ever, the global frame of reference was overlaid by a European one during the 
course of our investigation period. This is particularly true for Germany because 
the European dimension has been decisive from 2010. With the exception of 
Switzerland, the same applies to all other countries, as between 2010 and 2012 
the primarily national debates were supplemented by a European dimension. 
This part of the discourse is connected to the contents of the debate. Table 3.4 
shows that the debates with a national or European problem horizon had different 
thematic priorities. Economic, monetary, financial and external relations issues 
were clearly more often defined as European issues, while the areas of labour and 
employment, health and social affairs were primarily discussed at the national 
level. Monetary policy in particular was one of the most prominent European 
issues as one in three statements dealing with the European problem horizon dealt 
with this issue. In this way, public debates reflect actual political realities because 
the European Union has a clear mandate in the field of monetary policy, while it 
lacks such competences in the fields of labour and employment, social affairs and 
health. It is the nation state that continues to take the lead in these policy areas. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that actors primarily focus on a national problem 
horizon as soon as they deal with these issues. 
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Figure 3.4	 Problem horizon of the debates by country (multiple answers). Source: 
Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset. 
In the overall picture, this results in a crisis discourse, which was divided into 
several partial debates. The monetary and financial policy implications of the cri -
sis and the corresponding measures to overcome them were discussed primarily 
as a European issue, while the “clean-up” in the field of labour and social policy 
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Table 3.4 Problem horizons by topic (multiple answers) 
National European 
N % N % 
Economic and monetary affairs 3714 49.7% 633 67.2% 
Work and employment 1610 21.5% 73 7.8% 
Trade and finance 1434 19.2% 238 25.3% 
Urban and regional policy 889 11.9% 113 12.0% 
Health and social affairs 510 6.8% 19 2.0% 
Education and science 430 5.8% 57 6.1% 
Home affairs, immigration 404 5.4% 29 3.1% 
State and administration 385 5.2% 12 1.3% 
Environment, energy and transport 368 4.9% 29 3.1% 
International relations 307 4.1% 132 14.0% 
Other 174 2.3% 16 1.7% 
Total no. of cases 7478 942 
Total no. of answers 10225 1351 
Source: Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset. 
interrelated insofar as labour market policy and social policy were embedded in 
European economic, financial and monetary policy and therefore also had to be 
subordinately aligned with it. 
The interweaving of these partial debates becomes even more tangible as soon 
as a closer look at the content of the debates is taken and the issues expressed by 
the actors in the print media over the years are examined. Despite the multitude 
of topics, arguments and demands, it is possible to reconstruct and paraphrase 
certain threads of the debates.3 For instance, at the beginning of the economic 
and financial crisis, the focus of public statements was still almost entirely on 
one’s own country. In Germany, for example, there was intensive discussion 
in 2008 and 2009 about short-time working, the prevention of mass redundan-
cies and high unemployment. The discussion focused on government economic 
stimulus programmes propagated at the federal and state level to overcome the 
economic crisis, on new national debts and the sense or nonsense of tax relief for 
private individuals and companies. There was also controversy about rescuing 
ailing banks (BayernLB, IIKB Deutsche Industriebank, HSH Nordbank, Hypo 
Real Estate, WestLB) and corporations (e.g., Adam Opel Werke, Arcandor/ 
Karstadt). The focus was also on wage policy, as employers and unions had dif-
ferent opinions as to whether wage increases were justified in times of crisis. In 
3 Following the codebook of the “claims-making” analysis, the teams were instructed to summarise 
the contents for each identified statement. The paraphrasing is done in English, which allowed 
comparative evaluations. For the purposes presented here, the most frequent claims per country 
were identified and paraphrased. These evaluations therefore primarily serve to illustrate dominant 
debates. 
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Greece, there were more reports of corporate insolvencies, collective redundan-
cies and salary cuts. The discussions in Greece were about measures to make 
the labour market more flexible, but also about the Greek state’s debt, and here 
specifically about tax increases, restrictions on welfare benefits, the fight against 
tax evasion and the privatisation of public enterprises. Demands for a reduction 
in municipal taxes and duties were also discussed in order to relieve the tourism 
industry and agriculture. Several speakers called for strikes or street protests 
against the government’s austerity and reform policies. Here and elsewhere, the 
situation in one’s own country was at the focus of interest, as the vast major-
ity of statements dealt with the claimants’ own economy and financial sector, 
labour market and social system. And everywhere, the political measures that 
should be taken in the country to get a grip on the consequences of the crisis 
were discussed. 
Although the global and European problem horizon was implicitly or indi-
rectly addressed in most of these statements, the proportion of claims that explic-
itly referred to this problem horizon, which goes beyond one’s own country, was 
still quite low in the early days of the crisis. In 2008, only 62 statements referred 
to a European problem horizon out of a total of 1,246 (i.e., 5%). And while this 
figure rose to 108 in 2009, this partial debate remained subordinate. Additionally, 
these claims were devoted to a wide range of topics. Companies that had insti-
gated redundancies in several European countries at the same time came forward. 
National governments presented their national policies as a response to the com-
mon European crisis. Representatives of the member states and the European 
institutions (Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs Council, etc.) high-
lighted the need for a coordinated economic, monetary and financial policy but 
without being able to report consensus. At the same time, criticism was also 
voiced in the individual countries. On the German side, French demands for a 
European economic government were discussed just as critically as the European 
Central Bank’s policy of cheap money. In Poland, a more consistent distribution 
of European subsidies for the eastern European member states was demanded 
and proposals to make the labour market more flexible were criticised. And in 
Sweden, for example, there was a call for a clearer EU commitment to fight-
ing unemployment and regulating the financial markets. At the same time, these 
actors stressed that they did not consider economic policy coordination to be very 
useful. 
From 2010, the number of statements with European references increased. By 
2011, the number of such claims had doubled to 234 (17.3%), gradually falling 
to 65 (12.4%) by 2014. The thematic priorities are particularly important since 
in 2010 every other of these statements concerned issues of (European) mon-
etary, budgetary and financial policy. In 2011 and 2012, this proportion even 
increased to two-thirds of these statements. The background to the change in the 
debate was the dramatic worsening of the economic and financial crisis in some 
member states. Several countries had to contend with rising public debt, declin-
ing growth prospects and hard-to-predict risks from bad loans from national and 
private banks (including Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Greece). This weakened 
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the single currency and dampened confidence in the stability of the euro and the 
European banking and financial system. Work on a coordinated monetary and 
financial policy gathered considerable momentum in the wake of Greece’s immi-
nent national bankruptcy in spring 2010. As is well known, this led to the creation 
of a “euro rescue package” consisting of several programmes and institutions: 
bilateral loans and intergovernmental financing programmes such as the European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). All of them were 
looking to secure the solvency of individual member states. Essentially, the policy 
consisted of granting loans, all of which had to be repaid. Disbursement was sub-
ject to strict reform conditions negotiated and monitored by a troika of lenders: 
the European Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the European Commission (EC). 
The course of the debate strikingly reflects these events. For example, a large 
proportion of the Europe-related statements made in 2010 dealt with the European 
rescue package, the necessity of which was largely accepted. Greece appeared 
as an addressed country in a whole series of claims, with the leading commen-
tators originating mainly from France, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. In 
the following years, the European rescue package with its central instruments 
(EFSF and EFSM) left the focus somewhat. However, actors who were concerned 
that Greece’s excessive debt entailed incalculable risks continued to speak up. 
Demands were therefore made for a consistent policy of stability and reform. 
Actors repeatedly discussed Greece’s possible withdrawal from the eurozone. In 
addition, there was demand for a stronger recapitalisation of banks and a stronger 
regulation of the banking sector. This “banking union” has been discussed since 
2012 and was commented on until its implementation in 2014. Since 2013, more 
and more voices were talking about an imminent end to the economic and finan-
cial crisis and there was light at the end of the tunnel even for Greece. Demands 
for growth-promoting economic, industrial, tax and financial policies now moved 
more into the spotlight. Actors opposed the primacy of an austerity policy and 
called for greater flexibility on the subject of public debt and public investment 
programmes. The common fight against unemployment was discussed only mar-
ginally in this context but now started to gain prominence. 
The debates thus had common points of reference. The same events and issues 
were mentioned in all of the countries: the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the ECB’s 
decisions on interest rates or the purchase of government bonds, the summits of 
heads of government or ministers, economic development and mass unemploy-
ment. And similar assessments or demands were made everywhere: the stabilisa-
tion of the euro, the budgetary discipline of the member states, the recapitalisation 
of banks, etc. Despite wide agreement on the issues and the general tenor of the 
demands, public debates were not without dissent. Critical voices were heard 
either branding the agreed measures as too timid or protesting against the auster-
ity policy of the EU and its spokespersons. These statements were mainly made in 
those countries where the European problem horizon was much more significant 
for public debates; this is particularly true of Germany and Greece. 
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Weightings, assessments and demands differed considerably between the 
countries. For instance, public debates in the euro countries tended to differ from 
those in countries that were not members of the eurozone or the EU. In the euro 
countries, the common monetary and financial policy was a very decisive subject. 
This was easy to understand for Greece, as the solvency of the Greek state was 
largely dependent on decisions taken within the EU with regard to contingency 
plans, euro rescue packages, loans and purchases of government bonds. At the 
same time, however, there was also vehement criticism of EU policy, as numerous 
Greek statements focused on the social consequences of austerity policy and the 
promised reforms. The monetary and financial policy was also of great impor -
tance in Germany, as the German government played a leading role in the devel-
opment of the publicly discussed measures. Most spokespersons agreed that the 
EU should not become a transfer union because this would mean that taxpayers 
in one country would have to answer for the sins (past and future) of others. They 
argued that EU policies should be based on loans and encourage governments 
to undertake serious reforms in order to protect German taxpayers. In France 
and Italy too, statements related to Europe focused on the common monetary 
and financial policy. Greece remained a cause for concern and an incentive for a 
policy of sound public finances in these countries. In Italy, actors who criticised 
the primacy of austerity policy and wanted to generate more growth spoke out 
from 2012 onwards. A more active industrial policy and more state investments 
were called for, as was a more flexible approach to public debt. Spain’s overall 
picture is out of the ordinary in that the number of public claims with a European 
dimension was very small. But here too, most of the statements related to the EU’s 
monetary and financial policy. 
In comparison, public debates in countries that had not adopted the euro as 
their common currency diverged somewhat from the picture drawn so far in terms 
of subject matter and tenor. The few voices that welcomed their country’s entry 
into the eurozone at the beginning of the crisis quickly became silent, and there 
was concern that developments within Europe could be economically damag-
ing to one’s own country. This not only referred to the recession in the entire 
domestic market in the years 2008 to 2010 and the weak overall economy after 
2011. Above all, the crisis of the euro and its fiscal policy causes (high indebted-
ness of states and banks) were criticised as they also harmed the country’s own 
economic development. This argument was put forward repeatedly, particularly 
in Sweden and the UK. In the UK, concerns were expressed in 2011 that the 
problems in the eurozone could undermine the tentative recovery of the British 
economy and plunge it into a new recession. In both countries, reference was 
made to the remaining risks in countries such as Greece, Spain, Italy and France. 
Many commentators felt that it was important for the countries of the eurozone 
to do their homework, with the support of the British and Swedish governments. 
Similar voices were also found in Switzerland. The relatively high proportion of 
Europe-related statements for a non-EU country can be explained by the fact that 
the weakness of the euro had simultaneously led to a strong Swiss franc, which 
proved to be harmful for many companies in the long term. The debate on the 
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European sovereign debt crisis and the envisaged banking regulation also played 
an equally important role in Switzerland. 
Finally, European monetary and financial policy remained a marginal topic in 
Poland. Here the European debates were dominated more by policy-specific top-
ics, such as whether the European climate protection targets could harm Polish 
coal. Concerns about the European Structural and Social Funds were voiced 
repeatedly. After all, the desire of many EU and euro countries to use part of 
these funds for stimulus programmes and the fight against mass unemployment 
could be to the detriment of eastern and central European countries and damage 
European cohesion policy. 
Overall, the evaluations to date show that public debates on the crisis in all 
countries were primarily committed to a national agenda. This does not contradict 
the fact that the economic and financial crisis of the years after 2008, objectively 
speaking, affected several countries at once and should therefore be understood as 
a global and European crisis in its causes, manifestations and consequences. For 
public debates, however, it remained central that the crisis was discussed primar-
ily with a view to the concrete situation locally. The discussion focused on lay-
offs, short-time work or wage cuts, ailing banks and public finances, investment 
programmes, social benefits and austerity measures at home. Public debates rarely 
dealt explicitly with the European and global dimensions of the crisis, and in this 
respect a monetary and fiscal agenda prevailed. From a topical point of view, 
the public discourses on the crisis were therefore divided into different partial 
debates. The situation in one’s own country was the subject of debates that mainly 
concerned the banking and financial system, the economic situation and the situ-
ation of private and public budgets. There were also statements on unemploy-
ment and employment, social affairs and health. The statements related to Europe 
followed a much more limited agenda. They very rarely dealt with the specific 
situation in individual countries. Instead, they were about the weak euro, risks 
to the stability of the currency resulting from ailing banks and bankrupt states 
and measures to support the euro, stabilise public finances and recapitalise banks. 
These European-related debates were not free from dissent and reflected the par-
ticular situation of the countries within the EU and the monetary union. However, 
the pronounced consistency of events, topics and demands across national borders 
is surprising. 
Actors and discourse arenas: multi-level reciprocity 
The global economic and financial crisis has sparked a public debate in all the 
countries studied. As has been shown, the vast majority of the public statements 
remained committed to a national problem horizon, as they dealt with country-
specific consequences, countermeasures and problem solutions. This national 
segmentation of public discourse has been repeatedly confirmed by previous 
research (Gerhards 2001; Machill et al. 2006; Zschache 2016). The fact that a 
global economic crisis that spread across national borders and continents is dis-
cussed and addressed at a small scale may be surprising but can be explained by 
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the unbroken importance of language and cultural regions on the one hand, and 
nation states and nationally segmented public spheres on the other. However, this 
national segmentation in no way prevents cross-border debates because the same 
events, topics and demands were discussed in the respective countries. There were 
also mutual references to the situation in other European countries. 
This observation will be pursued in the following. These findings could indi-
cate that the European Union – despite country-specific debates – has created 
a cross-border communication space in which the participating actors not only 
share common topics but also talk to and about each other. It has not yet been pos-
sible to answer this question clearly on the basis of the previous analyses. It was 
only possible to demonstrate that in addition to the debates on the economic and 
financial crisis with a national problem horizon, there was an additional discourse 
devoted to pan-European issues. This may be an indication that there are two 
separate partial debates. In fact, it is possible that national actors were concerned 
with the causes, manifestations and consequences of the crisis in their country, 
while the EU institutions held a discourse on the accompanying monetary, eco-
nomic and financial policy measures to contain the crisis. These would be findings 
that would speak against a pan-European communication space in the proposed 
sense; they would rather support the hypothesis of a separate and supranational 
arena of public interventions with EU-specific topics and actors that would leave 
the segmental character of national public spheres untouched. Horizontally inter-
linked, pan-European debates in our sense would only exist if national actors got 
involved in the debates with a European dimension and if EU institutions and 
actors from other member states were present in the debates of the individual 
countries. Only in this sense would the public discourses be mutually interlinked. 
The empirical claims-making data provides answers to the question as to which 
of these two scenarios is the right one. To this end, it is helpful to give an overview 
of the group of actors involved. As Table 3.5 shows, state actors dominated public 
debates with over 50% of the statements. It was mainly representatives of gov-
ernments, parties and state authorities or agencies who spoke up. Other speakers 
included banks, companies, employers, economic research institutes and experts, 
including trade unions. Each of these actors highlighted different dimensions of 
the crisis: banks and companies discussed the economic implications (e.g., order 
situation, short-time work or redundancies, insolvencies, investments, capitalisa-
tion); the trade unions identified the problems specific to the labour market (wage 
development, rising insecurity and unemployment, socially acceptable counter-
measures by employers and the state); state actors discussed appropriate political 
solutions (investment programmes, tax increases, savings measures, social policy 
reforms, etc.). 
All in all, it can be seen that the public debates on the crisis were essentially 
conducted by political and economic elites. This is not unusual for media report-
ing, since it is mainly representatives from the state, politics, business and science 
who have their say in newspapers (Bennett 1990; Koopmans 2007), which also 
seems to apply to the debates on the economic and financial crisis. Additionally, 
public discussions were dominated by conventional forms of public debate 
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Table 3.5 Actors who had their say (multiple answers) 
N % 
State actors 
Governments, executive 2140 23.8 
Parliaments 517 5.7 
Parties 1038 11.5 
Courts 44 0.5 
Governmental agencies 876 9.7 
Economy and finance 
Banks 1021 11.3 
Companies and employers 1498 16.6 
Employees and civil society 
Trade unions 751 8.3 
Civil society actors 451 5.0 
Other actors 
Media 140 1.6 
Think tanks, experts 624 6.9 
Other 240 2.7 
Unknown 22 0.2 
Total no. of cases 9000 
Total number of answers 9362 
Source: Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset. 
because in the vast majority of cases they consist of verbal announcements and 
claims (press releases and conferences, resolutions, position papers and reports, 
etc.) or the announcement of political decisions or enforcement measures (legis-
lative initiatives, party programmes, administrative decisions, etc.). This share 
of 94.5% of all statements is contrasted by a small number of cases involving 
the political participation of civic groups or individuals (court actions, lobbying, 
petitions from citizens, participation in consultation procedures or committees, 
etc.), street protests (demonstrative, confrontational or violent forms of protest) 
or self-help initiatives (barter exchanges, soup kitchens, cooperatives, counselling 
centres, etc.). Only 3% of the statements are from street protests. In some coun-
tries, the share is more elevated – with 7.9% in Italy, 5.5% in France and 3.9% 
in Greece – but also in these cases they were unable to change the tenor of the 
debates. In fact, the few public protests reported in the media were eclipsed by a 
flood of conventional interventions, announcements and claims. The latter were 
not free from dissent but were nevertheless part of a surprisingly integrated and 
moderate discourse arena. This might be due to the content because as was shown, 
public debates on the crisis were dominated by an economic and financial agenda 
that ensured leadership for certain actors. However, this does not apply without 
restriction; one only needs to consider the greater diversity of topics in debates 
with a primarily national problem horizon. These debates also covered labour 
market and employment policy, social and health policy, education and regional 
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development. The fact that protesters and more confrontational objections hardly 
played a role despite this diversity of debates suggests that public discourse about 
the crisis was ultimately contained and controlled by well-established discourse 
communities (Singer 1990; Hajer 1993; Bislev, Salskov-Iversen and Hansen 
2002), and these discourse communities consisted primarily of representatives 
of political and economic elites who cultivated a rather conventional culture of 
communication. 
These observations can be confirmed as soon as the participants are broken 
down by country, and it is determined which actors were heard, and how fre-
quently, in the print media of the nine countries (Table 3.6). State actors were 
omnipresent, particularly in Germany, Greece and Spain, while banks, companies 
and employers, trade unions and organised civil society played a role in the rest 
of the debate. In the UK, Switzerland, France and Italy, the state actors were 
somewhat less prominent, with almost 50% of all speeches. However, banks, 
companies and employers were in the media much more frequently in the UK and 
Switzerland than trade unions and organised civil society, with almost one in three 
claims. In France and Italy, capital and labour were present with roughly equal 
shares. Finally, the debates in Poland and Sweden are striking in that state actors 
shaped the debates much less than banks, companies and employers, which is why 
the workforce and civil society ended up as a side note. 
The findings show that state actors and interest groups shape public debates 
about the crisis everywhere, but they do not disclose yet whether public discourses 
about the crisis transcended a purely national arena. An initial answer is provided 
as soon as it is determined whether the actors who spoke were representatives of 
local, national, European or global organisations or groups. In this regard, the data 
assembles public statements by myriad different actors, among them local and 
global companies, national governments, EU institutions or international organi-
sations (e.g., the World Bank or the IMF). Table 3.7 shows the proportions of 
claims. The results essentially confirm the findings already determined for the 
problem horizon of the topics discussed. Almost two-thirds of all claims were 
made by actors based in the country concerned; only one in ten statements came 
from a representative of a global organisation (mostly companies, the World Bank 
or the IMF). European actors only had a say in every 14th case, with the share of 
the EU institutions being significantly higher than the number of actors from other 
EU member states. 
If the circle of participants is subdivided by type (Table 3.8), it can be seen that 
European actors came mainly from the executive, political and administrative sec-
tors – in the majority representatives of the European Commission, national gov-
ernments of other countries or national delegates within the Council of Ministers. 
Interestingly, European companies or employers’ organisations, trade unions 
and non-governmental organisations did not play a significant role. The picture 
changes in relation to global actors as global banks, financial service providers, 
rating agencies and private companies dominate in particular. Trade unions and 
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Table 3.7 Actors by action level (multiple answers)

N % 
Global 825 9.2 
European EU level 490 5.5 
other member states 158 1.8 
Multilateral 73 0.8 
National 5689 63.2 
Regional 786 8.7 
Local 826 9.2 
Unknown 1512 16.8 
Total no. of cases 8999 
Total no. of answers 10359 
Source: Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset. 
The findings demonstrate that public debates were restricted to a national arena 
in all countries. The majority of the actors who have their say in the national 
media debates come from the respective country. However, one should not be 
blinded too much by this impression. This tabular overview simplifies the picture 
and thus also exaggerates the national isolation of public debates. It is true that 
only 10% of all the issues raised in the claims were identified as “European” (see 
Table 3.3 above), and it is true that only 7% of the actors who spoke are either 
from the EU institutions or from another member state (see Table 3.8). This does 
not necessarily mean, however, that the debates on the crisis fall into two separate 
arenas: the few European actors would therefore only talk about European issues, 
the many national actors only about national ones. This is not the case, however, 
because European actors also spoke with regard to national issues and national 
actors took part in debates with a pan-European topical horizon. 
In order to support this finding with data, the spatial problem horizons of 
the topics dealt with and the action horizons of the actors involved have been 
put in relation to each other. Table 3.9 provides a summary of the results, with 
all national, regional and local issues and actors summarised in the category 
“national” for the sake of clarity. The “European” categories contain statements 
by EU institutions and actors from other member states who comment on events 
in the respective country. The figures clearly show that the actors took a stand on 
issues at their respective action levels. This applies in particular to national actors 
who spoke almost exclusively on national issues, while in almost two-thirds of the 
cases, European actors also expressed their views on European issues. 
However, in more than half of the cases, global and European actors also com-
ment on national issues – in many cases they refer to multiple levels. The global 
actors with national issues include, for example, the rating agency Moody, which 
spoke in November 2007 to announce that French banks should emerge unscathed 
from the global financial crisis. These cases also include an announcement by eBay 
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Table 3.9 Actors and topics by level (multiple answers)

Thematic horizons 
Global European National Total number 
N % N % N % N % 
Actors	 Global 275 31.3 95 10.8 509 57.9 879 100 
European 50 9.2 329 60.4 312 57.2 545 126.8 
From own country 493 6.8 523 7.2 6400 88.4 7236 102.5 
Total answers 818 947 7221 8660 
Source: Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset. 
Note: % sums above 100 due to multiple answers. 
the crisis. Another example is the IMF’s demand for a deferral of Greek loan repay-
ments in December 2010. European actors who spoke on country-specific topics 
included primarily claims by European institutions and other member states, such 
as the European Central Bank’s demand on the French government in December 
2009 to secure the liquidity of the French central bank. Another example is provided 
by the rejection of state support by the EU Commission for the ailing Arcandor 
Group in June 2009. A statement by the President of the Commission, José Manuel 
Barroso, in January 2014 can also be added to this group; during a meeting in 
Brussels with the Greek Prime Minister, Andonis Samaras, he expressed his hope 
that the Greek government would implement the negotiated reform package and 
that the Greek economy would overcome the crisis. 
This finding provides us with the first indication that the public debates about 
the crisis were vertically as well as horizontally interwoven, even though the 
national focus remained. However, these results must be broken down by coun-
try, because, as has already been shown, the public debates in the various coun-
tries also differ in the extent to which they are open to non-domestic actors. This 
applies particularly to the question of how often global and European actors have 
their say on national issues. The following table summarises the figures for this 
part of the debate (Table 3.10) because, as shown, speeches on national issues 
account for the lion’s share of the debates on the crisis circulated in the media. 
The last column lists the total number of claims on national issues; the two pre-
vious columns list the shares of European and global actors who spoke on these 
national issues. 
The results show that global actors only make up a considerable proportion 
in Switzerland and the UK, while European actors play no role. The high pres-
ence of multinational corporations and globally active banks and financial service 
providers in the media coverage of these countries reflects the global orienta-
tion of the Swiss and British economies and financial world, and thus also the 
special sensitivity of these countries in their involvement in the global economic 
and financial crisis. European actors play a particularly prominent role in public 
debates in Germany and Greece. A closer look at the data shows that the European 
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Table 3.10 Claims on national issues by country (multiple answers) 
Global actors European actors Total 
N % N % 
France 34 4.1 28 3.3 839 
Germany 35 5.5 63 9.8 641 
Greece 77 8.3 109 11.7 930 
Italy 32 3.8 22 2.6 849 
Poland 56 6.2 33 3.7 903 
Spain 30 3.5 35 4.0 867 
Sweden 4 0.5 8 1.0 800 
Switzerland 99 13.5 5 0.7 735 
UK 142 15.6 9 1.0 913 
Source: Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset. 
institutions often had their say in the German newspapers in order to comment on 
and evaluate national measures for overcoming the crisis. In Greek newspapers, 
however, EU institutions and representatives of governments, industry or asso-
ciations from other member states were very strongly represented. This reflects 
the Greek government’s clear dependence on international lenders and the high 
degree of sensitivity to the role of European policy in the Greek national situation. 
Further evidence of the interrelatedness of European and national debates can 
be provided when looking at who the actors involved turn to in their claims. Not 
all claims mentioned an addressee, as this only applied to over 7,800 of the 9,000 
statements evaluated. Nor was it possible to identify in each of these claims the 
level of action at which these addressees are located because in many cases the 
actors addressed politics, the economy or society in general. Overall, it was pos-
sible to assign the addressees to a specific level of action in 73% of all statements. 
For this section, the same image that was identified in the topics can be traced (see 
Table 3.11). First of all, the data highlights the importance of the national level, as 
almost two-thirds of the statements were addressed to actors from the respective 
country. Global addressees were addressed in only every 20th claim, European 
addressees in every 12th statement. The vast majority of these statements were 
addressed to the EU, while other member states were rarely addressed. 
When relating the actors to the addressees, it can be seen from Table 3.12 that 
national actors primarily address other organisations from their country; the pro-
portion of global or European actors addressing their peers is also high. However, 
it can be noted that global and European actors very often addressed national 
organisations, as half of the statements by global actors and 43.2% of the European 
ones were addressed to national addressees. National actors also turned to the EU 
institutions or other governments in a considerable number of cases, but the rela-
tive figures are small. Since national actors dominated public debates on the crisis, 
our data set contains 330 statements addressed to EU institutions or other member 
states but this represents only a share of 7.2% of their public interventions. 
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Table 3.11 Addressees by level of action (single answers) 
N % 
Global 359 4.6 
European EU level 557 7.1 
other member states 83 1.1 
Multilateral 16 0.2 
National 4736 60.1 
Unknown 2124 27.0 
Total 7875 100.00 
Source: Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset 
Table 3.12 Actors and addressees by action level 
Addressees 
Global European 





Actors	 Global 158 35.2 61 13.6 230 51.2 449 100 
European 37 7.3 250 49.5 218 43.2 505 100.0 
National 169 3,7 330 7.2 4096 89.1 4595 100.0 
total 364 641 4544 5549 
Source: Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset. 
The intertwining of the debates on the crisis varies from country to country, 
also in terms of the addressees. When looking at the claims relating to national 
addressees, the following table shows that global actors in the UK were more rel-
evant, as in one in ten cases these organisations were aimed at British addressees 
(Table 3.13). In Greece, European actors played a greater role, as more than one 
in ten statements was from EU institutions or organisations from other member 
states and addressed to Greek actors. In 1 in 17 and 19 statements, respectively, 
these institutions addressed German or Spanish actors, and in 1 in 30 cases they 
did so with France, Spain and Italy in mind. 
In terms of numbers, these mutual references are a small part of the overall 
debate. Nevertheless, they show that the public debates in the various countries and 
on the various political stages were interrelated. This is most evident in Greece, 
where the economic and financial crisis made Greece an important point of ref-
erence for public debate and discourse. European and international actors were 
an integral part of the reporting in the Greek press. In our data set, there are 19 
statements or announcements from these actors in 2009, and in the years between 
2010 and 2012, this figure rose to 40 to 53 per year, only to fall again in 2013. 
However, it must be emphasised that our data set only collected public claims 
on a random basis, which is why the absolute number of statements was likely to 
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Table 3.13 Global and European actors speak to addressees of the countries 
Global actors European actors Total number of 
addresseesN % N % 
France 21 4.0 23 4.3 531 
Germany 27 5.1 31 5.9 527 
Greece 42 6.0 79 11.2 704 
Italy 28 3.8 25 3.4 737 
Poland 35 4.7 24 3.2 742 
Spain 20 3.8 27 5.2 520 
Sweden 0 0.0 2 1.0 209 
Switzerland 20 5.3 3 0.8 375 
UK 37 9.5 4 1.0 391 
Source: Livewhat WP3 political claims dataset. 
Note: Total number of addressees outnumbers the sum of columns because only two 
categories of actors are listed. 
be many times higher. It can therefore be assumed that “European” actors were 
heard in the Greek media at least once a week, certainly more often in the heated 
phase. These organisations included international organisations such as the IMF, 
the World Bank or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OCED), the rating agencies (Fitch, Moody, Standard & Poor’s) and multinational 
banks and financial service providers such as Deutsche Bank or Commerzbank. 
Representatives of European institutions, such as the European Commission, the 
European Parliament, the Council of Ministers or the ECB, also contributed. Also 
present were the Spanish, Italian or French Prime Minister, the German Chancellor, 
the German Minister of Finance and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
These actors were quoted with their assessments of the economic situation 
in Greece. The statements included claims announcing a sharp rise in unem-
ployment in 2010 (OECD, 7 July 2010), describing the situation of the Greek 
financial sector as disastrous (Goldman Sachs, 14 April 2010) and denouncing 
public debt (Bloomberg, 18 August 2010; IMF, 8 July 2013). Greek newspa-
pers reported that rating agencies downgraded Greece’s creditworthiness (Fitch, 
12 December 2008; Standard & Poor’s, 9 May 2011) or warned investors not 
to invest in Greece (rating agencies 14 April 2010 and 4 December 2011). The 
EU institutions (Commission, ECB, Eurogroup) and leading member states were 
very frequently quoted with assurances that Greece would remain part of the 
euro (European Head of State, 5 December 2009; Olli Rehn, Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, 30 January 2010; Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB, 
8 April 2010). Reference was repeatedly made to negotiations on the granting 
and extension of loans from European rescue packages (Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker, 13 December 2012; Poul Thomsen, Deputy Director of the 
IMF, 2 November 2013). At the same time, however, the demands of international 
lenders, the Eurogroup and important member states who linked a commitment of 
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funds to structural reforms, became public. These actors were repeatedly quoted 
with their concrete demands. They dealt with the reduction of public debt (Angela 
Merkel, German Chancellor, 26 April 2010) and the strengthening of Greek 
competitiveness (IMF, 12 April 2010). To this end, European actors called for 
wage cuts and redundancies in the public sector (Troika, 5 October 2011), cuts 
in social benefits (IMF, 21 August 2009), tax increases and a reduction in tax 
relief (Troika, 10 July 2014), the privatisation of public enterprises (German fed-
eral government, 22 July 2011) or increased flexibility of labour markets (Troika, 
10 September 2012). Dissent was only mentioned in passing, for example, when 
members of the European Parliament criticised the Troika’s austerity policy and 
called for a change of course (14 January 2011). Differences between international 
lenders on the issue of Greek debt relief and restructuring also became apparent, 
as the IMF (13 November 2012), the European institutions (ECB, 26 April 2011) 
or the German government (Wolfgang Schäuble, Minister of Finance, 31 January 
2011) took different positions on this issue. In general, however, the tenor of the 
objections and demands of international and foreign actors can be clearly heard. 
The objective was in line with a neo-liberal programme aimed at consolidating 
public budgets, deregulating markets, creating investment incentives and increas-
ing competitiveness. 
However, the interest of international organisations and European govern-
ments in Greece, which is reflected in Greek reporting, also implied that the 
“causa Greece” was also negotiated in the public debates of the other mem-
ber states. This is particularly true for the years from 2010 to 2012 when the 
threat of national bankruptcy was tangible and calls for political action became 
unmistakable. This issue repeatedly attracted attention in Germany, which is 
also related to the fact that the German government claimed political opinion 
leadership at the European level. The handling of the financial and currency 
crisis was negotiated in the German newspapers between 2010 and 2012 as an 
explosive topic in European and domestic policy and was high on the minds 
of parties, associations and think tanks. This can also be illustrated with ref-
erence to our data. Even before the law on German participation in the first 
bailout package for Greece was passed, there were voices against the communi-
tarisation of Greek debt (the liberal party FDP, 1 February 2010; the Chamber 
of Commerce Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag President Martin 
Wansleben, 15 February 2010). This debate continued until the decision of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, which declared Germany’s participation 
in the EFSM constitutional (7 September 2011) (Peter Gauweiler, Christlich-
Soziale Union member of the German parliament, 8 September 2011), although 
the opinion prevailed that the Greek sovereign debt crisis could create a domino 
effect, which is why it needed urgent resolution (Josef Ackermann, Deutsche 
Bank, 29 June 2011; Olli Rehn, Economic and Monetary Commissioner, 29 
June 2011; Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, 28 September 2011). The posi-
tion of the German federal government was repeated endlessly. Loans were 
linked to the fulfilment of strict reforms, debt relief with reference to the role 
of private investors and creditors excluded (Angela Merkel, 17 June 2011; 
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Wolfgang Schäuble, Minister of Finance, 13 November 2012 and 9 April 2013; 
Jens Weidmann, President of the German Federal Bank, 20 May 2011). After 
all, Germans should not have to pay for the rescue of Greece (Angela Merkel, 
12 August 2013). 
The criticism was directed primarily at the Greek government. Some actors 
claimed that it had been a mistake to integrate the country into the eurozone 
(Kai Wegner, Christlich Demokratische Union, and Marco Buschmann, Freie 
Demokratische Partei, 11 May 2010; Helmut Kohl, former German Chancellor, 
18 July 2011); others stated that Greece may have to be excluded from the 
monetary union again if reforms are not implemented (Philipp Rösler, German 
Minister of Economic Affairs, 7 November 2011). The opposition parties repeat-
edly attacked this strict position of the federal government and the international 
lenders, and they also spoke out against the disproportionate criticism of Greece 
(Sigmar Gabriel, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland, 27 April 2010; Jürgen 
Trittin, Green Party, and Carsten Schneider, SPD, 12 August 2013). At the same 
time, it was stated that German aid should also be given out of self-interest (Peer 
Steinbrück, SPD, 22 June 2011 and 7 February 2013; Martin Schulz, President of 
the European Parliament, 17 November 2012). There are virtually no public pro-
tests in our data, with the exception of a call to demonstrations by the trade unions 
and other groups against the eurozone crisis policy (7 January 2012). 
In other countries, the causa Greece is negotiated much less publicly. This 
applies to France, Sweden and Switzerland, but particularly to the UK, Italy and 
Spain, where our data set contains few public statements on this matter. In these 
few cases, it was primarily governments, banks or economic research institutes 
that commented on the economic and monetary consequences of Greece’s sov-
ereign debt crisis and addressed the possible implications for their own econo-
mies or currencies. Very rarely, trade unions spoke out against the EU’s austerity 
policy towards Greece and raised concerns that this could also affect their own 
country. With these statements, the perspective also remained inward, because 
these references to the EU and other EU member states were ultimately about the 
position and role of one’s own country in the European economic, monetary and/ 
or solidarity community. 
Public debates on the crisis: interlocked segmentation 
Since its beginnings in 2008, the European economic and financial crisis has also 
left its mark on the public discourses in the mass media. Many actors spoke up to 
discuss the causes and consequences of the crisis and to propose possible solu-
tions. In the nine countries studied, for which newspaper data was collected and 
analysed (Germany, France, Greece, the UK, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland 
and Spain), it quickly became apparent that mass-mediated public discourses are 
conducted by political and economic elites. The vast majority of public statements 
about the economic and financial crisis can be attributed to governments, state 
agencies or political parties, banks and rating agencies, companies, employers’ 
associations or economic research institutes, and to a certain extent also trade 
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unions and organised civil society. Confrontational objections and protest activi-
ties were very rare. Debates on the crisis conveyed by the mass media thus mobi-
lised only a very specific section of “public opinion” because here the voice of the 
social elites clearly dominates. 
Additionally, the analyses have substantiated the fact that public debates 
about the crisis unfold in a partially open discursive space. On the one hand, 
they remained committed to a national arena and agenda; on the other hand, they 
were permeated with public statements from EU institutions and claimants from 
other member states. National and European debates about the crisis were not 
separate and secluded discourses but interwoven and interrelated discussions. 
Public discourses are thus nationally segmented, but horizontally and vertically 
interconnected. 
This observation is in line with the findings of previous studies, which have 
shown that public debates in the mass media remain bound to a national frame of 
reference. They have provided evidence corroborating that countries have their 
own agendas and deal with common European topics in quite different ways 
(Gerhards 2001; Machill et al. 2006; Zschache 2016). The results of our own 
analyses emphatically confirm this picture because national discourses addressed 
the economic and financial crisis from different angles and stressed country-spe-
cific circumstances and consequences. However, our findings have also shown 
that this picture is too one-sided because national debates are not closed entities. 
Particularly within the EU, public interventions by the EU institutions and other 
member state actors are relevant news that have to be taken into consideration and 
will provoke comments or reactions. Public debates about the crisis might gravi-
tate around one’s own country, but the various national debates are embedded 
into a field of mutual influences and interrelations. This means that pan-European 
discourses can unfold within nationally segmented public spheres (Eder 2004; 
Trenz 2004; Pfetsch et al. 2006). 
The empirical data presented in this chapter evidences that pan-European 
discourses developed in response to the economic and financial crisis but that 
these discourses remained committed to a national agenda. These pan-European 
discourses thus challenge simplistic assumption, given that they are European 
and national at the same time. In the first instance, pan-European discourses are 
patterned along national segmentations. The financial and economic crisis might 
have been a joint problem, but countries were affected differently, which means 
that the crisis remained much more in the public consciousness in the southern 
European countries, while the discussions in the northern member states reached 
a peak in 2008 and 2009 and levelled off afterwards. Additionally, issue agendas 
differed as well, because public statements centred on economic developments in 
Germany or Sweden, ailing banks in France or Switzerland, redundancies and the 
unemployed in Spain or Poland and public debt in Greece or Italy, to name but a 
few examples. The focus was on country-specific causes and consequences of the 
crisis and country-specific measures taken to overcome them. 
These issues were discussed time and again in their global and European 
dimensions since one out of ten claims opened up a global problem horizon and 
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just as many statements were made in European categories when they referred 
to the situation in other member states and/or looked at the European Union as a 
whole. However, there are also differences between countries in this respect. In 
Germany, Italy and Greece, the debates were the most enriched with European 
references when asking about the importance of the European problem horizon of 
the topics in question. In contrast, the debates in the UK, Sweden and Switzerland 
were the least open towards Europe; i.e., EU institutions and actors from other 
member states hardly ever got a chance to speak there, and the topics dealt with 
were hardly ever discussed in their European dimension. The fact that Switzerland 
is not a member of the EU and that the UK and Sweden are not members of the 
eurozone undoubtedly plays a role here. For these countries, the financial and eco-
nomic crisis was only defined as an indirectly common problem, as it was seen as 
an external risk to the economic recovery of the British and Swedish economies. 
In the UK and Switzerland, the global dimension was much more important than 
the European dimension, as documented by the presence of global actors and 
global problem attributions in the media of these countries. This global dimen-
sion is due to the fact that the banking and financial sectors in both countries are 
particularly active outside of Europe. 
This national “bias” of public debates on the “common” economic and 
financial crisis is to be explained by the fact that the investigation focused on 
public statements conveyed by the mass media. The primacy of the national 
element is linked to the structure of mass media systems (Machill et al. 2006; 
Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg 2009; Zschache 2016; Segesten and Bossetta 
2019). In fact, mass media are still primarily nationally organised and oriented, 
which means that public debates reported by the mass media continue to be 
linked to linguistic areas and national markets, especially when asking about 
the audience of these media, the readership of newspapers and the listeners 
of radio broadcasts. The news value of the reports depends on the perceived 
relevance of the contributions to the specific audience, which is why it can 
be assumed that global and European reports are “nationalised” to become 
more palatable. Reports on the global financial crisis and the risks to the single 
European currency, for example, will ask what this means for each country, 
which actors are affected, what consequences can be expected and what meas -
ures should be taken. 
It can be assumed that such a national “filter” exists for the selection and 
presentation of public statements on the economic and financial crisis (Zamponi 
and Bosi 2016; Sommer et al. 2016) and that such a national filter is linked to 
the functioning and orientation patterns of mass media (Bijsmans and Altides 
2007; Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Adam et al. 2019). However, this is not the only 
reason, because if the media were the central driving force behind this national 
bias, this would be reflected in our data set. Journalists and media representatives 
who speak up themselves in our data set should become spokespersons for such 
a national agenda. This assumption cannot be confirmed because journalists and 
publicists did not privilege a national agenda but spoke as often about a global or 
European problem horizon as the other actors did. 
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It is plausible to assume that the national “bias” of public discourses about 
the crisis is determined by the dominant role of political elites within the public 
sphere (Bennett 1990; Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Skogerbo et al. 2016). In fact, 
the empirical evidence presented in this chapter shows that mass-mediated pub-
lic discourses are dominated by actors with a national mandate. They are repre-
sentatives of national governments, administrations or agencies, spokespersons of 
national employers’ associations, often also members of national banks or com-
panies, and also representatives of national trade unions and non-governmental 
organisations. Even if they operate on the international stage, their claims will 
very often be linked to their mandate and thus primarily addressed to a nationally 
defined audience. 
Public debates about the crisis are thus divided or segmented nationally for 
understandable reasons. However, this national element does not rule out the pos-
sibility of these debates having cross-border structures. As has been shown, the 
same events and topics are being discussed, common partial discourses are also 
unfolding, and there is also talk about each other. Although national segmentation 
is the dominant feature, the interconnections between national debates within a 
pan-European area of communication is a secondary but not insignificant feature 
(Trenz and Eder 2004; Pfetsch et al. 2006; Caiani and Guerra 2017; Segesten and 
Bossetta 2019). In this sense, public discourses unfold as a network of segmented 
debates. 
According to our findings, this interweaving of national debates takes place 
along the aforementioned elements. First of all, common events and issues were 
discussed in all countries. This might seem trivial because it is the function of the 
mass media to report about news. However, mass media do not fulfil this function 
in the sense of a mirror image since the actors involved and the mass media that 
circulate these claims interpret, construe and translate these events. This applies 
in particular to the public debates on the economic and financial crisis, since the 
current situation had to be initially considered to be “crisis-like”, and actors had to 
agree on such an assessment if crisis perception was to establish itself as “public 
opinion” (Bohmann and Vobruba 1992; Stråth and Wodak 2009; Coleman 2013; 
Lahusen Kousis, Kiess and Paschou 2016). The interpretation of a situation as a 
crisis is necessarily linked to public debate because such interpretations must be 
negotiated, recognised and shared. At the same time, this discursive construction 
remains fundamentally conflictual because the assessment of a situation as criti-
cal releases criticism of existing conditions and implies the need for action. Thus, 
crisis discourses are always controversial discourses on the correct diagnosis and 
the appropriate remedies (Fairclough 1993; Hay 1996; 2002; Kiess 2019). 
With regard to the crisis discourses in the nine countries examined, the debates 
were dominated by an economic, monetary and financial policy agenda, with 
two-thirds of all public claims relating to these fields. The areas of work and 
employment fell sharply, with a greater focus on high unemployment and job 
security, especially in the first year of the 2009 crisis. Social and health policy 
issues played an even more marginal role, and this also affected those coun-
tries that were hit hardest by the recession, high mass unemployment and the 
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impoverishment of entire sections of the population (especially Greece, but also 
Italy and Spain). The unison between the countries is surprising and speaks for 
a pan-European basic consensus shared by the actors raising their voices within 
the media. They saw the primary objective in stabilising the banking and finan-
cial sectors, improving the competitiveness of the economy, reducing public debt 
burdens and strengthening the single currency. Social policy measures played an 
accompanying role in alleviating the social consequences of the economic and 
financial crisis. However, they ultimately had to comply with a supply-oriented 
policy approach that focused on economic growth by improving corporate invest-
ment decisions, bank liquidity and currency stability. Criticism of this dominant 
agenda was expressed as well, in the newspapers examined, but this was only a 
very small minority of statements. 
A second striking element of these crisis debates, which points to a pan-Euro-
pean crisis discourse, can be found in the claims that advocated a pan-European 
solution to the problem. This debate gained momentum in 2010 when it became 
clear to governments that the crisis had caused massive distortions in the member 
states and could therefore entail incalculable risks for the internal market and the 
single currency. Although the debate was sparked by Greece’s looming national 
bankruptcy, it also pointed to the problem of the high national debt of several 
member states (Ireland, Portugal, Spain or Italy). The fact that this partial debate 
placed a clear emphasis on monetary, financial and competition policy certainly 
has something to do with the competences of the European Union because in 
these areas the EU institutions are much more active than in the areas of labour 
market and employment, social and health policy. However, it also seemed 
decisive that the group of actors involved was quite small, as it consisted of the 
EU Commission, the European Central Bank, the Council of Ministers, and the 
International Monetary Fund. Apparently these actors were able to agree quite 
quickly on a general approach. At the European level, it can be stated without 
reservation that the battle to interpret the crisis, especially with regard to the 
causes and the steps derived from these, can be regarded as concluded as of 2010. 
The participants generally agreed that the crisis had a strong financial and fis-
cal policy component, which was largely attributed to the high level of debt of 
the states and banks and the imminent dangers for the common currency. The 
measures negotiated primarily concerned the member states that were part of the 
common currency (e.g., the euro rescue package and the various aid packages for 
Greece). However, our evaluations have shown that there was also a view in the 
other countries that there was no alternative to such a policy in order to get the 
European Economic Area off the ground again as a whole. 
There is also a third indication of a European interlinking of public debates 
in the individual countries among the actors involved. Public debates about the 
economic and financial crisis centred mainly on national issues and agendas and 
mainly involved actors from the respective countries. However, the European 
institutions and some member states (in particular the German government) 
repeatedly appeared in the newspaper reports of other countries with their assess-
ments and demands, particularly frequently in Greece, but again and again also 
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in Poland, Italy and Spain. At the same time, the situation in other countries was 
repeatedly the subject of country-specific debates, because the causa Greece, for 
example, was often discussed by the German government, the German economic 
institutes or associations. Particularly with regard to Greece and Germany, the 
public debates were interlinked on a transnational basis, as they were always 
talked about and both referred to one another. In quantitative terms, these cross-
border claims are only a small proportion of all statements printed in the news-
papers of the countries. But our data are based on a representative sample from a 
much larger overall population of public claims, which is why it can be assumed 
that such articles are likely to have appeared regularly (sometimes weekly) in the 
press. 
The public debates about the crisis thus reveal the existence of a common 
political field in which the right way of dealing with the economic and financial 
crisis, including before the eyes of the mass media, was discussed. With regard 
to the field-theoretical frame of reference and the objectives pursued here, the 
question of whether this also constitutes a “European public sphere” does not 
appear to be the relevant one. The mass media continues to be primarily nation-
ally structured, which is why debates mediated by the mass media also remain 
a national issue. This also applies to the debates on the economic and financial 
crisis. However, the field-theoretical frame of reference on which this study was 
based sensitises us to the fact that “published opinions” within the EU are pulled 
out of a purely national discourse space and are drawn into a common field of 
political will formation and decision-making. What European and national actors 
say about the crisis also becomes politically relevant for other countries in a com-
mon Europe. European and national actors therefore not only struggle within the 
EU institutions for binding decisions on how to deal properly with the crisis but 
also wrangle within the public space for the valid interpretation of the crisis and 
the justification of political decisions. 
These observations are of particular importance for an analysis of people’s 
political attitudes because they show that public opinions are expressed and 
formed within a pan-European field of debate and contestation. Controversies 
about the economic and financial crisis are not settled within a purely national 
arena of public debate, given that views from “outside” have an effect on the for-
mation of “public opinions” about the extent to which the economy and society 
in the various member states were affected by the crisis and how well the crisis 
and its consequences were handled. Although the focus of the debates was pri-
marily national, the severity of the crisis, the extent of the social upheavals and 
the appropriateness of the countermeasures in the respective countries were ulti-
mately “comparatively” determined within a pan-European frame of reference. 
This is an indication of European standards of perception and assessment. The 
national frame of reference is obviously not dissolved but apparently embedded 
in a pan-European reference horizon. 
4
4 A European compass 
Citizens’ perceptions of European 
living conditions 
European integration is having an impact on everyday life in various ways. 
Europeans have stepped up their mobility in recent decades when considering 
educational pathways, professional work and career development. They have 
developed informal contact networks, consumption habits and leisure time activ-
ities that frequently transcend national borders (Mau 2009; Kuhn 2011; 2012; 
Delhey et al. 2014). All this allows them to extend the range of their experience 
and knowledge beyond national borders within their personal life. Additionally, 
citizens make use of mass media and are thus enmeshed in public debates that 
recurrently address news from other European countries. In the face of various 
crises, there has been increasing attention focused on living conditions in other 
European countries and the interdependence of economic and political conditions 
(Vobruba 2012), as evidenced in the previous chapter. It is thus very likely that 
Europeans directly or indirectly relate the situation in other European countries 
to their own living conditions, thus encouraging people to place themselves on a 
European cognitive map. 
The European Union is nurturing this European frame of reference explicitly 
(Beck and Grande 2007). Social cohesion and equal living conditions are among 
the EU’s key objectives (EU Commission 2009; Council of Europe 2000; 2004; 
2010), and instruments to measure and assess the performance of member states 
and their regions are at the very centre of European institutions and policies. 
In fact, the EU sees Europe as a common social space that must be integrated 
and harmonised legally through binding fundamental rights, politically through 
joint decisions and financially through structural funds worth billions (Kangas 
and Ritakallio 2007; Lahusen 2013). The implementation of European policy is 
accompanied by more or less binding processes of evaluation, control and sanc-
tions (Hodson and Maher 2001; Heidenreich and Zeitlin, 2009; Jessoula 2015; 
Copeland and Daly 2018). Although these efforts in no way reduce economic and 
social inequalities between countries, regions and people to the desired extent, 
the EU is at least establishing a cognitive map of Europe, institutionalised in the 
form of databases and expert bodies, regular evaluations and decision-making 
processes. In this way, the EU urges political actors and the public to compare 
countries, regions and people. 
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European integration should have thus shaped the way European citizens per-
ceive and assess their own situation by animating them to compare themselves 
with other Europeans. This expanded frame of reference might have a significant 
impact on their perceptions and assessments of the social and political reality in 
which they live. This is to be expected if research on reference groups is taken 
into consideration. Many of these studies showed early on that people frequently 
compare their social situation with that of other groups (Merton and Kitt 1950; 
Kapteyn, van Praag and van Herwaarden 1978). People judge their own situa-
tion as good or bad not only in absolute categories but also relative to that of 
others, as better or worse. For this reason, the feeling of social disadvantage is 
very often a relational feeling, i.e., one of relative disadvantage or deprivation 
compared to other people (Walker and Smith 2010). In the search for relevant 
reference groups, research has identified a large number of real or imaginary ref -
erence groups, e.g., friends, neighbours or colleagues, professional groups, social 
classes or generations (van Praag 2011; Luttmer 2005; Goerke and Pannenberg 
2015). Countries can also become points of reference for comparison because 
people compare their social situation with the perceived living conditions in other 
countries with demonstrable consequences for their own life satisfaction (Delhey 
and Kohler 2006; Lahusen and Kiess 2019). 
The analyses of this chapter are guided by these insights and wish to assess the 
extent to which and how citizens perceive and assess differences between living 
conditions of various reference groups, among their friends, their neighbourhood, 
their country and most importantly, other European countries. This inquiry will 
prepare the ground for the subsequent chapters, which will be interested in the 
potential effect of perceived living conditions abroad on the political attitudes 
and evaluations of European citizens. Before embarking on this task, however, 
a number of questions have to be answered. Are Europeans able and ready to 
assess living conditions between European countries? To what degree do these 
perceptions deviate from the assessment of more immediate reference groups, 
such as friends or neighbourhoods? Do Europeans from different countries agree 
in regard to their perception of living conditions in other European countries? 
And how do they see their own situation, when compared to these assessments of 
living conditions abroad? 
Data collected by Livewhat, an EU-funded research project (see Chapter 1), on 
the basis of an online population survey (CAWI) conducted in 2015, can be exam-
ined to answer these questions. The representative samples consist of at least 2,000 
respondents from each of the participating countries (Germany, France, Greece, the 
UK, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain). Although this data set does not 
provide a complete picture of the EU with its former 28 member states, the country 
selection gives us a varied insight into the topic because these countries represent 
very different social realities, as will be shown. Data comes from old and new mem-
ber states, as well as from a non-member country (Switzerland). There are economi-
cally strong and weak countries that were hit more or less severely by the economic 
and financial crisis, and levels and forms of social inequalities and societal divisions 
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necessary insights because it was built on a questionnaire that was explicitly inter-
ested in a comparison of living conditions, using different reference groups for this 
purpose. On this basis, it is possible to paint a nuanced picture of the divergent liv-
ing conditions in a diversity of European countries and the specific ways European 
citizens perceive and evaluate them. 
Social divisions and perceptions of divergent living conditions 
Living conditions are, indeed, very different when comparing European coun-
tries. Scholarly writing explains these differences with reference to a number of 
factors, among them the strength of the national economy, the inclusiveness of 
the labour market, the magnitude of the welfare state and its measures of social 
redistribution (Beckfield 2006; Barbieri and Cutuli 2016; Heidenreich 2016a; 
Saltkjel 2018; Verbunt and Guio 2019). In more specific monetary terms, living 
conditions are determined by access to paid work, labour-market-specific wage 
levels and welfare-related social benefits on the one hand, and by the accessibility 
of goods and services within market economies on the other. These differences 
materialise in social inequalities, given that households have dissimilar levels of 
monetary income and consumption of goods. Commonly, these social inequalities 
are measured in terms of income differentials, risk of poverty rates and/or levels 
of material deprivation (Fusco, Guio and Marlier 2010; Guio 2018). 
The available data paint a clear picture of diverging living conditions in 
European societies, as visualised in the following two graphs (Figure 4.1). The 
left figure plots the strength of the national economy (measured in gross domestic 
product per capita in purchase parity standards (PPS) in euro) against the per-
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Figure 4.1 Living conditions – selected indicators (2015). 
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strain, the availability of durables, housing deprivation and the environment of the 
dwelling. The right side graph plots levels of social expenditure per capita against 
the rate of households that are at risk of poverty, as they only earn less than 60% 
of the national median equivalised disposable income. The eight countries in the 
centre of attention are highlighted in order to show that they represent, by and 
large, the range of disparate living conditions in Europe. 
The data show that European countries with a lower level of economic wealth 
per capita are also those with higher rates of households living in conditions 
of material deprivation. The fact that material deprivation is less extensive in 
Sweden, even though the GDP per capita is lower than the one of Switzerland, 
shows that economic development is not the only contextual condition impacting 
on material deprivation but also the generosity of the welfare state (Saltkjel 2018; 
Verbunt and Guio 2019). As indicated in the graph on the right, the percentage of 
households that are at risk of poverty, when considering their disposable income, 
is lower in countries with higher rates of social expenditure. 
More information about the living conditions of households is provided in 
Table 4.1, which summarises available data on a number of socio-economic indi-
cators for our nine countries. The rate of households suffering material depri -
vations while very low in Sweden and Switzerland is elevated in Greece, Italy 
and Spain. This has to do with the higher shares of households living under the 
statistical poverty line in regard to their income situation. These higher rates 
have to do, in the first instance, with higher unemployment rates, in particular, 
long-term unemployment, as joblessness deprives household members of earn-
ings. However, unequal wages within the labour market also contribute to poverty 
rates, given that countries with higher levels of income inequalities are among 
those with a greater number of households living at risk of poverty. Finally, the 
generosity of the welfare state makes a considerable difference, given that the 
risk of belonging to a poor household is lower in countries with a welfare state 
investing higher sums of public funds into redistribution, and thus contributing 
to the household income through social benefits. However, there is also an indi -
rect effect of the performance of the national economy, given that countries with 
a higher GDP per capita (and a higher growth rate) are also among those with 
a more proactive welfare state. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 has 
had a considerable impact on the economic development of the European Union, 
albeit with big differences between its member states. Switzerland, Germany and 
Sweden experienced only a short-term economic recession (Poland was margin-
ally affected), while the Mediterranean countries – Spain, Italy and most notably 
Greece – were exposed to a longstanding economic crisis that has had consider-
able effects on living conditions. 
Macro-economic development has had a clear impact on European citizens, 
given that a considerable share of the respondents participating in the Livewhat 
survey in 2015 reported less favourable socio-economic situations. Tables 4.2 and 
4.3 summarise the finding of questions that tried to grasp the subjective perception 
of economic aggravations at the household and national levels. In the first instance, 
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Table 4.2	 Subjective perception of the household situation compared to earlier times 
(means, 1=“much better” – 10=“much worse”) 
Compared to 
5 years ago 12 months ago Differences 

















































































Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
to five years and twelve months ago, using in both cases a ten-point scale that has 
been recoded to run from one, “much better”, to ten, “much worse”, for the purpose 
of analysis. In the northern European countries, citizens tended to opt for the inter-
mediary categories, indicating that respondents perceive their household situation 
to be neither better nor worse, that is, ultimately unchanged or stable. Answers vary 
around this opinion, on average two and a half points, but this shows that there 
is largely agreement among the vast majority of the surveyed population. Polish 
respondents marginally lean towards the negative assessment, but it is particularly 
the French, Spanish and Italian, who converge on the opinion that their households’ 
living conditions have deteriorated. In the Greek case, it has become much worse. 
When taking a closer look at the assessment of the developments during the last 
12 months, we see that the differences between countries shrink, given that the 
northern countries see, on average, a slight deterioration, while the Mediterranean 
countries report minor improvements. Greek respondents assess their household’s 
situation more than one point less precarious, when comparing the last 12 months 
with five years ago, as the last column of Table 4.2 shows. 
Respondents were also asked to assess the development of the national econ-
omy. The findings do not markedly diverge when compared to the evaluation 
of the household situation. British, German and Swedish respondents report a 
minor downturn, while the Italian, French and Greek respondents indicate sub-
stantial degradations. Overall, respondents paint a gloomier picture of the national 
economy (see the last column of Table 4.3) – with the exception of the British, 
who testified that the national economy is in a slightly better condition than their 
own households. However, the assessment of the personal and the national situ-
ation is very similar, thus reaffirming the ranking between the nine countries. In 
countries with a weaker performance of the national economy, the situation of 
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Table 4.3	 Subjective perception of the national economy – compared (means, 1=“much 
better” – 10=“much worse”) 
Compared to 12 months ago 
Mean SD N 
Difference to the 







































Greece 9.04 2.06 2016 1.31 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
the respondents’ own household has also deteriorated; in those countries with a 
more stable economy, the personal living conditions remain largely unaltered. It 
would appear that the citizenry has a tendency to rank the living conditions of 
their household and their social environment in a highly congruous manner. 
This general observation disregards the potential variations that might prevail 
within each of the nine countries. In fact, the economic situation of households 
differs considerably within each nation state, mirroring the social inequalities 
depicted above. Following these observations, it is to be assumed that the assess-
ment of the economic situation and the potential aggravations reported by citizens 
will differ significantly between households in weak and strong economic condi-
tions. Additionally, it is very likely that the different sensitivity towards past eco-
nomic aggravations might be patterned by both the specific position of households 
in the stratification system of each country and by the joint experiences of citizens 
of the same country. This assumption requires validation, particularly because the 
ambition of this chapter is to highlight whether respondents assess their living 
conditions with “countries” as contextual frameworks. 
In order to account for the internal variation of perceptions between and within 
countries, a linear regression analysis was calculated with the assessment of the 
household situation, compared to the living conditions five years ago, as the 
dependent variable. The two other items (i.e., the perceived economic develop-
ment of the household and national economy in the last 12 months) generated 
similar findings, albeit with slightly lower effects. The analysis includes two sets 
of explanatory factors: the various countries of residence and a number of stand-
ard indicators of the respondents’ social structural position (age, gender, migra-
tion background, education, income, occupational status). In regard to countries, 
we assume that residents will share a similar assessment of the economic situa-
tion of their household with countries in a better socio-economic situation (see 
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Table 4.1 above) encouraging more positive assessments, while nation states with 
worse living conditions encourage feelings of economic deterioration. The fact 
that countries mirror specific socio-economic, institutional or cultural contexts 
will be disregarded for the moment and taken up in Chapter 6 because at this point 
of the analysis, it is important to unveil whether countries are a relevant refer-
ence point affecting the assessment of living conditions, as confirmed in general 
terms by previous studies (Kapteyn et al. 1978; Frey and Stutzer 2000; Böhnke 
2008). In regard to the social structural position of respondents, we assume that 
vulnerability determines the perception of economic degradation, in the sense that 
households with a weak socio-economic condition (i.e., in terms of income, edu-
cational attainment, social class affiliation, occupational group) might experience 
social degradation much more directly than households with a stronger position. 
Table 4.4 summarises the findings in two steps, focusing on country effects 
before and after including a number of social structural predictors. The find-
ings show that the perception of economic deterioration is influenced by both 
the country of residence and the degree of social structural vulnerabilities, given 
that the overall explanatory power of the integrated model is higher than the one 
with country variables alone. That is, the effect of national contexts does decrease 
once the social divisions within countries are included in the model. However, the 
reduction is moderate and restricted to the German, Swedish, Polish and Italian 
respondents. Swedish respondents are among those who report less often about 
the degradation of their household situation when compared with the French; a 
similar observation applies to the German, Swiss, British and Polish respondents. 
In Spain and Greece, the likelihood of perceiving aggravations is much higher, 
particularly among Greek respondents who rank the economic situation of their 
households 2.1 points worse than those of the French. In terms of predictive 
margins, French respondents opted, on average, for a 6.8 on the 10-point scale, 
while Greek respondents chose an 8.9. In regard to individual vulnerabilities, 
households with the poorest income situation assess their living conditions more 
than one point worse than five years ago, when compared with households with 
the best income situation. The same is true for the unemployed or chronically 
ill respondents and those affiliating themselves with the lower middle or lowest 
social classes. 
The two factors, national contexts and internal vulnerability, are interrelated, 
which means that the perception of deteriorating living conditions diverges con-
siderably between poor and rich households of economically strong and weak 
countries. If we estimate the average assessments of different occupational groups 
(predictive margins) on the basis of the regression model above, we see how far 
apart the households from different countries are. Unemployed Greek respond-
ents with a low household income will assess their household’s situation as 
much worse than it was five years ago (9.94 points on the 10-point scale), while 
Swedish respondents in the same situation indicate a modest decrease only (an 
estimated average of 6.4). Fully employed Swedish citizens with high incomes 
report a slight improvement (an average of 4.4), while the same respondents in 
Greece argue that they are confronted with a considerable degradation of their 
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Table 4.4 Perception of the household’s living conditions (OLS regression, 
marginal effects) 
Country (France) 
Sweden −1.994*** −1.545*** 
Germany −1.316*** −0.854*** 
Switzerland −1.080*** −0.809*** 
United Kingdom −1.000*** −0.906*** 
Poland −0.689*** −0.319*** 
Italy 0.251*** 0.007 
Spain 0.231*** 0.353*** 
Greece 2.082*** 2.089*** 
Age (std.) 0.430*** 
Gender (male) 0.087** 
Born in country (yes) −0.210*** 
Educational attainment (university) 
Secondary −0.055 
Less than secondary −0.140** 
Income (highest tercile) 
Middle tercile 0.432*** 
Lowest tercile 1.106*** 
Subjective social class (upper) 
Middle 0.393*** 
Lower middle 0.864*** 
Lower 1.425*** 
Main activity (full time) 
Part-time employment 0.111* 
In education 0.416*** 
Unemployed 0.904*** 
Chronically ill 0.934*** 
Retired −0.153** 
Housework, care 0.146 
Observations  14523  14523 
Pseudo R2 0.178 0.292 
Significance level: * P < 0.1; ** P < 0.05; *** P < 0.01.

Data Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey.

living conditions (an average of 7.9). It is noteworthy that unemployed Swedish 
respondents report a less drastic deterioration in their living conditions when com-
pared to the employed Greek respondents. 
Obviously, this peculiar ranking does not entail that the two groups have simi-
lar living conditions because our dependent variable measures perceived changes 
across time. In regard to objective indicators, we can expect that the poorest 
Swedish households will be exposed to stronger vulnerabilities than Greek house-
holds with a very good income situation. However, what these comparisons show 
is that the perception of relative deprivation is strongly dependent on the country 
of residence. Respondents from the same country share similar experiences, albeit 
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on different levels of personal wealth. These findings indicate that respondents 
share an understanding of how their countries are doing, what the standard of 
living conditions is, with which they compare themselves and how they have gen-
erally developed across time. This consensus hints at comparative assessments 
between countries. The fact that Greek respondents agree on the weakness of their 
economy and household situation, while Swedish respondents discard significant 
deteriorations of their economy and personal living standards does not seem to be 
determined only by their being asked to compare today’s situation with the situ-
ation in previous times. It seems as though respondents share a feeling of where 
they are placed in comparison with other countries and citizens. 
The relevance of European living conditions for people 
These preliminary findings raise the question of whether “countries” are relevant 
reference groups with which individual respondents compare themselves when 
assessing their living conditions and forming political perceptions and opinions. 
Earlier studies have provided evidence supporting the assumption that countries 
are relevant reference groups (Kapteyn et al. 1978). This applies for one thing to 
one’s own country because it has been shown that the perception of economic, 
social and political conditions in one’s own country has a discernible influence on 
personal life satisfaction (Frey and Stutzer 2000; Böhnke 2008). But a compari-
son with living conditions in other countries has also proved to be an equally reli-
able factor. This insight was gained from studies by Jan Delhey and his research 
team because survey data from 1999 and 2002 enabled them to determine the 
influence of the perceived living conditions of a number of reference groups, such 
as friends, neighbours, fellow citizens of the country, and also other countries, 
on personal life satisfaction. The comparison with other countries was validated 
as an influential factor in these studies (Delhey et al. 2002; Delhey and Dragolov 
2014; Lahusen and Kiess 2019). 
However, until now, research has not been interested in whether such 
comparisons also shape people’s political attitudes. These questions will be 
addressed in this and the next chapters on the basis of the data presented above. 
It is necessary to remember that this survey was conducted in 2015, i.e., dur-
ing the European economic and financial crisis. Disparities and inequalities 
between countries are expected to be more virulent and prominent in such times. 
Macro-economic indicators (e.g., economic performance and growth, employ-
ment and unemployment, salaries and income) confirm that national differences 
have widened since 2008 (Barbieri and Cutuli 2016; Heidenreich 2016a). And 
as was shown in the previous chapter, the living conditions in the member states 
and the political measures to overcome the crisis were discussed intensively 
in the countries (Kutter and Jessop 2015; Monza and Anduiza 2016; Sommer 
et al. 2016). It can be assumed that there is also likely to be heightened public 
awareness of differences in national living conditions in times of crisis and that 
people are also likely to be able to compare themselves with other Europeans in 
these circumstances. 
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Data collected in the Livewhat project is used to examine countries as refer-
ence groups. In this investigation, people were asked to place other countries on 
an 11-point scale, after placing their own country. The list included the nine coun-
tries that were part of this project, which makes it possible to provide data on eight 
benchmarks. For each country, respondents made their assessments using a scale 
ranging from 1 (“very bad living conditions”) to 11 (“very good living conditions”); 
“don’t know” was also a possible answer. In addition to these questions, the partici-
pants were asked about their own current living conditions as well as the conditions 
in the neighbourhood and among friends, each along the same scale. In addition, 
there were questions about assessing the living conditions in one’s own country. 
Looking at the results, the first thing of interest is whether respondents have 
the confidence to assess living conditions in other countries. For this purpose, 
Table 4.5 shows the percentage of respondents who selected “don’t know” for 
each of these questions. In the italic parentheses, the proportions of respondents 
who do not know the living conditions in their own country are added. 
It can be seen that only a very small minority is not able to estimate how good 
or bad the living conditions in other European countries are. The proportion of 
people who feel unable to rate their own country is even lower, which indicates 
that they are even more familiar with their own country’s conditions. In regard 
to the assessment of other countries, the differences are rather small. British citi -
zens are consistently more often unable to evaluate the living conditions abroad 
because the proportion of “don’t know” ranges between 11.6% (in regard to 
Greece) and 13.7% (Italy). The readiness to assess living conditions abroad also 
varies very little for the other respondents because the shares of “don’t knows” are 
either 4% (Italy), 7.5% (Greece) or 11.4% (Poland) apart. 
On closer inspection, respondents particularly believe they can make an assess-
ment with regard to living conditions in Greece and Germany. People are the least 
likely to assess the situation in Poland. The attention that Greece and Germany 
have received in public debates on the EU’s economic and financial crisis may 
explain this noticeable accumulation. The fact that many people feel more famil-
iar with living conditions in Switzerland than with those in Poland may have 
something to do with cultural proximity and the historical heritage of the division 
of Europe. However, this cannot be fully clarified. 
The socio-structural profile of those who do not believe they can answer the 
question of living conditions in other countries can be determined more clearly. 
For this purpose, a binary logistic regression analysis was performed, which tries 
to determine whether the people who ticked “don’t know” differ from those who 
provided an answer (no matter which one). It is to be assumed that those respond-
ents who do not feel confident in their assessment are among the more disadvan-
taged in terms of social structure, are less frequently informed via the mass media 
and also have less social capital in the form of personal contacts and organisa-
tional memberships. They are likely to be less well-connected and less informed. 
To check whether these effects are not caused by socio-demographic factors, such 
as age, gender or migration background and differences between countries, these 
factors were also included in the calculations. 
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The results in Table 4.6 largely confirm these assumptions. As can be seen, 
this table has refrained from extending the evaluations to all nine reference coun-
tries. Instead, only the results of the two countries that cover the spectrum of 
response behaviour have been determined. These are the countries with the lowest 
(Greece) and highest (Poland) shares of “don’t know” answers. As will be shown, 
the explanations for the response behaviour are similar in both cases. Finally, it 
should also be noted that the total number of cases taken into account varies, as 
respondents from Greece and Poland were asked to assess the living conditions in 
the other countries and are not taken into account in regard to their own country. 
Overall, the explanatory power of the model with its various influencing fac -
tors is not very high. In the Greek case, the r2 coefficient is higher than in the 
Polish case. This may be due to the fact that the number of people who did not 
want to respond varied between the two countries. In the Greek case, there were 
fewer respondents, increasing the likelihood that they are people with a similar 
social profile. In the case of Poland, the group was larger and possibly also more 
socially heterogenous. Despite the generally low explanatory content, however, 
the findings still give us information about the social profile of people who do not 
believe themselves capable of making an assessment. 
Educational attainment is one of the more important determinants, as people 
with lower educational attainment tend more often not to give an answer to the 
question of living conditions in Poland. The relative probability of not answer-
ing the question is 3.7% higher among respondents with the lowest educational 
attainment level when compared with those with university degrees. It is pos-
sible to identify the expected shares predicting probabilities on this basis. Only 
9.2% of people with a university degree do not provide an answer; this proportion 
increases by 2% and 3.7% to 11.2% and 12.9% for those with secondary educa-
tion and those without a school-leaving qualification, respectively. For Greece, 
the relative difference is estimated to be 3.3%, which means that the predictive 
probability increases from 3.6% to 6.9% when comparing the group with the low-
est and highest level of education. It is also remarkable that the budgetary situa-
tion has an influence on response behaviour. More often than not, people do not 
respond if they live in a household that is economically worse off than before. 
It can be assumed that this is an effect of social disadvantage. The fact that the 
subjective stratification assessment has a similar effect also fits this assumption. 
People locating themselves at the lower end of the stratification structure more 
often state that they do not know the conditions in other countries – even if this 
effect is statistically significant only for Poland. 
In addition to these socio-structural characteristics, it was shown that media 
consumption makes a difference. People who do not regularly inform themselves 
via the mass media also frequently do not provide an answer. Social capital also 
plays a role because people who meet with friends more often and are also mem-
bers of one or more (volunteer) organisations put a “don’t know” on record less 
often. In addition to the mass media, friends and organisations seem to offer a 
means of finding out about living conditions in other countries. Finally, the results 
show that women fail to respond more often than men. The youngest and older 
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Table 4.6	 Social profile of respondents with “don’t know” (logistic regression, average 
marginal effects) 
Don’t know living conditions in Greece Poland 
Socio-structural position 
Education level (ref: university degree and above) 
Secondary education 
Lower than secondary education 
Household situation (ref: better than before) 







Worse 0.025*** 0.026*** 
Subjective class assignment (ref: upper classes) 
Middle class 0.008 0.018 
Lower middle class 0.005 0.005 
Working class and lower class 0.017** 0.038*** 
Informedness and social capital 
Regular newspaper reader (ref: min. 3 days/week) 
Meeting friends (ref: less than once a week) 





Every week and more 






In two −0.028*** −0.036*** 
In three and more −0.043*** −0.064*** 
Socio-demographic factors 
Gender (ref: male) 






45–64 −0.023*** −0.030*** 
65+ −0.029*** −0.020** 
Migration background (ref: no) 
Place of residence (ref: city and surroundings) 
(Small) town 







Country (ref: United Kingdom) 

















Greece — 0.022* 
Observations 14.459 14.591 
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.0663 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey.

Note: Significance levels: * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.
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respondents are significantly more likely to evaluate living conditions elsewhere 
compared to those in the middle of their careers and family life. The place of 
residence has no discernible influence, which means that it is also possible to rule 
out an urban-rural divide. 
These findings show that people in socially disadvantaged situations abstain 
somewhat more frequently from providing an answer. Conversely, this means 
that the group of respondents who assess living conditions elsewhere have a slight 
middle- and upper-class bias. This can be seen not only in the higher level of edu-
cation and the better economic situation of households. The greater availability 
of social capital also fits this stratification component because previous research 
has shown that the middle and upper classes have larger contact networks and 
increased organisational memberships (van Oorschot, Arts, Gelissen 2006; Warr 
2006; Deutschmann and Delhey 2015). 
Overall, it can be stated that people in the investigated countries are familiar 
with living conditions in other European countries. At least, they are so familiar 
with them that they are confident enough to make an assessment along a scale. 
Only a very small minority of respondents stated that they were unable to answer 
this question. It is remarkable that the proportion of respondents who are unable or 
unwilling to assess the situation in their own country is similar. These initial obser-
vations are important for further analyses. First of all, it can be seen that people are 
sufficiently informed about living conditions in other European countries as they are 
about those in their own country or at least that they are supported in their assess-
ment by the media, friends or organisations. It can therefore also be assumed that 
people are so familiar with living conditions in other countries that they are likely 
to compare themselves with other Europeans. This would mean that other countries 
play a role for people as relevant reference groups. Later analyses will look at the 
consequences of these comparisons for people’s political thinking. 
One’s own place within a European space
of unequal living conditions 
When looking at the vast majority of those who feel confident to assess the living 
conditions in other European countries, the answers are quite striking. Figure 4.2 
summarises the results by showing how respondents assess living conditions in 
nine European countries. The scale ranges from 1 (very bad) to 11 (very good). 
The bars reflect the data of all respondents, with the exception of the inhabitants of 
the country, as only the living conditions outside their own country were assessed. 
It can be seen that the respondents assess the living conditions in Switzerland as 
very good because the median value is 10, which means 50% of the respondents 
describe the Swiss conditions with an 11 as very good and 50% of responses are 
below. The grey bar shows that half of the respondents assess life in Switzerland 
between 9 and 11. The spike on the left side of the grey box indicates the assess-
ments given by a further quarter of the respondents, in this case, a mediocre to 
good value (6 to 9). There are outliers, but the answers are scattered much less 
compared with answers for the other countries. 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
very bad very good 
Figure 4.2 Living conditions in other countries (boxplot). Source: Livewhat WP4 
population survey. 
Sweden and Germany are placed behind Switzerland. Living conditions are 
also rated as good here as the median value is 9; the median 50% of respondents 
state between 8 and 10. While the lower quarter rates the situation as less than 
good (5 to 8), the top quarter assesses the situation as excellent. The ratings for the 
UK, France and Italy dropped again by a few points on the scale, as did those for 
Spain and Poland. Additionally, respondents do not agree as much, as the range 
of the responses increases not only in the median 50% but also in the lower and 
upper quarters. For Poland, respondents use the entire range of values. The trend 
is for living conditions to be considered rather mediocre. Greece comes off worst 
in this assessment, even if the values are also scattered here. 
The subjective assessments correspond to the picture that would be expected 
when consulting available indicators for country-specific living conditions. For 
example, following the OECD’s Better Life Index, which includes a number of 
indicators such as housing, income and employment, education, environment, 
health, life satisfaction and security in the country comparison, an almost identi-
cal order for our countries in 2015 can be seen, with only Italy and Spain changing 
places. When looking at individual OECD indicators separately, there are some 
shifts. In the subjective assessment of their own health, Switzerland and Sweden 
are once again in the lead with a high number of satisfied people (81% and 80% 
of respondents respectively). The UK and Greece are equal (74%), followed by 
Spain (72%), France (67%), Germany (65%) and Poland (58%). Similar rank-
ings are also repeated with regard to many other indicators, such as disposable 
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Table 4.7 Assessment of the living conditions in the nine countries (mean values) 
Self-assessment External assessment Deviation 
Average SD N Average SD N 
Switzerland 8.27 2.15 1994 9.50 1.63 14859 1.23 
Sweden 8.24 2.06 1900 9.09 1.73 14884 0.85 
Germany 7.97 2.00 1958 8.66 1.83 15023 0.69 
UK 7.61 1.95 1940 7.97 1.89 15039 0.36 
France 6.22 2.10 1905 7.61 1.83 14834 1.39 
Italy 4.86 2.10 1967 6.19 1.96 14672 1.33 
Spain 5.69 2.03 1975 6.09 1.93 14793 0.40 
Poland 5.25 2.19 1933 5.38 1.88 14125 0.13 
Greece 4.12 2.01 2011 3.76 2.15 15105 −0.35 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
household income, where Switzerland, Germany and Sweden are at the top of the 
list with US$ 33,491, US$ 31,252 and US$ 29,185, respectively. They are fol-
lowed by France (US$ 28,799), the UK (US$ 27,029), Italy (US$ 25,166), Spain 
(US$ 22,477) and Greece (US$ 18,575), which is why Poland (US$ 17,852) drops 
to the end (OECD, 2014).1 
Overall, the findings show that respondents in the nine countries are generally 
in agreement as to which countries have the best and worst living conditions. The 
ranking that people make is also confirmed when looking at how respondents 
view living conditions in their own country. As can be seen in Table 4.7, the 
Swiss and Swedish respondents also believe that conditions in their country are 
very good, while those from Greece consider the conditions to be rather mediocre. 
Only the Italians are changing the order because they evaluate the conditions in 
their own country to be almost the same as those in Greece. 
What is interesting about the findings is the difference between the external 
assessment and the self-assessment because the conditions in one’s own country 
are assessed more negatively almost everywhere than they are from outside. This 
is shown by the mean values of the respective estimates and the deviation between 
the two values, which are listed separately in the last columns. The deviation 
is particularly pronounced for France, as self-perception is at a moderate 6.22, 
while the external assessment of French living conditions has turned out better 
at 7.61. The same applies to the Swiss, as they consider the living conditions in 
their country to be quite good with an average of 8.27; however, the respondents 
from all other countries rate the situation in Switzerland 1.23 points better. This 
picture is repeated in most countries, albeit at a lower level. In Spain, the UK and 
Poland, the differences are smaller but point in a similar direction. The opposite is 
1 The data are also available online at the following link: http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/ 
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the case only with Greece because although the Greeks consider the situation in 
their own country to be rather poor, respondents from the other countries assume 
an even more negative situation. Media coverage of the economic crisis and its 
disastrous consequences for life in Greece has obviously had a very clear impact 
on people’s perception. 
Finally, it is striking that all respondents rate living conditions in other countries 
quite similarly. In fact, Table 4.7 shows that external assessments are less scat-
tered than self-perceptions, as can be seen from the standard deviation. In terms 
of self-perception, respondents’ assessments vary by two points around the mean 
value, while this value drops noticeably for the external assessment, especially for 
the two top-ranked countries. It is only with regard to Greece that opinions differ 
somewhat more. This unanimity is remarkable inasmuch as the respondents from 
all other countries were taken into account in the external assessment, which means 
that more than seven times as many opinions were included than for the assess-
ment of living conditions in respondents’ own countries. The circle of participants 
is therefore much larger, and yet the assessments are much closer together. 
Especially with regard to the best-placed countries (Switzerland and Sweden), 
there is a great deal of consensus about the living conditions there, while the opin-
ions among the countries in the lower ranks vary more significantly. This may be 
because respondents are less certain with regard to the less well-off countries but 
more confident in agreeing about the good situation in the best-ranked countries. 
Additionally, it is very likely that the respondents have assessed living conditions 
in a comparative manner. Spanish respondents, for instance, will agree that the sit-
uation in Switzerland is likely to be very good, while opinions differ more strongly 
when it comes to assessing the situation in France, Poland or Greece, which are 
perceived to be closer to the Spanish living standards. The assumption that the 
assessments always contain a comparative component is reasonable because the 
questionnaire design suggested this comparison. The respondents always assessed 
the living conditions in the nine countries as an overall package, i.e., they had 
to tick the boxes for all countries one after the other. The respondents may have 
therefore followed an implicit ranking in the individual assessments. 
This comparative and relational assessment of living conditions in Europe can 
be empirically verified when comparing the average assessments per country and 
checking whether the deviations between the mean values are also statistically 
significant. In other words, it can be assumed that the respondents differ in their 
assessment of living conditions in other countries because they always judge the 
situation from the perspective of their own situation. It is therefore conceivable 
that the Swedish respondents do not portray Swiss living conditions as good as 
the Greeks because the Swedish respondents are likely to judge Switzerland from 
a much higher standard than the Greeks. 
A multivariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) is recommended to verify this 
assumption. The respondents from France were used as a reference group for this 
purpose. This enables us to clarify to what extent the average ratings of respond-
ents from the other eight countries differ from those of the French sample. For 
example, it will be determined whether people from Switzerland or Sweden assess 
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the situation in other countries worse on average than those from France, since the 
former look at all other countries from a higher reference value than the latter, and 
whether the respondents from Greece or Poland assess living conditions better 
elsewhere than the people from France, since the situation in their own country 
is perceived as less good. As can be seen from Table 4.8, this is indeed the case. 
The Swiss, for example, assess the situation in other countries almost consistently 
worse than the French, which makes it clear that they do this assessment from a 
higher perceived standard of living than the French. With regard to the UK, this 
deviation is more than half a point on a scale of 11 points. This assumption is 
also confirmed by respondents from Poland and Greece, where the assessment of 
living conditions in the other countries is much more positive than in the French 
sample. People from Poland rate the situation in Germany and the UK more than 
one and a half points better than the French group, and in relation to Italy even 
more than two points. 
The picture is less clear with the other survey groups because people from 
Sweden, Germany and the UK also assess the situation in other countries almost 
consistently better than those from France. Conversely, this means that respond-
ents from France see living conditions in Italy or Germany in a worse light than 
those from the UK by more than one point. But this is also due to the fact that the 
social situation in France is viewed more negatively by the locals as a whole. This 
was already shown in Table 4.7 above. Respondents from France also consistently 
rate other countries worse when their assessments are compared with those by the 
other samples. Separate calculations show that people in France rate living condi-
tions in Sweden at 8.6 points, at least half a point worse than all other respondents, 
with the exception of people from Switzerland. The same applies to the assess-
ment of the other countries. 
When summarising the results so far, it can be seen that the people of all the 
countries investigated live and think in a European reference area. They are in a 
position to assess social conditions in other countries, and they largely agree in 
their assessments of the countries in which social conditions are good, mediocre 
or bad. The assessments differ from one another to some extent because people 
judge the situation elsewhere from their (national) perspective. Respondents from 
countries with poorer living conditions tend to assess the situation in other coun-
tries to be better compared to people living in countries with good living condi-
tions because the latter always gives the situation in the same countries a slightly 
worse rating. But the consensus about the quality of life in different European 
countries is remarkable. Europe is therefore perceived as a social space with une-
qual living conditions. And one’s own country is located within this hierarchically 
ordered space, with a generally agreed-upon position. Citizens tend to view the 
living conditions in their own country as somewhat worse when self-perception is 
compared with external assessments, but this changes little in the ranking. 
These findings raise the follow-up question on where the respondents situate 
their personal situation in this social space. How do people assess their current 
living conditions? Do the people of the different countries also differ from one 
another in this respect? And what is the relationship between one’s own living 
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conditions and the perceived situation of other groups or countries? In order to 
answer these questions, I will add another variable to the analyses. In the ques-
tionnaire, people were also asked to assess their own current living conditions. 
The 11-point scale marked the differences even more clearly since it compared the 
“worst imaginable” and the “best imaginable living conditions”. 
A look at the frequency distributions on this scale shows that the assessments 
of people follow a similar pattern (see Figure 4.3). The majority of people posi-
tion themselves more in the middle of the scale. The figures drop towards the 
margins as fewer respondents say they live in particularly bad or good conditions. 
However, the majority of respondents tend to describe their personal situation as 
good, and this is especially true for people from Switzerland, Sweden, Germany 
and the UK. But in the other countries, the assessment also tends to be rather posi-
tive, which is why an accumulation of negative assessments can only be found in 
Greece. Here the proportion of people who describe their position as the “worst 
imaginable” (9.4%) or as rather poor (18.8% at scale point 4) is increasing. 
The statistical measures confirm the visual impression of the bar graphs 
shown, as demonstrated in Table 4.9. However, they indicate even more clearly 
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Figure 4.3 Assessment of own living conditions per country (in %). Source: Livewhat 
WP4 population survey. 
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Table 4.9 Assessment of own, current living conditions, per country 
Mean value SD Skewness Kurtosis N 
Switzerland 7.45 1.90 −0.70 3.61 1998 
Sweden 7.85 1.92 −0.86 3.92 1951 
Germany 7.34 1.81 −0.60 3.37 1949 
UK 7.94 1.62 −0.83 4.54 1964 
France 6.74 1.89 −0.65 3.72 1920 
Italy 6.16 2.09 −0.55 3.21 1983 
Spain 6.55 1.87 −0.62 3.67 1969 
Poland 6.48 2.03 −0.43 3.16 1986 
Greece 4.77 2.06 −0.03 2.65 2019 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
that these self-assessments have certain peculiarities. British respondents are now 
among those who, on average, rate their own living conditions to be best. The 
people from Sweden, Switzerland and Germany only follow after. Respondents 
in Greece and Italy consider their own situation to be rather poor. The frequency 
distribution has a tendency to more positive assessments everywhere (a skewness 
to the right). From the curvature, it can be seen that the answers pile up more 
strongly in a smaller (here, the middle) scale range, while the people in Greece 
are more clearly distributed across the width of the scale, especially in the lower 
range. 
Furthermore, the assessments of the personal life situation do not differ as 
much as expected on the basis of the results to date. For example, the differ-
ences between the top group (Switzerland and Sweden) and the worst performer 
(Greece) with regard to the assessed living conditions at home were much greater, 
as seen in Table 4.7. A reminder, external assessments were 9.5 for Switzerland 
and 3.8 for Greece. This is a difference of 5.7 points, while the values differ by 
only 3.2 points with regard to the respondents’ own living conditions. People, 
therefore, tend to make more drastic appraisals when assessing another country’s 
general living conditions than when assessing their own circumstances. 
However, personal living conditions do deviate to a considerable degree. And 
it is remarkable that respondents agree about how they rank their personal living 
conditions: Swiss and Swedish citizens see themselves on average at the top of the 
social ladder and the Greek respondents at the bottom. Responses deviate from the 
average scores in all countries (i.e., 1.6 to 2.1 points), but the deviation is not very 
large. This finding is noteworthy because it indicates that European citizens have 
a similar compass to identify one’s own position within a stratified social space. 
It could be that European citizens have a common anchor point from which to 
assess their personal living conditions. This interpretation is not fully convincing 
because it is highly improbable that all respondents have internalised an identi-
cal reference point, an absolute shared value of good life. More convincing is 
the assumption that the similarities in the assessment of respondents’ own living 
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conditions are a consequence of ongoing comparisons. People assess the situa-
tion in their own country in relation to the conditions in other countries, and they 
assess their own situation in relation to others, whether these others are tangible 
reference groups (friends, family, neighbours, colleagues, etc.) or abstract units 
such as their own country or other states. Europe would, therefore, be a common 
social space that enables people to comparatively construct a social hierarchy of 
living conditions and thus determine common standard values that serve as points 
of reference or yardsticks for assessing their own living conditions. Europeans 
seem to have internalised a mental map of social living standards, and this means 
that this map is a collectively shared compass. Europeans should know from each 
other that they take up different positions in a consistently unequal habitat. The 
less well-placed know that there are others who are better placed and the same 
applies to those who see themselves as better placed because they have others in 
mind that they consider to be worse off. The fact that this relational map extends 
beyond the borders of one’s own environment, even of one’s own country, would 
be the special thing about Europe. 
Before looking at these assumptions to determine the degree of consensus, 
however, it must be recognised that there are differences in the assessments of 
social conditions between countries. It was shown that people in France tend to 
view living conditions at home and in other countries more negatively than other 
respondents, and the same applies to respondents from Italy. In the UK, people’s 
own circumstances (and the situation in their own country) tend to be rated more 
positively than those of other countries. These deviations are a sign of a more 
pessimistic or optimistic attitude among those surveyed in the countries. In any 
case, they show that it could be problematic for our further analyses to directly 
compare the assessments of the respondents across national borders and possibly 
treat them as equivalent. People in France, Italy and the UK may, to stay with the 
examples, assess the social situation to be worse or better per se, which is why 
any attempt to compare them directly across countries would mean engaging in 
systematic distortions. 
For this reason, I abstained from using the absolute assessments, i.e., those 
of the living conditions of the individual, the country or other countries. Instead, 
I will only apply relative assessments. The question to be asked in the follow-
ing is how the assessments of other countries fare in relation to the perception 
of one’s own living conditions and vice versa. To this end, it is useful that the 
survey encouraged respondents to assess the living conditions of a whole range 
of reference groups such as those of friends and neighbours in their own country 
and those in the other eight countries that were part of the survey. If these ques-
tions are related to each other, it is possible to determine what the assessment 
of personal living conditions is in relation to that of others. Are people in their 
personal situation doing worse or better than their friends and neighbours, their 
compatriots or the inhabitants of other European countries? A separate variable 
was calculated for each of these reference groups, which puts the ratings in rela-
tion to each other on the 11-point scale. Each of these relational variables ranges 
from −10 (one’s own living conditions are 10 points worse than those of the other 
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reference groups) to +10 (one’s own living conditions are 10 points better than 
those of the reference groups). A zero would indicate that the respondent sees 
no differences between their own living conditions and the ones of the reference 
group under consideration. 
In Figure 4.4, these relational assessments were compiled for three reference 
groups: friends, neighbourhood and one’s own country. The figure shows the fre -
quency distribution in per cent. Since a single chart would be too confusing for 
all nine countries, the focus is initially only on respondents from Switzerland, 
France and Greece, which provides a good picture of the country spectrum. The 
results show that the vast majority of respondents consider the living conditions 
of their friends and neighbours to be identical to their own. For friends, the pro-
portion of those for whom the value zero has been determined is almost 60%, for 
neighbours, approximately 50%. The proportion of those who assess their own 
circumstances to be somewhat worse is slightly higher than those who assess their 
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Figure 4.4	 Own living conditions better or worse than (in %) – only for respondents from 
Switzerland, France and Greece. Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
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own situation to be better. Overall, it can be seen that the living conditions are 
perceived very homogenously in the immediate environment of the respondents. 
A greater scatter only occurs at the country level, where the proportion of those 
who find no difference between their own living conditions and those of the coun-
try falls below 30%. More people, therefore, see a difference between the per -
ceived standard of living in the country and their own situation. In Switzerland, 
respondents tend to think that their living conditions are slightly worse than those 
in the rest of the country, while the Greeks tend to think that they are somewhat 
better off than their compatriots in general. 
These observations are confirmed when the statistical measures for all coun-
tries are collected in relation to all three reference groups (see Table 4.10). On 
average, people in all countries assess their own living conditions as only slightly 
worse than those in the neighbourhood and among friends. This results in a clearly 
Table 4.10 Own living conditions better/worse than 
Mean value SD Skewness Kurtosis N 
In the neighbourhood 
Switzerland −0.27 1.60 −1.25 8.02 1934 
































Greece −0.23 1.58 −0.79 9.15 1949 
Of friends 
Switzerland −0.44 1.55 −1.21 8.67 1972 
































Greece −0.39 1.50 −1.21 9.16 2002 
In own country 
Switzerland −0.82 2.17 0.30 5.45 1968 
































Greece 0.68 2.22 −0.21 5.23 1988 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
88 A European compass 
peaked frequency distribution (kurtosis), and only a very slight, right-heavy skew-
ness. The assessments also scatter only very weakly because the assessments of 
having better or worse living conditions than friends or neighbours scatter only 
around the mean value by 1–1.7 points. 
The assessments regarding the situation in the respondents’ own country differ 
considerably. In the countries that were among the leaders in living conditions 
(Switzerland, Sweden and Germany), people tend to think that they are personally 
a little worse off. This is reversed in the other countries. Here, the respondents’ 
personal situation is judged somewhat more favourably than that of the country 
overall. As expected, opinions scatter more strongly around the mean value (i.e., 
up to two points), which also means that the frequency distribution does not run 
so sharply, but has a flatter curvature. 
Leaving the immediate environment of the respondents and looking at the 
other countries, there are remarkable differences to be seen. People’s own living 
conditions are assessed significantly differently from the situation in other coun -
tries. It is enough to concentrate on two countries – Switzerland and Greece – 
to document these striking discrepancies because the living conditions there 
were rated best and worst, relatively, by those surveyed. In the other six coun-
tries, differences are also apparent when comparing the well-placed countries 
(Sweden and Germany) and the worst-placed countries (Poland and Spain). The 
identified patterns remain similar, which is why these results are not graphically 
represented here. 
Table 4.11 summarises the results of the relational assessments. With regard 
to Switzerland, the respondents from other countries consider their personal liv-
ing conditions to be worse. For instance, people in Sweden rate their personal 
situation on average one point worse than living conditions in Switzerland. 
This figure rises to up to five points among Greek respondents. This means 
that in this country, the subjective situation differs the most from Swiss living 
conditions. 
The relative assessments reported in Table 4.11 are averages, and it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that these relational assessments deviate around the mean by 
more than two points of scale almost everywhere. Hence, respondents do not fully 
agree regarding how they relate their own situation with that in other European 
countries, that is, some highlight bigger differences, others less marked ones. This 
variance will be the result of different living conditions among residents within 
each of our nine countries. In Sweden, for example, the worse-off may perceive a 
greater contrast between their own situation and Swiss living standards than their 
well-off compatriots. The picture is mirrored when looking at Greece as a point 
of reference. For all other countries, respondents assess their own living condi-
tions as more favourable than those of Greece. The difference for respondents 
from Poland is 1.7 points, and this difference grows in the other survey groups. 
In Switzerland, the estimation of the Swiss’ own personal situation is four points 
better than the living conditions in Greece. Here, too, the values scatter, generally 
even more strongly. 
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Table 4.11 Own living conditions better/worse than 
Mean value SD Skewness Kurtosis N 
In Switzerland 
Respondents from — — — — — 
Switzerland 
Sweden −1.13 2.21 −0.30 4.18 1738 
Germany −1.88 2.06 −0.36 3.81 1877 
UK −1.73 1.86 −0.43 4.51 1772 
France −2.46 2.33 −0.19 3.85 1785 
Italy −3.36 2.59 −0.25 3.22 1948 
Spain −2.90 2.37 −0.26 3.80 1900 
Poland −3.43 2.38 −0.11 3.32 1823 
Greece −5.07 2.63 0.36 3.65 1875 
In Greece 
Switzerland 4.12 2.51 −0.48 3.71 1959 
Sweden 3.91 2.60 −0.40 3.39 1796 
Germany 3.66 2.52 −0.45 3.92 1887 
UK 3.35 2.33 −0.16 3.26 1777 
France 3.46 2.54 −0.58 3.84 1826 
Italy 2.72 2.63 −0.50 4.04 1948 
Spain 3.41 2.44 −0.51 4.00 1916 
Poland 1.76 3.08 −0.40 3.65 1823 
Greece — — — — — 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
A cognitive map of the European social space 
European citizens do not hesitate to assess and rank the living conditions in their 
environment. The share of respondents claiming to be unable or unwilling to 
make a guess is very small and even corresponds with the share of people that 
refrain from making judgements about other groups as well. Respondents in all 
countries agree that the living conditions of their friends and neighbours come 
very close, if not identical, to their personal living conditions. Major differences 
arise as soon as the subjective perception of the respondents’ own situation is 
compared with the assessment of national living conditions. But even these dif-
ferences are relatively minor. Much larger deviations only occur when looking at 
other countries. Respondents consistently agree that while living conditions are 
very good in Sweden, Switzerland and Germany, they are poor in Greece. They 
also agree in relative terms on the divergences between their own situation and 
the living standards in countries in the top and bottom positions. Respondents in 
most countries find themselves in a disadvantaged or privileged situation when 
comparing themselves either with Swiss or Greek citizens. 
The analysis of these relative assessments has two implications that are of 
crucial importance for the subsequent analyses in the next chapters. First, and 
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following the subjective perception of the living conditions of all reference 
groups, it is possible to trace the picture of a gradual increase in social differences 
from the closest area to one that is further removed. It is the comparison with other 
societies, and thus the European frame of reference, that makes social differences 
for people more marked. Put another way, on a European scale, the homogeneity 
of living conditions within one’s environment is eclipsed by the perception of a 
clear social heterogeneity of personal situations within Europe. Secondly, there is 
impressive agreement among European citizens in their perception of living con-
ditions abroad. Europeans from different countries are not only capable of placing 
each other on a map of European living conditions, they also agree about which 
countries should be placed where. This shows that across countries, people have 
internalised a similar scale and ranking of living standards. Europeans claim to 
know where living standards are very high, moderate and low, and even if there is 
variation, due to the diverging perspectives from which they report about “high”, 
“moderate” and “low” standards, this ranking corresponds largely to the picture 
painted by macro-economic indicators. 
European citizens thus seem to perceive and assess living conditions in 
European categories. The uniformity with which they identify positions and place 
countries shows that they are following an implicit yardstick that allows them 
to identify comparable living standards and that enables them to specify which 
countries perform better or worse. These findings suggest that European citizens 
have internalised a cognitive map of a European social space that is made up of 
different living conditions that are related to each another in a hierarchical man-
ner, e.g., in terms of inferior and superior positions. This cognitive map, which is 
not necessarily restricted to the European continent, nor the EU, allows citizens 
to place themselves and their countries in reference to other Europeans and coun-
tries. Citizens, for instance, had no problem placing Switzerland into the larger 
landscape of European living conditions, even though this country is not a formal 
nor full member of the European Union. We would assume that citizens would 
also add further, non-European countries onto the list of countries with superior 
or inferior living conditions. This has to do with the fact, discussed in Chapter 2, 
that social spaces are in themselves not strictly contained by political borders. 
However, the openness of social spaces does not limit the relevance of the related 
cognitive maps; even “open” cognitive maps can provide citizens with an orienta-
tion and yardstick to perceive and assess living conditions in specific places. The 
social division enshrined in these maps might have an impact on the assessment 
of the political field with its internal cleavages, as proposed before. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that Europe and the European Union 
increase the salience and relevance of some countries, to the detriment of oth-
ers. Our data, for instance, shows that respondents exhibited a lower inclination 
to assess the living conditions in Poland, while they had the least problems in 
doing so for Germany and Greece. Both countries were at the centre of public 
debates about the European financial and economic crisis in 2009 (see Chapter 3) 
and were thus more salient for our respondents when fieldwork was conducted 
in 2015. Additionally, it is plausible to assume that these countries will be more 
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relevant as reference groups when focusing on the potential impact of the cogni-
tive map on the political views and attitudes of European citizens. Citizens that 
highlight divergent living conditions within Europe might be more dissatisfied 
with politics. These comparisons might nurture feelings of relative deprivation, 
particularly when citizens compare themselves with better-off Europeans. These 
assessments might have the potential to become social dynamite if the citizens 
assume that the national governments and EU institutions do not consistently pur-
sue the promise of comparable living conditions for all countries, regions and 
people. 
5
5 Social divisions and perceptions 
of national politics 
The hidden European compass 
Public opinion is strongly focused on national politics, even if European issues 
are at stake. This is true when looking at citizens’ political knowledge, their pol-
icy priorities and political behaviour. It is also true when considering how citizens 
think about the European Union because their perceptions and assessments are 
strongly mediated and directed by the nation state to which they belong, with 
its political institutions, party allegiances and political cleavages (Hooghe and 
Marks 2005; Desmet et al. 2012; de Vries, 2018). The European Union might 
have become an important arena for political decision-making, but this political 
weight does not seem to have translated into an ability to shape public opinion 
in the member states unmediated by the arena of national politics itself. Indeed, 
national governments, parties, associations or experts are all likely to have formed 
an opinion about the EU, implying that public opinion about the EU reflects the 
agendas and cleavages of the national arenas. 
Public debates in the mass media mirror this situation quite clearly, as high-
lighted in Chapter 3. The 2009 economic and financial crisis was experienced as 
a common, European crisis. However, public debates within the different member 
states were devoted primarily to discussing the implications of the economic and 
financial crisis for their own country. The European Union has not been success-
ful in shifting public interest more strongly from the national onto the European 
level. However, this does not segregate public opinion into closed national con-
tainers. Public debates and perceptions transcend national borders horizontally 
through interrelating events and claims from different countries. Public debates 
do not shift the focus of attention from the national to the European arena but 
expand public awareness beyond national borders, thus nurturing cross-national 
debates. Governments, associations and parties observe the positions of other 
actors in other countries; they take a public position on them and react with agree-
ment or criticism. The public opinion thus seems to maintain its primary focus 
on the nation state without fencing itself off. It does gravitate around the nation 
state but expands the range of potentially relevant actors, issues and claims (Trenz 
2004; Pfersch et al. 2006; Caiani and Guerra 2017; Segesten and Bossetta 2019). 
These observations suggest that it is advisable to reach beyond the nation 
state when analysing political perceptions and attitudes. While public opin-
ion about national and European politics appears to be strongly shaped by the 
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socio-economic, political and cultural situations within the respective countries, 
it is also true that these national “containers” are not secluded and disjointed but 
strongly interrelated points of reference for public opinion formation. Citizens’ 
judgements about national and European politics might not be grounded in their 
position only (i.e., their residence, social-structural situation), but in a relational 
assessment that takes the situation in other countries into account, thus expanding 
their frame of reference to include national and European politics. The findings 
of the previous chapter evidence that citizens tend to do so when asked to assess 
the living conditions in their immediate environment and that of other European 
countries. 
The analyses of this chapter wishes to validate the relevance of this cogni-
tive map as a factor influencing political perceptions and attitudes. This general 
aim translates into general and more specific objectives. In the first instance, it is 
necessary to examine whether cross-national perceptions have an impact on the 
assessment of national politics. In particular, the aim is to validate whether the 
perception of social divisions within and between countries is having an effect 
on the way citizens perceive and assess the social and political reality in their 
own country. Three main topic areas are addressed here. Firstly, the question of 
whether the comparison of living conditions goes hand in hand with increased 
crisis sensitivity, and thus with feelings of both personal and collective concern 
about economic distortions and social decline. Secondly, it must be clarified 
whether country comparisons and crisis sensitivity also affect political attitudes. 
It is conceivable that people’s perceptions and feelings of relative deprivation 
result in more forceful distancing from political institutions, developing a greater 
dissatisfaction with governments and orienting themselves much more frequently 
towards a populist criticism of the political establishment. Finally, it must be 
asked whether the cognitive map of the European social space also influences 
political participation, for example, in terms of protest mobilisation. The empiri-
cal analyses will make use of the Livewhat survey conducted in 2015, presented 
in the previous chapter. 
Perception of the economic crisis in a
European comparative horizon 
The global economic crisis, which began at the end of 2008 with the insolvency 
of the private bank Lehman Brothers in the USA, led to massive economic slumps 
in Europe, rocked the banking systems and exacerbated the over-indebtedness of 
public budgets in many member states. Economic output for the EU as a whole 
fell by 6.1% (in market prices per capita) between 2008 and 2009. The economic 
downturn was of a shorter duration for some countries (e.g., Germany, Austria, 
Sweden or Poland), but in many others, recovery was slow and arduous. Five 
years later, total economic output had fallen by 24.3% in Greece, 13.2% in Cyprus, 
9.5% in Spain and 9% in Croatia. As a result, many people lost their jobs, and the 
unemployment rate within the EU rose from an average of 7% in 2008 to 10.9% in 
2013. In Greece and Spain in particular, one in four citizens was unemployed (i.e., 
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27.5% and 26.1%, respectively). But mass unemployment also affected countries 
such as Croatia, Portugal, Slovakia and Ireland, where unemployment rates were 
13%–17% in 2013. 
These figures conceal a massive deterioration in the personal situation of 
many people, especially in the countries hardest hit by the economic, finan -
cial and national debt crisis and austerity policy reforms, where disposable 
household income dropped in the face of unemployment, shrinking wages and 
social benefits and rising taxes and contributions (Hermann 2014; Petmesidou 
and Guillén 2015). The supply situation of the population with goods and ser-
vices deteriorated noticeably, as did the infrastructure and the health and social 
system. Many, especially younger, better-educated people left their coun-
tries in search of work and better prospects elsewhere. In the crisis countries, 
homelessness and suicide rates increased markedly (Markantonatou 2013; 
Monastiriotis 2013). 
Even if the economic and financial crisis had significant and sometimes dra -
matic consequences for the population, especially in the southern and eastern 
European countries, the economically more stable countries were not unaffected. 
This also applies, among others, to Germany, which is generally believed to have 
already overcome the crisis in 2010. At the height of the economic crisis, the 
number of employees in short-time work reached 1.5 million (May 2008), com-
pared with 810,000 in December 2009 (Brenke, Rinne and Zimmerman 2011). 
Unemployment was a realistic threat for many Germans during these years. The 
number of atypical employment situations and precarious circumstances has 
increased significantly in the last two decades (Countouris 2007; Heidenreich 
2016a). Insecure employment, periods of unemployment and low income were 
faced by an increasing number of people in the heart of society. The increasing 
polarisation of personal situations at the expense of the middle classes (Atkinson 
and Brandolini 2013) and the decline of the middle classes (Pressman 2007; Mau 
2015) are also spoken about in this context. Concerns about a social decline seem 
to have firmly established themselves in the middle classes (Ehrenreich 1989; 
Bude and Spengler 2018). 
The survey data used here were collected in 2015, which is why it can be 
assumed that the economic and financial crisis was no longer the focus of pub -
lic attention everywhere at the time of the survey. However, it can be assumed 
that the difficult economic and social upheavals had a strong influence on the 
mood of the European population. The fact that this is indeed the case is shown 
in Table 5.1, which lists how clearly the sense of crisis is prevalent among the 
populations of the countries surveyed. The table is based on a statement that was 
used to obtain the respondents’ personal assessment of the economic situation at 
the time: 
Some say that our country is suffering a very serious economic crisis, others 
say that we are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, while others say 
that there isn't any economic crisis. What do you think? 
Livewhat 2015: p. 48 
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Table 5.1 Crisis perception (N and %) 
Serious Crisis not No crisis Other Don’t N 
crisis serious know 
Switzerland 313 1062 432 62 177 2046 
15.3% 51.9% 21.1% 3.0% 8.7% 100% 
Sweden 327 844 492 32 323 2018 
16.2% 41.8% 24.4% 1.6% 16.0% 100% 
Germany 353 679 744 53 279 2108 
16.8% 32.2% 35.3% 2.5% 13.2% 100% 
UK 753 875 196 36 162 2022 
37.2% 43.3% 9.7% 1.8% 8.0% 100% 
France 1357 341 70 60 199 2027 
67.0% 16.8% 3.5% 3.0% 9.8% 100% 
Italy 1611 241 72 39 77 2040 
79.0% 11.8% 3.5% 1.9% 3.8% 100% 
Spain 1497 355 50 77 56 2035 
73.6% 17.4% 2.5% 3.8% 2.8% 100% 
Poland 477 843 464 35 205 2024 
23.6% 41.7% 22.9% 1.7% 10.1% 100% 
Greece 1805 110 51 57 25 2048 
88.1% 5.4% 2.5% 2.8% 1.2% 100% 
Total 8493 5350 2571 451 1503 18368 
46.2% 29.1% 14.0% 2.5% 8.2% 100% 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
The frequency distribution shows that at the time of the survey, almost all Greek 
respondents felt that their country was in a serious crisis. More than two-thirds 
of respondents from Spain, Italy and France took the situation equally seriously. 
This assessment was shared by one in three in the UK, one in four in Poland and 
one in six in the other countries. Even in those countries that respondents felt were 
less hard-hit, the view was that the country was indeed experiencing a crisis, even 
if it was not serious and therefore surmountable. This meant that only a quarter of 
all people were of the opinion that there was no crisis in 2015. While this share 
was highest in Germany with one-third, it nevertheless shows that the feeling of 
living in times of crisis was also widespread in this country. 
But how can these quite different crisis perceptions be explained? This ques-
tion seems unnecessary with regard to Greece, as the widespread sensitivity to the 
crisis is likely to be a direct response to the prolonged recession, austerity poli-
cies and serious social upheavals. A similar assumption can be made for Spain 
and Italy. However, this explanation is unsatisfactory because even in the crisis 
countries, there are people who do not speak of a crisis. At the same time, it 
must be clarified why so many respondents from the UK, Sweden, Germany and 
Switzerland assume that their country is going through a crisis when the socio-
economic core indicators seem to suggest a different conclusion. 
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Social science research has shown that crises are, above all, interpretations 
of existing circumstances (Bohmann and Vobruba 1992; Hay 1996). There is no 
doubt that such interpretations respond to economic, political or social events and 
people’s experiences with them. But a situation must first be defined as a crisis, 
which is why public discourses are an important arena for these – certainly con-
tested – interpretations (Coleman 2013; Kiess 2019; Lahusen et al., 2016). It has 
also been confirmed at the level of individual crisis perception that external events 
and circumstances also need to be interpreted as “crises”. Besides psychological 
factors such as self-confidence, life satisfaction and resilience, societal character-
istics, such as gender, income and social situation, as well as political attitudes, 
such as trust in political institutions, also play a role (Zoll and Neumann 1986; 
Burns, Peters and Slovic 2011). 
These assumptions will be pursued in the following. It is not only a question 
of determining the social factors influencing crisis perception. This book is also 
interested in the country comparisons discussed so far, which also raises the ques-
tion of whether the perception of the crisis in the countries is also associated with 
the perception of living conditions in other countries. But these aspects will be 
addressed in a second step. First, three groups of possible explanatory variables 
are to be included in the analyses and only then are the country comparisons to be 
included in the evaluations. 
The first step is to clarify which population groups are more sensitive to crises. 
The aim is, in particular, to determine whether the groups of people with high and 
low crisis sensitivity can be distinguished through identifiable characteristics. The 
focus here will be on three factors: socio-structural positions, political attitudes 
and socio-demographic profiles. First, it must be clarified whether the socio-struc-
tural situation of the respondents has an influence on their perception of the crisis. 
This is determined using the respondents’ data on their educational attainment, 
subjective income situation (measured by the financial problems of their house-
hold) and their subjective affiliation with a social class. In addition, the perceived 
development of the economic situation of the respondent’s household budget and 
that of the respondent’s own country will be included; respondents were able to 
provide information on a ten-point scale ranging from “greatly deteriorated” to 
“greatly improved”. Behind these factors is the assumption that respondents in 
a less privileged position develop a greater sensitivity to crises than people with 
better capital resources. A lower level of education, limited household income and 
negative development of one’s household situation are likely to feed the opinion 
that the consequences of a crisis (job losses, wage cuts and the associated curtail-
ment of one’s lifestyle) have either already hit or are due to hit. 
Secondly, the effect of trust in fellow human beings and political institutions is 
being examined. After all, to speak of a serious crisis is to assume serious disrup-
tions or emergencies that can no longer be easily overcome and call into question 
the functioning of the existing system. People with greater confidence in their 
environment are less likely to experience a serious crisis. People should be more 
confident that serious crises cannot arise in the first place and/or can be effectively 
overcome if they have greater confidence in institutions. 
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Thirdly, a number of control variables are to be introduced. It is conceivable 
that the perception of crises has to do with the socio-demographic characteristics 
of the interviewees, such as gender, age, migration background and residential 
perspective. Older men with a migration background living in urban contexts 
might be more vulnerable in regard to the effects of an economic crisis and thus 
more disposed to see their country in a crisis when compared with the younger 
respondents, women and residents of rural areas. In addition, there is the country 
in which the respondents live, as crisis sensitivity varies considerably between 
countries, as Table 5.1 shows. 
Table 5.2 summarises the results of a regression analysis (ordered logit 
model). Two answer categories were excluded from the calculations, namely 
those respondents who indicated “don’t know” and “other” in their answers. This 
reduces the number of cases by approximately 1,950 respondents. The people 
who assumed “no crisis” form the basis of this regression analysis as a reference 
group. The aim is to clarify whether the social background and political orienta-
tion of the crisis-sensitive respondents are noticeably different from that of those 
who do not perceive a crisis. The listed coefficients are average marginal effects 
and can be interpreted as percentages of higher or lower probabilities. 
What is not surprising about the results is that the average probability of 
respondents in the crisis countries of southern Europe speaking of a serious crisis 
is much higher when compared with the people living in Switzerland (see bottom 
of the table). The probability is 58.2% higher in Greece when compared with 
responses from Swiss respondents. In Italy, Spain or France, on the one hand, the 
probability of seeing the country in a serious crisis is 51%, 48% and 46% higher, 
respectively. In Poland, Sweden and Germany, on the other hand, it is slightly 
lower. More interesting for the purposes pursued here are the findings for the 
other factors. First of all, it should be noted that the socio-structural position of 
the respondents plays a minor role. Low educational attainment and low income 
do not have a significant impact on crisis perception. It is surprising that people 
with the lowest household income are not more likely to perceive the existence 
of a crisis, while those having trouble paying their bills are more crisis sensitive. 
It may be that sporadic financial problems are more likely to be associated with a 
temporary crisis, while permanent financial problems are more likely to be associ-
ated with stable (but unfavourable) conditions. Those who do not know whether 
their household has financial problems are also more likely to deny that the coun-
try is in a serious crisis. 
While the objective indicators of social situation (education and income) hardly 
contribute to the identification of the group of crisis-sensitive people, the subjec-
tive class affiliation is different. It can be seen that crisis sensitivity increases the 
more we move down from those who feel they belong to the upper class or the 
upper-middle class to the lower classes. For respondents who feel they belong to 
the lower class, the probability of assuming a serious crisis is 5.1% higher than 
among those who see themselves at the top of the pyramid. Conversely, these 
respondents also tend to be less likely to believe that their country is not in any 
crisis. However, the group that cannot or do not want to locate themselves is also 
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Table 5.2 Crisis sensitivity and its determinants – a basic model (ordered logistic regres-
sion, average marginal effects) 
Serious crisis Crisis not serious No crisis 
Educational attainment (university) 
Secondary education 
Lower than secondary education 











Lower third –0.005 0.002 0.004 
No details 0.018** –0.006** –0.013** 
Financial household situation (no 
problems) 
Manages with difficulty 











Subjective class affiliation (upper class, 
upper-middle class) 
Middle class 0.016 −0.004 −0.012 
Lower middle class 0.030** −0.008*** −0.022** 
Lower class 0.051*** −0.015*** −0.036*** 
Other, don’t know 0.056*** −0.017*** −0.039*** 
Economic situation of the household over 
the past five years (better) 
Similar 0.036*** −0.010*** −0.026*** 
Worse 0.138*** −0.052*** −0.086*** 
Don’t know 0.013 −0.003 −0.009 
Trust in fellow human beings (low) 









Trust in institutions (low) 


















45–64 0.016* −0.005* −0.011* 
65+ −0.012 0.004 0.009 
Migration background (no) 
Place of residence (city) 
(Small) town 
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Table 5.2 Continued 
Serious crisis Crisis not serious No crisis 
Poland −0.028** 0.001 0.027** 
Greece 0.582*** −0.364*** −0.217*** 
Cases 16.413 
Pseudo R2 0.246 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey.

Note: Significance levels: * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.

much more sensitive to the crisis. In summary, the following can be stated: it is 
the people who consider themselves to belong to the middle and the upper classes 
who are less likely to perceive a crisis, all other locations on the social spectrum 
are more sensitive to crises. 
The perceived deterioration of the economic situation significantly increases 
the perception of the crisis at 13.8% compared to those who do not perceive a 
deterioration. As far as trust is concerned, the assumption is confirmed. Trusting 
individuals perceive a serious crisis less often. Above all, however, confidence 
in political institutions makes a clear difference as it significantly reduces crisis 
sensitivity by 15.6% from a predicted 60.1% for those with low institutional con-
fidence to 44.5% for those with high confidence. It is also remarkable that this 
effect only occurs during the perception of a serious crisis. Those surveyed who 
have great confidence in the institutions either assume that the crisis is moderate, 
i.e., not so serious, or completely deny that their country is in crisis. As suspected, 
institutional confidence does not seem to blind people to the effects of crises. 
However, it seems to take away their concern that crises are no longer controllable 
or manageable. 
By summarising these interim results, it becomes clear that the perception of 
the crisis is noticeably linked to the relative position of the respondents in the 
social sphere. People who tend to rank lower in the stratification pyramid and who 
have seen their situation deteriorate over the last few years are also more sensitive 
to crises. The relational position of people in space and time is thus the factor that 
is linked to crisis perception. Objective and absolute positions in the social struc-
ture (e.g., determined by educational titles or income) play no discernible role. 
Finally, crisis sensitivity is also linked to greater distrust towards fellow human 
beings and institutions. 
The factors discussed so far are related to the national frame of reference. This 
is explicitly the case with educational attainment, the assessment of the economic 
situation of one’s own country or with regard to confidence in political institu -
tions. But with the other factors, it is not clear per se whether the information pro-
vided by the respondents stops at national borders. This applies to subjective class 
affiliation because the possibility that respondents have also drawn comparisons 
with people in other countries when indicating a social class cannot be ruled out. 
The fact that migrants rarely perceive there to be a crisis may have something to 
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do with the fact that they also take their home country into account when assess-
ing the current economic situation. They may, therefore, come to the conclusion 
that the situation in their current country of residence is not so bad when com-
pared with the situation in their home country. In this sense, people with a migra-
tion background would be less pessimistic than the local population because their 
frame of reference is an international one. 
This raises the question as to whether people also assess the economic situa-
tion in their country within such an international frame of reference. The findings 
so far have at least shown that almost all respondents consider themselves able to 
assess living conditions in other European countries. And people manage to put 
the living conditions of different reference groups (their own situation, the living 
conditions of their friends, neighbours, their fellow citizens and people in other 
countries) into a logical and coherent order. On the basis of these insights, it can 
be concluded that the European citizens have a mental map of the European social 
space in mind, which they used to position themselves and others. 
It, therefore, makes sense to presume that the perception of a crisis is also 
adapted to this mental map. Following plausibility considerations, it can be 
assumed that people who view living conditions elsewhere as better, and thus 
their own situation comparatively worse, are much more like to perceive there to 
be a crisis, especially a serious one. In order to check the validity of the assumed 
correlations, the variables measuring the relative assessments of living condi-
tions in other countries have been included in the modelling. This study considers 
an extended regression model based on the basic model already described (see 
Table 5.2) to examine the significance of country comparisons in the perception of 
crises. Figure 5.1 summarises the results, listing only the effects of the comparing 
variables. The model is too extensive to be included here in its entirety. However, 
a breakdown would also not provide any new information, as the effects of the 
variables listed above remain largely the same. Generally, the extended model 
once again excludes respondents and thus reduces the number of cases. Firstly, 
people who did not answer the question about the crisis or provided other state-
ments are not taken into account. Secondly, the question of living conditions in 
other countries was only answered by respondents from the other respective eight 
countries. Therefore, a regression analysis had to be carried out for each refer-
ence country without the participation of respondents from the respective country 
being assessed. These separate calculations also give us an idea of the extent to 
which the effects of the other factors change as soon as a group of respondents is 
excluded. As can be seen from the figures, the effects remain quite constant, mak-
ing the results robust. 
Figure 5.1 shows that crisis perception is associated with the compara-
tive assessment of living conditions in other countries. People who perceive 
the existence of a crisis consider themselves to be worse off than their fellow 
Europeans when compared with those respondents who do not perceive there 
to be a crisis. The link is strongest with regard to Switzerland and Germany 
because here, the likelihood that respondents who consider their personal situ-
ation to be worse than those of the Swiss or German also speak of a serious 
          
Social divisions and national politics 101 










-.25 -.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 
(a) 
relative probabilities 
similar worse living conditions 










-.25 -.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 
relative probabilities
(b) 
similar worse living conditions 
Figure 5.1	 Crisis perception and assessment of own living conditions – extended model 
(ordered logistic regression, average marginal effects). Note: The findings 
shown in these tables are limited to the coefficients of the variables (country 
comparisons) additionally introduced in the extended model. The variables of 
the basic model (see Table 5.2) were included but effects are not displayed. 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
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crisis is approximately 7% higher than with those who consider their situa-
tion to be better. The predictive probability of seeing a serious crisis is 57.5% 
and 57.9% of those being worse off than people in Switzerland and Germany, 
while the share is lower for those judging their personal situation as being bet-
ter (50.4% and 51.1%). A comparison with Switzerland and Germany thus 
seems to increase the likelihood of a crisis being perceived. It is interesting to 
note that the effect for Germany is almost as high as for Switzerland, although 
Switzerland is still ahead of Germany in the ranking of living conditions; conse-
quently, the group of people who locate their own living conditions below Swiss 
conditions is also the largest. Nevertheless, the comparison with Germany has 
just as recognisable an impact on people’s perception of the crisis. This is likely 
to be due to the fact that Germany and the German government have been much 
more at the centre of public discussions about the crisis and the policies for 
dealing with it than other countries and national governments. This seems to 
have given special attention or saliency to German living conditions. Is it nota-
ble that respondents who report that their living conditions are comparable to 
those in other countries also tend to see a crisis slightly more often. In these 
cases, the general assessment of the citizens’ country’s situation might influence 
these assessments indirectly. 
Furthermore, it is striking that the relevance of living conditions abroad 
steadily decreases when moving from the best-placed countries (Switzerland, 
Sweden and Germany) to the member states at the bottom of the scale. The 
effect decreases continuously and even reverses in the case of Greece. With 
regard to Greece, European citizens who feel that they are worse off than peo -
ple in Greece (a total of nearly 800 respondents in all other countries), are less 
likely to perceive there to be a crisis in their own country, even a not very 
serious, temporary one. The comparison of one’s living conditions with the 
conditions in Greece thus seems to even reduce crisis sensitivity, even though 
this effect is weaker than the one associated with comparisons with better-off 
countries. This finding proves that comparisons with those who are better off 
are more relevant and have more consequences for people than comparisons 
with those who are worse off. It corresponds with the findings of earlier stud -
ies, which have shown that an upwards comparison places a greater burden on 
life satisfaction than downwards comparisons (Delhey and Kohler 2006; Boyce, 
Brown and Moore 2010). 
So far, it has been possible to confirm this correlation across all countries and 
samples. However, it cannot be ruled out that differences between countries may 
be overlooked; after all, Table 5.1 shows that the perception of the crisis varies 
considerably from country to country. It is necessary to differentiate the calculated 
effects by country. It must be clarified whether the probability of talking about a 
serious crisis is higher in all countries among those respondents who feel person-
ally worse off compared with the well-placed countries. Figure 5.2 shows predic -
tions of marginal effects for the two opposite response categories – for those who 
perceive a serious crisis and for those who do not see a crisis – broken down for 
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the respondents of each country. This study is limited to the reference country 
that was identified in the extended regression model as a particularly influential 
comparison target, Germany. 
The results confirm that the comparison of personal living conditions with 
those in Germany demonstrably influences the perception of the crisis in all 
other countries. It is true that the probability of the perception of a serious crisis 
is generally higher in the “crisis countries” of Greece, Italy, Spain and also in 
France than in the other four countries. However, one effect can be confirmed 
everywhere; the probability of crisis perception increases as soon as people 
have the impression that their life situation is worse than the perceived living 
conditions in Switzerland or Germany. The effect is not very great, especially 
in Greece, but this is probably also due to the fact that crisis perception is very 
widespread. In the reverse case – the respondents do not consider their country 
to be in any crisis – the effect is even clearer. Those respondents who assess 
their own living conditions as better than German living conditions are more 
likely not to perceive a crisis if compared with those who assess their situation 
as worse. In the crisis countries, this effect is smaller, but here the people seem 
to generally assume that the country is experiencing a crisis. In other coun-
tries, the crisis-sensitising effect of personal disadvantage is, however, clearly 
pronounced. 
Overall, it can be seen that people in Europe not only assess the economic 
situation in their countries from a purely national perspective. Whether the situ-
ation has changed drastically, and whether we are therefore facing an economic 
crisis, is something that Europeans also assess within a pan-European frame of 
reference. For them, the living conditions in other countries are not unknown. 
Their own situation, as well as the conditions in their country, can place them at 
a recognisable relation to the living conditions in other countries. This creates a 
mental map of living conditions within Europe, and in this way, also, a mental 
representation of Europe as a common social area. People seem to see Europe as 
a common living space characterised by differences. This map allows people to 
define their own position, that of their own member state and that of other popu-
lations with a considerable agreement, as was made clear in previous remarks. 
What was added, however, as a result of the analysis of crisis perception, is the 
insight that this intellectual map is becoming a relevant point of reference for the 
evaluation of national conditions. The more the conditions in countries differ from 
those in other countries, the more significantly the crisis perception increases. 
Effects measure correlations, which means that responses are closely related to 
each other. People who are worse off than those in other countries see the national 
economy in a serious crisis, but this also means that people who perceive a seri-
ous crisis also describe the situation in other countries (especially the top-ranked 
member states) as better. What is important, however, is the clear link between 
the two assessments because, for Europeans, the mental map of living conditions 
in Europe is an inescapable part of their verdicts about the economic situation in 
their own country. 
1 
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Figure 5.2 Influence of comparisons on crisis perception (predictive margins). Source: 
Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
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The assessment of national politics: a quiet benchmarking? 
With these findings in mind, we now turn to a politically explosive follow-up 
question. How satisfied are people with the work of their governments in the 
countries surveyed? What factors cause some respondents to be satisfied and oth-
ers dissatisfied? Do the assessments of living conditions in other countries also 
play a role here? Is people’s satisfaction with the government’s work in their own 
country also influenced by how well or badly they assess their situation in life 
compared to that of other countries? And is the perception of divergent living 
conditions in Europe affecting the populist criticism citizens’ voice in regard to 
national politics? 
Satisfaction with the respondents’ government 
The following will first investigate the proposition that people blame their gov-
ernments for life being better in other countries. This assumption fits into the 
research discussion because studies to date have shown that satisfaction with the 
work of the national government seems to depend on a whole series of factors. 
It would, therefore, come as no surprise that such a comparison leaves its mark 
across national borders. However, so far there have been no findings on this ques-
tion, which is why barely anything can be said about whether the support of the 
national government now also depends on the assessment of life situations in 
other European countries. 
In order to be able to measure the effect of perceived life situations in Europe 
on satisfaction with the government’s work empirically, other accepted explana-
tions must be taken on board. It may be the case that living conditions in other 
countries are only of secondary importance once more important factors are taken 
into account. Political science research has shown that satisfaction with the gov-
ernment’s work is a specific form of support for political institutions (Easton 
1975; Dalton 1999), which reacts sensitively to current events and developments. 
Compared with more general forms of political support, such as advocacy for 
democracy and confidence in existing political institutions, the assessment of gov-
ernment work is about what outputs day-to-day politics delivers. Even a popula-
tion that is thoroughly satisfied with democracy can be rather dissatisfied with the 
work of the government currently in office. It can even be assumed that the higher 
the democratic demands of a population, the more the dissatisfaction will grow 
(Dalton 2005; 2008). 
Among the most important factors influencing satisfaction are bundles of 
causes, some of which have already been outlined. Firstly, people evaluate the 
respective revenue of government work from their respective social situations. 
The socio-structural position within society, which is measured, for example, by 
educational attainment or income, should make a difference as much as the eco-
nomic situation in a country (Newton 2006; Dotti and Magistro 2016). Secondly, 
general support for the political system (e.g., in the sense of fundamental trust 
in the institutions) should have an effect on satisfaction with the work of the 
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government; those who generally do not trust the political institutions should also 
be much more dissatisfied with the work of those institutions (Hetherington 1998; 
Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn 2000). Thirdly, the assessment of the country’s cur-
rent situation is likely to play an important role (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; 
Cordero and Simón 2016); in our context, this is the assessment of the economic 
situation as difficult or critical. Respondents who perceive a (serious) crisis may 
be more dissatisfied with the work of their own government if it is assumed that 
people feel that the governments are partly responsible for the course of the crisis. 
Fourthly, the influence of personal characteristics must be controlled. In addition 
to the socio-demographic factors considered so far (gender, age, migration back-
ground and place of residence), it must be clarified whether general life satisfac-
tion also influences satisfaction with the work of the government. 
Before looking at these explanatory factors, it is necessary first to describe 
how satisfied people in the countries surveyed were with their governments at the 
time of the survey. For this purpose, the answers to the following question are 
used: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way in which your country’s 
government is dealing with the following?” Eight subject areas were available 
for selection: the economy, poverty, education, unemployment, healthcare, pre-
carious employment, immigration and childcare. Respondents were able to give 
answers between 1 (extremely dissatisfied) and 11 (extremely satisfied), or tick 
“don’t know”. On average, childcare (mean 4.97), education policy (4.94) and 
healthcare (4.80) with a value in the middle of the scale got better scores, while 
immigration and poverty (3.87 and 3.96, respectively) were ranked last. Table 5.3 
presents the results for four of these policy areas for all nine countries. 
While respondents’ answers show that people are more satisfied with certain 
policies than with others, it must be emphasised that satisfaction varies much 
more between countries. Respondents from Switzerland are most satisfied with 
Table 5.3 Satisfaction with government policy (averages) 
Economy Poverty Education Immigration 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
value value value value 























































































Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
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the government’s work in all policy areas, while those from Greece are most 
dissatisfied. The differences between these two countries are remarkable, as opin-
ions differ by almost four points of scale. Behind the Swiss are respondents from 
the UK, who are among the most satisfied citizens, even ahead of those from 
Germany and Sweden. The people from Poland are close to this group and are still 
ahead of France in terms of their satisfaction values. In addition to the respond-
ents from Greece, it is sometimes those from Italy or Spain who show very low 
satisfaction values. 
However, the standard deviation shows that the respondents’ answers clearly 
scatter around these mean values – by 2.5 to 3 points on both sides of the mean. This 
shows that opinions in the countries are clearly diverging. In the UK, for example, 
people are most divided when it comes to assessing economic and poverty policies, 
whereas the French and the Swedes disagree when it comes to immigration issues. 
These differences are mainly due to the high number of people who are extremely 
dissatisfied with their respective governments in the aforementioned policy areas. 
The individual evaluations have been combined into an index that shows how dis-
satisfied or satisfied the respondents are across all policy areas to illustrate this fact. 
The proportion of respondents who consistently provide the minimum value, 1 
(extremely dissatisfied), is only 0.4% in Switzerland, but increases in Germany, 
Sweden and the UK (3.3%, 5.2% and 5.9%, respectively). In France and Poland, 
already 1 in 10 respondents are extremely dissatisfied (10.9% and 9.6%, respec-
tively), and in Italy, Spain and Greece even 1 in 7 (16.7%, 15.4% and 15.8%). 
Figure 5.3 summarises the frequency distribution of satisfaction values for a 
selection of countries to illustrate this. For Switzerland, a normal distribution with 
a slightly positive overall trend can be seen, as the values are accumulating in the 
middle range, while they are increasingly thinning out in the direction of high dis-
satisfaction or satisfaction. Even in Germany, the average satisfaction values are 
clearly increasing at the expense of the dissatisfied. In Poland and Greece, there 
is a one-sided tendency because the clearly dissatisfied dominate the picture; the 
more the focus moves to moderate and positive assessments, the fewer respond-
ents can be found. The countries not shown here also match this picture because 
Spain and Italy follow the Greek pattern in surprising proximity, Sweden and the 
UK follow the German example and France follows Poland. 
It can, therefore, be assumed that people’s dissatisfaction with their govern-
ments is a reaction to the major crises in the European Union. The citizens of 
the countries most affected by the economic and financial crisis (Greece, Italy, 
Spain) are most dissatisfied with the work of their governments. However, this 
applies not only to politics with regard to the issues most closely linked to the cri-
sis, such as the economy, unemployment, insecure employment and poverty, but 
also to other policy areas such as education, healthcare, family and immigration 
policy. In this respect, too, it was shown that dissatisfaction is extremely wide-
spread in Greece, Italy and Spain. In these countries, the economic and financial 
crisis has apparently become a widespread acceptance crisis as a result of the 
prolonged recession and the strict conditions imposed by the European austerity 
policy. However, the number of extremely dissatisfied people in other European 
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Figure 5.3 Satisfaction with the government (all fields, in %). Source: Livewhat WP4 
population survey. 
countries, with the exception of Switzerland, has also reached a surprising level. 
This may be a sign that the European crises in these countries could also have had 
a lasting impact on the part of the population. 
Against this background, it is now important to clarify which social and politi-
cal factors guide people’s assessments and which population groups belong to the 
dissatisfied ones. For this purpose, we would like to fall back on the explanatory 
factors introduced above and that have been bundled to form a basic model. The 
respondents were divided into three groups with regard to the dependent variable 
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to verify these assumptions: the most satisfied, the dissatisfied, and the respond-
ents with medium satisfaction values. This classification should make it possible 
to identify clear group differences. In this case, too, a regression analysis (ordered 
logit model) was carried out, which is appropriate for this group differentiation. A 
number of cases had to be excluded because they had not answered some of the 
questions about satisfaction with government work. 
Table 5.4 shows that most of the research assumptions are correct, albeit with 
nuances. The income situation has little recognisable influence on satisfaction. 
Only people with low educational attainment have a slightly increased tendency 
to dissatisfaction. The respondents who feel they belong to the middle and lower-
middle classes are often moderately satisfied or dissatisfied compared with the 
greater satisfaction felt by the upper and upper-middle classes. Those who assign 
themselves to the lower class are more likely to be dissatisfied. 
There are clearer differences in the assessment of the economic situation. For 
example, respondents complaining about the deterioration in the economic situa-
tion of their household and diagnosing a serious crisis are dissatisfied. In figures, 
this means that the predicted average likelihood of dissatisfaction with govern-
ment work is 40.7% for households experiencing a financial decline, i.e., about 
13.4% higher than for those who see their budgetary situation improving (27.3%). 
However, the high levels of dissatisfaction among those surveyed who did not 
provide any information show that the dissatisfaction is a relative one. In par-
ticular, the better off, those who have improved their financial situation and are 
unable to discern a crisis, are comparatively more satisfied with the work of the 
government. 
With regard to political factors, political confidence and political interest 
make a difference in the level of dissatisfaction with government policies. When 
it comes to institutional confidence, in particular, it is noticeable that people 
with a high level of confidence are much more satisfied with the government. 
Conversely, satisfaction with the work of the government decreases dramatically 
when people have less confidence in political institutions or do not provide any 
information. Among the personal attributes, it is noticeable that respondents with 
a generally higher level of life satisfaction are less often dissatisfied with govern-
ment work. Women and all those over 25 tend to be slightly less satisfied than 
men and younger people. Respondents with a migration background are less criti-
cal. And with regard to the countries, it can be seen that in all countries there is 
a noticeably higher tendency to be dissatisfied with government work when the 
answers are compared with those of the Swiss respondents. 
All in all, the social position of people in society plays a less visible role in 
determining whether citizens are satisfied with their government. Rather, it is the 
perceived deterioration of the personal economic situation and the increasing cri-
sis sensitivity as well as the fundamental trust of the respondents in the political 
institutions that are closely related to satisfaction. 
On the basis of these findings, the analysis can move to the question of 
whether the satisfaction with the work of the government may also be related 
to the assessment of living conditions in other countries. For this purpose, the 
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Table 5.4 Satisfaction with government, basic model (ordered logistic regression, average 
marginal effects) 
Mostly satisfied Neither Mostly dissatisfied 
Educational attainment (university) 
Secondary education 
Less than secondary education 












Lower third 0.004 0.003 −0.007 
No details −0.002 −0.002 0.004 
Subjective class affiliation (upper 
class, upper-middle class) 
Middle class −0.002 −0.002 0.004 
Lower middle class −0.003 −0.002 0.006 
Lower class −0.028*** −0.025*** 0.054*** 
Other, don’t know −0.019** −0.015** 0.034** 
Economic situation of the 
household over the past five 
years (better) 
Similar −0.020*** −0.013*** 0.032*** 
Worse −0.066*** −0.068*** 0.134*** 
Don’t know −0.041*** −0.032* 0.073** 
Crisis perception (no crisis) 
Non-serious crisis −0.034*** −0.012*** 0.046*** 
Serious crisis −0.096*** −0.079*** 0.175*** 
No details −0.054*** −0.025*** 0.079*** 
Trust in institutions (high) 
Medium −0.168*** 0.004 0.164*** 
Low −0.245*** −0.198*** 0.444*** 
Don’t know −0.193*** −0.028*** 0.221*** 
Political interest (mostly interested) 






























45–64 −0.033*** −0.022*** 0.055*** 
65+ −0.026*** −0.017*** 0.043*** 
Migration background (no) 
Place of residence (city) 
Town (small) 















Germany −0.098*** −0.024*** 0.123*** 
(Continued) 
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Table 5.4 Continued 
Mostly satisfied Neither Mostly dissatisfied 
United Kingdom −0.074*** −0.010*** 0.084*** 
France −0.098*** −0.024*** 0.123*** 
Italy −0.118*** −0.042*** 0.160*** 
Spain −0.130*** −0.057*** 0.187*** 
Poland −0.161*** −0.114*** 0.275*** 
Greece −0.127*** −0.053*** 0.180*** 
Cases 15.330 
Pseudo R2 0.2349 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey.

Note: Significance levels: * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.

regression analysis was recalculated, but now additionally with the respective 
reference countries. As in the previous sections, the analysis had to be calcu-
lated separately for each reference country, with the result that respondents from 
the respective reference country were not included in the calculations either. As 
the results table with all variables is too extensive to be presented here, merely 
a compilation of the correlation measures for the nine reference countries is 
presented here. 
Figure 5.4 shows that satisfaction with government work is clearly related to 
the assessment of living conditions elsewhere; those who feel worse off are also 
less satisfied. Our findings, therefore, suggest that people measure their own gov-
ernment by whether living in other countries is better or worse. Here, too, the rank-
ing between the best-placed and worst-placed countries can be seen. The highest 
probability of dissatisfaction with one’s own government is among people who 
view their living conditions more negatively than Swiss living conditions. This 
effect is also repeated at a slightly lower level in the other well-placed countries 
(Sweden, Germany, UK, partly France). The correlation among the crisis coun-
tries (Spain, Italy and Greece) is much less pronounced. In the case of Greece, the 
influence of the poor living conditions on satisfaction largely evaporates; here, the 
comparison seems to be less disappointing. This confirms that comparisons with 
poorly placed countries have less impact on people’s political judgements than 
comparisons upwards. 
Figure 5.4 also breaks down whether people who assess their personal situ-
ation as similar to those in other countries are also more dissatisfied with their 
governments. This is evidently not the case. On the contrary, there are signs of the 
opposite effect: people who see similarities are less likely to be dissatisfied with 
their government. It seems that these people see less reason to criticise their poli-
ticians as their personal situation does not differ significantly from that of other 
Europeans. The effects vary only very slightly between the nine reference coun-
tries, indicating that the similarity of living conditions, in any case, has a moderat-
ing influence on the assessment of the government. People seem to have less cause 
for dissatisfaction as long as they are as well or as badly off as other Europeans. 
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Figure 5.4 Satisfaction with government and living conditions – extended model 
(ordered logistic regression, average marginal effects). Source: Livewhat WP4 
population survey. 
The calculation of the predictive margins per country shows that these correla-
tions follow the same pattern everywhere (see Figure 5.5). This time, the analysis 
is restricted to one reference country, namely Sweden. As in the previous section, it 
can be seen that the member states initially differ in the average probability of hav-
ing dissatisfied or satisfied citizens. Figure 5.5a shows that dissatisfaction is gener-
ally highest in Italy, Spain and Greece, while it is lowest in Switzerland, Germany 
and the UK. Inversely, satisfaction is higher in the wealthier countries and lower in 
the crisis countries. In addition, however, the comparisons of living conditions have 
a clear influence on satisfaction with government work everywhere. Respondents 
from all countries have a clear tendency to be dissatisfied once they assess their 
personal situation more negatively than that in Sweden. The effect is weaker in the 
best-ranked countries, probably also because the countries receive similarly good 
marks as Sweden. The increase in dissatisfaction is remarkable in the less well-
placed member states. Finally, it is confirmed for each individual country that the 
perception of similar living standards has a tempering influence on political dissat-
isfaction. The group that considers itself on par with the Swedish population is not 
only as often satisfied with its own government as those who feel better off; figure 
5.5b shows that this group tends to be even more satisfied. 
It can be concluded that similar standards of living reduce political dissatisfac-
tion while unequal standards of living increase dissatisfaction with one’s own 
government. The general insight behind this association is remarkable. On the 
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Figure 5.5 Dissatisfaction with government work and country comparisons (predictive 
marginal effects). Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
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one hand, people assess their governments’ performance within a pan-European 
frame of reference, which implies that people have ideas of a common European 
standard of living – otherwise the comparisons of social situations on both sides 
of the border would have no political relevance. On the other hand, it shows that 
the similarity of living conditions in Europe does not just have a neutral effect, 
but also diminishes political dissatisfaction and even supports satisfaction with 
one’s own government. The similarity, therefore, seems to be people’s compass 
for assessing political performance balances, and this aspect shows that people 
have indeed internalised the concept of a common European living standard. The 
European population is evidently a strong supporter of the EU’s mission to create 
equal living conditions in Europe. 
Political disappointment with the political 
“establishment” on a European scale 
It has been shown that the dissatisfaction of citizens with the political work of 
their government is noticeably linked to the economic situation in the countries. 
Satisfaction levels are collapsing, especially in the crisis-stricken countries of 
southern Europe. But the poorer economic situation of the personal household 
also causes respondents to be dissatisfied with their governments, especially if 
they believe that life is better elsewhere. This dissatisfaction is part of politi-
cal reality and thus also an incentive for democracy because it puts pressure on 
the governing parties to improve their performance balance, and it provides the 
political opposition with new opportunities to win elections. Satisfaction or dis-
satisfaction with the work of the government is regarded as specific support or 
criticism of the political system and is thus the fuel of a living democracy (Dalton 
1999; 2008). 
Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction of citizens with the work of the government 
may well lead to the alienation of citizens from the political system, provided 
that the criticism no longer only questions the work of the political personnel 
but, more fundamentally, also questions the political conditions or institutions as 
a whole. In the analyses above, for example, it was shown that satisfaction with 
government work very often goes hand in hand with fundamental trust in political 
institutions. Conversely, the dissatisfied much more often distrust political institu -
tions. It seems that bridges have already been burned here. 
This topic has been intensively researched for many decades, with the debate 
having been conducted under a variety of buzzwords. It was about political dis-
interest and non-participation (abstentionism or disengagement), disenchantment 
with politics and alienation from the political system, protest voters and angry 
citizens and, most recently, populism (Finifter 1970; Kleinhenz 1998; Amnå and 
Ekman 2014; Fieschi and Heywood 2004; Kneuer 2019). These debates unite a 
dual diagnosis because, on the one hand, it was found that people stay away from 
politics because they are simply not interested. It is not seen as part of their life, 
their priorities and desires. Very often, people around them share this view, which 
is why politics is experienced as a foreign body in their everyday life (Smith 
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2011; Hobbins and Lahusen 2015). Disinterested people frequently lean towards 
political passivity out of ignorance, incapacity or apathy and, therefore, share a 
feeling of internal ineffectiveness (Bertelson 1974; Reichert 2016). On the other 
hand, it is noted that political abstinence can also be the result of political disen-
chantment and thus of active dislike. Here it is the disappointment and alienation 
from day-to-day political business and political institutions that drive people to 
turn away from politics. This alienation does not rule out political participation 
because disappointed voters can vote for parties outside the established party 
spectrum (Stockemer and Barisione 2016; Treib 2020). Behind this disappoint-
ment and alienation is very often the belief that one’s political participation has 
little effect on politics (Ruxton and Saunders 2016) since the rulers have no ear 
for one’s interests. 
Populist parties and groups know how to play to this kind of audience and can 
successfully use the electoral potential of the politically disappointed for their 
own benefit. While dissatisfaction and disenchantment with politics are nothing 
new, the fact that political parties are being established that successfully call these 
people to the polls is a novel phenomenon. These groups address a somewhat 
diffuse general unease with established politics (Taggart 2004), but it should be 
noted that such parties can be found in all political leanings of the party spec-
trum (left and right, but also liberal, market-radical movements). They include, 
for instance, national right-wing parties such as the Rassemblement National in 
France, Austria’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs or Germany’s Alternative für 
Deutschland, but left-wing liberal groups such as the Spanish Podemos or the 
Greek Syriza should also be mentioned. These parties thus serve a worldview 
described as populist, which essentially consists of few convictions such as the 
belief in the people as a homogenous group, the opposition against a corrupt elite 
and the absolute desire to make the voice of the people heard. The criticism of the 
political system and the elite is often accompanied by the support of a charismatic 
leader who is seen as the direct representation of the people. After all, populism is 
considered a phenomenon of a crisis because it appeals to people who see them-
selves as losers of the social changes that they experience as rapid, and who con-
sequently believe not only themselves but society and politics to be in a serious 
crisis (Mudde 2004; Rooduijn 2014; Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Kneuer 2019). 
If these descriptions are correct, populist attitudes should be generally rep-
resented in the European population. After all, so far, it has been shown that a 
considerable proportion of respondents assume that we are living in times of a 
noticeable, even serious crisis. And many people are dissatisfied with the work 
of their governments in a whole range of policy areas. This seems to indicate that 
the long-standing economic and financial crisis has triggered a crisis of political 
acceptance and legitimacy of the existing representative democracy in parts of the 
citizenry. Populist beliefs would be a good indicator of this. 
But how widespread are these ideas among the European population? Is it 
possible to determine an association with the perception of the crisis, i.e., are 
these convictions much more prevalent in the crisis countries of southern Europe 
than in the member states that are less noticeably and enduringly affected by the 
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crisis? Can it also be said that populist beliefs are often shared by people living in 
disadvantaged circumstances who are at risk of social decline and more sensitive 
to crises? And does the comparison of living conditions within Europe fuel such 
populist convictions as soon as people assume that they are personally worse off 
than those living in other European countries? 
In order to answer these questions, a battery of items from the survey evalu-
ated so far will be used, which seeks to measure populist beliefs on the basis of 
proposals from previous studies (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2014; Stanley 
2011; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016). The measuring instrument consists of eight 
statements that belong to the populist core convictions, namely the centring on the 
people, the anti-elitist orientation, the antagonism between people and political 
class and the primacy of popular sovereignty (Rico and Anduiza 2016). In detail, 
respondents were asked to comment on the following statements, with answers 
ranging from one (completely disagree) to five (completely agree): 
•	 politicians in [the country’s] parliament need to follow the will of the people 
•	 the people, and not politicians, should make our most important political 
decisions 
•	 the political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the 
differences among the people 
•	 I would rather be represented by a citizen than by specialised politician 
•	 elected officials talk too much and take too little action 
•	 what people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s 
principles 
•	 the particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of 
the people 
•	 politicians always end up agreeing when it comes to protecting their privileges 
Table 5.5, with an integrated chart, gives an overview of the opinion climate in 
the countries by expressing the average agreement with the eight statements. The 
scatter of the answers was not included; however, with values around 0.8–1.0, 
the standard deviation with each statement is recognisable but moderate. It can 
be seen that not all statements meet equal approval. Respondents are less con-
vinced that politicians betray their principles when they make compromises. And 
the desire that citizens and not professional politicians should direct the fate of 
the country also barely receives approval, as with 3.6 it is only slightly above a 
mediocre “neither”. However, respondents broadly agree that parliament should 
follow the will of the people and that politicians talk too much and have their own 
privileges in mind. 
With regard to the average opinion in the countries, it is obvious that the 
French, Italian and Greek respondents are more aligned with populist beliefs 
than the others. Particularly the criticism of the political class is very pronounced 
because, on average, respondents agree with the statement that the elites seek 
to protect their own privileges and harm the welfare of the people. In contrast, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Germany and the UK are among the countries with lower 
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Table 5.5 Agreement with populist beliefs (averages) 
CH S De UK Fr It Es Pol Gr All 
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privileges 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
Note: Switzerland (CH), Sweden (S), Germany (De), United Kingdom (UK), France (Fr), Italy (It), 
Spain (Es), Poland (Pol), Greece (Gr) and all countries (All). 
approval values. The Swedish respondents, in particular, differ significantly from 
the overall picture. Apart from the sentiment that parliament should do what the 
people want and that politicians talk too much, Swedes are the least critical of the 
political class. 
These individual statements themselves do not yet measure populist orienta-
tions; some of them are even part of democratic self-perception. This applies, for 
example, to the opinion that parliament should represent the will of the people. 
And the statement that the people should make important political decisions also 
corresponds to the convictions of plebiscitary democracy and its procedures (e.g., 
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referendums or citizens’ petitions). However, in combination with the other state-
ments, these statements also contain a populist reckoning with the political estab-
lishment. In political science research, these attitudes are therefore not treated 
individually but are only associated with populist beliefs as a package (Akkerman 
et al. 2014; Stanley 2011; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Rico and Anduiza 2016). 
This practice is also to be followed here. 
For the following evaluations, these eight statements have therefore been sum-
marised into an indicator that is intended to capture basic populist beliefs in the 
population. A factor analysis pointed to two dimensions, but all statements were 
loaded very clearly with the first dimension, while the second could hardly be 
interpreted meaningfully. An overall indicator has, therefore, been maintained. 
The internal consistency of the indicator with all eight statements is good, as the 
reliability test showed an alpha value of 0.87 for the total sample, and values for 
the individual countries, which were between 0.82 (Greece) and 0.90 (France). 
Table 5.6 summarises the descriptive results of this indicator. It is confirmed that 
the populist orientation is highest on average in Italy. But in Greece, France, Spain 
and Poland, too, the needle tends to swing in the direction of higher approval. The 
scatter around the mean value is rather small because, with less than one point, 
the respondents are oriented more or less populistically than the average of the 
country. 
This indicator has been divided into three equally large groups in order to 
identify those respondents who stood out for their high approval levels of the 
populism index (i.e., on average between 4.2 and 5 of the 5-point scale). As can be 
seen in Table 5.6, about a third of all respondents can be assigned to this group. In 
Switzerland, the group is quite manageable, with only one in seven respondents. 
There are also fewer people who share populist beliefs in the UK, Sweden and 
Germany. The largest group is in Italy, with almost one in two respondents, but 
Spain and France are just behind Italy with just under 40%, followed by Greece 
and Poland. 
It would now make sense to attribute the unequal distribution of populist 
beliefs to the consequences of the economic and financial crisis because this crisis 
led to a significant drop in living standards in southern European countries. For 
many people, it meant the precarisation of their personal situation, social decline 
and impoverishment. But even households from more secure backgrounds could 
not avoid such worries; one only needs to think back to the majority of Greek, 
Italian or Spanish respondents who said in this survey that their country was in a 
serious crisis. Therefore, the question arises in which circumstances the respond-
ents with populist convictions live, and in what situation they see themselves. At 
the same time, it must be clarified whether this group of people consistently rate 
their own living standards as worse than those in other countries when comparing 
living conditions. They would then be expressing the feeling of being neglected 
or left behind within Europe. 
To answer these questions, it is important to validate the explanatory power of 
a number of factors analysed in previous chapters, because they have confirmed 
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whether people with high levels of approval are characterised by greater social 
disadvantage when they are compared with those without affinity with populist 
orientations. Populism research assumes this, although one would have to differ-
entiate between different assumptions here. Initially, the expectation is that mod-
ernisation and globalisation processes create new structures of division and lines 
of conflict that essentially generate winners and losers (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi 
and Pappas 2015). The losers are likely to be people with fewer societally relevant 
resources such as education, income and professional status. 
However, populist beliefs do not necessarily have to be a consequence of 
objective social disadvantage, but may just as well correspond to subjective per-
ceptions of social decline, unfair treatment and being the victims of an increas-
ingly divided society (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Rico and Anduiza 2016). This 
expands the circle of people who are open to populist beliefs because even people 
in more secure circumstances can fear a deterioration in the economic situation 
of their household or perceive a deterioration in the economic situation in their 
country, which could sooner or later have a negative impact on them personally. 
The aim is, therefore, to clarify whether the perception of such macroeconomic or 
personal threats is more important for the expression of populist convictions than 
the objective, socio-structural position of the respondents. 
In addition to these socio-economic factors, political determinants must also be 
considered, above all because the described economic crisis phenomena can also 
lead to a political acceptance crisis. Indeed, it is assumed that populist attitudes 
are not primarily a reaction to social changes and economic crises but rather a 
response to the perceived inability of politicians to find solutions (Laclau 2005; 
Pappas 2014). It appears more likely that the differences between people with 
and without populist beliefs can be explained by their relationship with political 
institutions. If the observation is correct that populist beliefs can be found in all 
political camps, they should not vary along the political left-right spectrum, but 
along satisfaction with government work and trust in politics, in other words, with 
the general acceptance of political conditions. 
These factor bundles are part of a basic model to which a number of control 
variables are then added. It is important to exclude that populist beliefs are linked 
to specific population groups that share socio-demographic characteristics (age, 
gender, place of residence or migration background). It must also be checked 
whether these factors lose their explanatory power as soon as the countries are 
introduced as variables, as in this case, it is also possible that the populist approval 
rates are not due to the social-structural variables and political attitudes of the 
respondents, but can be attributed solely to the differences between the countries. 
As in the previous analyses, the assumptions are to be checked using a regression 
analysis (ordered logit model). 
Table 5.7 confirms most of the assumptions of the basic model; only the socio-
structural location of the respondents has little influence on populist beliefs. 
Although respondents with low educational attainment are more likely to agree 
with the populist world view rather than those with a university degree, there 
is no clear correlation with regard to household income. More important is the 
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Table 5.7 Populist beliefs, basic model (ordered logistic regression, average marginal 
effects) 
Rejection Neither Agreement 
Educational attainment (university) 
Secondary education 
Less than secondary education 











Lower third −0.004 0.000 0.004 
No details 0.014 −0.001 −0.013 
Subjective class affiliation (upper class, 
upper-middle class) 
Middle class −0.039*** 0.006** 0.033*** 
Lower middle class −0.066*** 0.008*** 0.058*** 
Lower class −0.096*** 0.009*** 0.087*** 
Other, don’t know −0.025 0.004 0.021 
Economic situation of the household over 
the past five years (better) 
Similar 0.021*** −0.002*** −0.019*** 
Worse −0.042*** 0.001** 0.041*** 
Don’t know −0.019 0.001 0.018 
Crisis perception (no crisis) 
Non-serious crisis −0.055*** 0.010*** 0.045*** 
Serious crisis −0.131*** 0.012*** 0.119*** 
No details 0.074*** −0.022*** −0.052*** 
Satisfaction with government work 
(mostly satisfied) 









Trust in institutions (high) 
Medium −0.156*** 0.047*** 0.109*** 
Low −0.325*** 0.020*** 0.305*** 
Don’t know −0.087*** 0.032*** 0.055*** 
Political interest (mostly disinterested) 





























45–64 −0.081*** 0.008*** 0.073*** 
65+ −0.071*** 0.008*** 0.063*** 
Migration background (no) 
Place of residence (city) 
Town (small) 
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Table 5.7 Continued 
Rejection Neither Agreement 
Country (Switzerland) 

























Greece 0.043*** −0.006*** −0.036*** 
Cases 17333 
Pseudo R2 0.146 
Note: Significance levels: * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01. 
Data: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
subjective assessment of one’s situation. People who feel that they belong to the 
lower classes and assume that the economic situation of their household has dete-
riorated in the last five years are remarkably more susceptible to populist beliefs 
when they are compared with respondents in a subjectively better situation. 
Above all, it is confirmed that populist views have a conspicuous affinity with cri -
sis perception, as respondents who believe their country is in a serious crisis share 
populist opinions more often (i.e., 11.9%) than those who do not perceive a crisis; 
in terms of predictive probabilities, the difference is between 24.2% and 36.2%. 
This finding is highlighted by the fact that respondents who have no opinion on 
the crisis issue are much less likely to agree with the populist world view. 
The strongest correlations result from political attitudes. Those who are dis-
satisfied with government work express populist beliefs over 20% more often 
when compared to satisfied people. And with regard to confidence in the political 
institutions, the probability of populist beliefs is 31% higher, although it should be 
noted here that the content of this question is very close to the populist question 
items, which is why this finding is hardly surprising. It is remarkable that populist 
attitudes are by no means a sign of lack of political interest; on the contrary, these 
respondents are more interested in politics. In terms of political orientation, there 
is only a slight tendency for people on the left of political ideologies to more fre-
quently share a populist view. However, the weak association is an indication that 
populist beliefs are at home in all political camps. Finally, the results show that 
the various control variables hardly challenge the explanatory power of the basic 
model; populist attitudes are more common among men and older age groups; 
migration experiences and place of residence have no discernible influence. In 
terms of countries, the differences outlined in Tables 5.5 to 5.6 are confirmed, 
given that the British population is less populist compared with Switzerland, and 
the Polish population is more populist. All in all, it can be confirmed that populist 
beliefs are not a sign of sheer disinterest in politics, but more fundamentally an 
expression of disenchantment with politics and alienation from the established 
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political system. This disenchantment with politics seems to be most widespread 
among those sections of the population who feel pushed to the margins of society 
and feel that there is a serious crisis in the current situation. 
The basic model thus confirms much of what previous research already 
addressed (Pappas 2014; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Rico and Anduiza 2016). 
However, this study is interested in the question of whether populist beliefs are 
also linked to the comparative assessment of living conditions in other countries, 
in addition to the explanations already provided by the basic model. The results 
of the extended regression analyses (see Figure 5.6) underpin the relevance of 
the intra-European comparisons, since the likelihood that respondents share 
basic populist beliefs also depends on how they assess their living conditions in 
comparison with those of other Europeans. This figure summarises the effects of 
the nine regression analyses graphically. People are more likely to hold populist 
beliefs once they feel that people in other countries are better off than they are. 
And conversely, those whose situation seems to be better than in other countries 
are less likely to agree with populist statements. The effect is greatest in relation to 
Switzerland as a top-ranked country. People who rate their personal living condi-
tions to be better than those in Switzerland are unlikely to share populist beliefs. 
This probability decreases steadily when moving from the top-ranked countries 
to the crisis countries, and the effect is reversed when looking at Greece. This is 
understandable because, in our overall sample, there are many respondents who 
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Figure 5.6 Populist beliefs – extended model detail (ordered logistic regression, average 
marginal effects). Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
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group is therefore very large and inevitably includes people with and without 
populist attitudes. 
Cross-border comparisons thus inspire populist beliefs, especially when one’s 
situation declines in relation to others. In this case too, however, it must be clari-
fied whether this correlation applies to each of the nine country samples because 
so far, only the effects across all countries have been calculated. As in the previous 
chapters, predictive margins have been calculated for this purpose that allow us to 
indicate the probability of basic populist beliefs for each country and each refer-
ence group. Figure 5.7 compiles these coefficients for two countries at the top of 
the list, Switzerland and Sweden. The results show first of all that some countries, 
especially France and Italy, have a larger following of populist beliefs among the 
population, which is why the average probabilities here are also higher. However, 
the differences between the different comparison groups within the national sam-
ples are more meaningful. Populist beliefs are much more likely among those who 
see their personal living conditions below the Swiss and Swedish living standards. 
And this association exists in all countries. The difference is particularly marked 
in countries with a higher overall distribution of populist beliefs, such as France 
and Italy. The differences between the three groups are not so marked when com-
parisons are made with Swedish living conditions. It is striking that those who see 
their personal situation to be equal to the Swedish level share populist views only 
marginally more often than those who are better off than the Swedish population. 
And this picture continues with the other reference countries, which have not been 
taken into account here for space reasons. Better and similar living conditions are 
accompanied by populist opinions less often. It is only the perceived worst posi-
tion compared to people in other countries that significantly increases the proxim-
ity to populist convictions. 
In this case, too, it is a matter of correlations, and it can only be noted that 
populist attitudes and a feeling of being in a worse position than can be found 
elsewhere probably belong together. However, the question of a clear causality is 
less important for our purposes, as both sides are obviously part of a common pat-
tern of perception and interpretation. The fact that people brand the political elites 
of their countries as detached, selfish and harmful fits into a world view that sees 
their own country in a bad situation, trailing behind other states. The establish-
ment of the EU has given these populist beliefs a recipient for their political dis-
satisfaction. And especially in the course of the 2010s, populist parties and groups 
throughout Europe have significantly tightened their anti-European programme. 
However, in Chapter 6 it will be shown that people localise the problem much 
more clearly in their own country, as the feeling of not being heard politically is 
much more pronounced and momentous in the national context than the feeling 
of not being heard within the EU. The dissatisfaction is therefore also directed at 
national politics. 
The EU thus contributes (unintentionally) to the spread of populist beliefs. It 
provides people with a yardstick for measuring the European social space, and 
according to the survey data, this social space is perceived as eminently unequal. 
These subjectively perceived divisional structures seem to fuel concerns about 
0 
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Figure 5.7	 Populist convictions and country comparisons (predictive margins). Source: 
Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
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social decline, which are shared in particular by people in insecure or precarious 
living conditions. When these people report that they and their households have 
been threatened or affected by a social decline in recent years, and when they feel 
that their country is in a serious crisis, these assessments take on a particularly 
negative value when compared with other countries. Following this perception, 
the European social space is interspersed with differences, inequalities or lines 
of division. This view can fuel the belief in a fundamental distribution conflict, 
according to which conditions in one’s own country are curtailed by those of 
other countries. This view is not shared by all Europeans, because as will be 
shown in Chapter 6, the majority of people perceive there to be more common 
elements than divisive elements between the populations of Europe. However, it 
was also shown that 18% of those questioned are of the opposite opinion and thus 
emphasise the divisive elements. This belief in a distribution conflict here could 
develop considerable political volatility for the EU. After all, it must be consid-
ered that populist beliefs have become a pan-European phenomenon, paving the 
way for the respective parties and groups to enter parliaments in all member states 
(Taggart 1995; 2004; Mudde 2004; Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi and Pappas 2015). 
Political protest in times of European crises 
This raises the question of whether the attitudes identified so far – the crisis affin-
ity of the population, dissatisfaction with governments, populist beliefs and the 
perception of a relatively bad position compared with others – also shape the 
political actions of European citizens. After all, the European economic and 
financial crisis has triggered political controversy in many countries and has also 
provoked street protests against the governments’ austerity policies (della Porta 
and Mattoni 2014). The people also use elections to express their dissatisfaction 
because, in many places, the ruling parties lose votes in favour of the parliamen-
tary opposition and smaller, sometimes new protest parties (Kouki and Fernandez 
2018). In many countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and also Germany), this 
has significantly changed the political landscape, in some cases even turned it 
upside down. 
In Greece, for example, the traditional two-party system – with the conserva-
tive “New Democracy” (ND) and the social-democratic “Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement” (PASOK) – was dismantled by the 2009 and 2012 elections in favour 
of smaller parties on the margins of the political spectrum. In particular, the 
socialist Syriza party benefited most from this upheaval, since it succeeded in 
forming a government in 2015, alongside the right-wing populist Independent 
Greeks. However, since then Syriza has had to meet the reform requirements of 
international lenders, which led to a dramatic drop in approval levels in the elec-
tion polls and the reappearance of street protests. 
Other European countries have witnessed the emergence of protest parties that 
are critical of the political establishment (Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Hernández 
and Kriesi 2016). In Italy, for example, the Five Star Movement led by TV enter-
tainer Beppe Grillo in the 2013 national parliamentary elections ousted Silvio 
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Berlusconi’s right-wing conservative Il Popolo della Libertà and former Prime 
Minister Matteo Renzi’s centre-left alliance Partito Democratico (Democratic 
Party) with an astonishing election victory of more than 25%. In the parliamen-
tary elections of 2018, the movement was even able to increase its share of the 
vote to over 32%, which is why it became part of the ruling coalition with the 
Lega Nord in early summer 2018. Similar upheavals have taken place in Spain 
with the two popular parties, the Partido Popular and the PSOE (Spanish socialist 
workers’ party), suffering severe defeats in the December 2015 general elections, 
while the new Unidos Podemos, led by lateral entrant Pablo Iglesias, received 
over 20% of the vote in those elections. The party sees itself as the left-wing 
populist mouthpiece of an extra-parliamentary protest movement (especially 
the Indignados and the so-called 15-M Movement). These demonstrations were 
directed not only against the austerity policies of the Spanish government but also 
against the established parties and representation system, which they perceived 
to be in a serious crisis and wanted to transform into a more direct democracy 
(Kouki and Fernandez 2018). 
In many European countries, right-wing populist protest parties also experi-
enced a brisk influx of supporters. Parties such as the French Rassemblement 
National, the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid, the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs, the Belgian Vlaams Belang, the German Alternative für Deutschland 
or the British UK Independence Party should be mentioned here. This success 
was not necessarily supported by broader, extra-parliamentary protest move-
ments. Nevertheless, street protests for this right-wing populism are not com-
pletely unknown, such as the German PEGIDA (patriotic Europeans against the 
Islamisation of the Occident) movement, which has organised regular demonstra-
tions against immigration, alienation and asylum policy since 2014 (Vorländer, 
Herold and Schäller 2018). This right-wing populism is driven by the demand to 
seal off one’s own country in times of crises, which is why, in comparison with 
the countries in crisis in southern Europe, one should rather speak of wealth-
protectionist, right-wing national populism. 
The attention given to these anti-establishment parties, however, paints a one-
sided picture, given that the stronger mobilisation of the population in times of 
economic crisis has also led to the emergence of new civil society organisations 
and groups. Particularly in Greece, numerous citizens’ initiatives, associations and 
aid projects have emerged in response to the economic and financial crisis (Clarke 
and Huliaras 2015). Most of their activities are aimed at alleviating the immedi-
ate needs of the population, which have been exacerbated by years of recession, 
high mass unemployment, falling wages and the reduction of welfare state ben-
efits (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2014; Kousis, Kalogeraki, Papdaki, Loukakis 
and Velonaki 2018; Papadaki and Kalogeraki 2017). Essentially, however, this 
commitment is also a political one, since a large number of these initiatives see 
their task in mobilising protests for the purpose of a political transformation of 
Greece (Diani and Kousis 2014; Kousis 2014). Similar findings are also available 
for the other crisis countries because in Spain, Portugal or Italy, too, civic involve-
ment in informal networks, initiatives or civil society organisations is of greater 
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importance. Their goals include not only alleviating the immediate plight of the 
population but also the political mobilisation of the public (Pérez de Armiño 
2014; Baumgarten 2017). Despite the widespread dissatisfaction with the political 
parties, one should therefore not necessarily speak of a rampant disenchantment 
with politics. Rather, this commitment seems to be a sign of a persistently high 
politicisation of the population. 
This overview suggests that the consequences of the economic and financial cri-
sis have increased people’s tendency to protest in many member states at the same 
time (della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Kriesi 2016a). Street protests were directed 
against the consequences of the recession and national debt, especially in the crisis 
countries, against the consolidation and austerity measures of national governments 
but also against the reform dictates of the EU and the leading member states. Since 
late summer 2015, there have also been public disputes about European asylum and 
immigration policy, which have intensified as a result of the increasing number of 
refugees. As the survey data used here originate from the summer of 2015, it is, 
however, possible to rule out any influence of these conflicts on the protest behav-
iour of the people identified. But even for this period, it can be assumed that people 
were dissatisfied with the political conditions in Europe in the face of the economic, 
financial and sovereign debt crises that grew into a crisis of governance and accept-
ance of the EU. They may have been prepared to protest because they perceived 
the plights and inequalities in their own environment also to be a consequence of a 
pan-European crisis. And they were probably also prepared to protest because they 
compared the situation in their country with the reality of life in other European 
countries and felt that the perceived inequalities were unfair. 
It can, therefore, be assumed that the protest behaviour of the people in the indi-
vidual countries did not have local or national causes alone. Rather, it is assumed 
that the participation in the protest was also marked by common problems and 
evaluation standards. This assumption can be verified when the explanatory mod -
els introduced in the previous chapters are taken up and developed further. In this 
sense, it should be assumed that protest behaviour becomes more and more likely 
as soon as people perceive the current situation as critical and assess the living 
conditions in their country as worse than those in the other European countries. 
The effect of these two factors must be balanced against other influences (here, 
in particular, socio-structural situations and political attitudes), which have been 
repeatedly confirmed in previous research as determinants of political protests. 
The survey data used here provides important insights into people’s propensity 
to participate politically because the respondents were asked whether they had 
campaigned for matters in the public interest. “There are different ways of trying 
to improve things or help prevent things from going wrong” (Livewhat 2015, p. 
5). Respondents were able to choose from a list of 16 activities, and these included 
contacts with politicians, variants of political consumption, various forms of street 
protests and political communication in the social media. Respondents were asked 
to indicate whether they had previously performed the listed actions (last year, last 
five years, at some point in their lives), whether they could imagine performing 
these actions or whether they would never perform any of them. 
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The following analyses will focus on the three listed forms of political street 
protests: participation in demonstrations, marches or rallies, participation in occu-
pations, sit-ins or blockades and participation in protests where the property was 
damaged. Participation in demonstrations is particularly useful for our purposes 
because it is now a rather widespread form of political participation that is chosen 
by many groups to give their demands a voice in public. 
Table 5.8 summarises how many people reported having participated in these 
protest events. One in ten respondents said they had demonstrated in the last 12 
Table 5.8 Participation in protest events (in %) 
Last Last Earlier Never, but Would N 
12 months 5 years in life conceivable never 
do it 
Demonstrations, marches or rallies 
Switzerland 5.8 8.9 15.9 23.3 46.0 2046 





































Greece 23.1 19.2 18.6 21.8 17.3 2048 
All respondents 10.9 11.1 17.4 21.4 39.2 18368 
Occupations, sit-ins or blockades 
Switzerland 1.3 3.1 7.1 17.7 70.8 2046 





































Greece 5.4 11.1 19.3 26.5 37.7 2048 
All respondents 2.3 4.7 9.4 20.3 63.3 18368 
Protests involving property damage 
Switzerland 1.42 1.96 5.57 3.76 87.3 2046 





































Greece 1.03 1.32 2.00 4.44 91.2 2048 
All respondents 1.1 2.0 3.8 4.2 88.9 18368 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey. 
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months; another 11% are added as soon as the period is extended to the last five 
years, and another 17% can be added as soon as the respondents look further back 
into their lives. More than one in three had therefore participated in street pro-
tests. Another 21% could imagine doing so, which is why only 40% remain who 
categorically excluded demonstration participation. Percentages fall sharply when 
moving to confrontational and even violent forms of political protest. Almost two-
thirds categorically ruled out participation in blockades, and almost 90% oppose 
violent protests. Only 7% and 3% said they had participated in blockades or vio-
lent protests in the last year or the last five years, respectively. 
The differences between countries are minimal for violent forms of protest, as 
at least 85% of respondents categorically excluded participation. Thus, the vast 
majority of people in Europe agreed that violence is not a legitimate means of 
political expression. The non-violent but confrontational forms of protest show 
greater differences. Only one-third of Greek respondents could not, in princi -
ple, imagine participating, and the same applies to one in two in Italy and Spain. 
Compared with other countries, more people considered taking part in these forms 
of protest. In other countries, two-thirds of those surveyed were fundamentally 
opposed to participation. The greater affinity with confrontational forms of protest 
in the southern European countries is also evident in the fact that the proportion 
of those who have participated in occupations or blockades in the last 12 months 
or 5 years was significantly higher in Greece, Italy and Spain (16.5%, 10.6% and 
9.2%, respectively) than in the other countries. 
The greater degree of mobilisation in Greece, Italy and Spain applies above all 
to demonstrations and rallies; France also joins this group. In these countries, the 
proportion of those who cannot imagine participating in principle is the lowest. In 
Greece, only a small minority of just 17% is not prepared to go to a demonstra-
tion. It is also remarkable that demonstration participation in these countries is 
also relatively recent. Almost one in four respondents from Greece has attended a 
demonstration in the last 12 months, and the same applies to 17% of the Spanish 
and 14% and 12% of the French and Italian population, respectively. The circle 
of respondents who have participated in a demonstration in the last five years is 
similar. 
The greater protest affinity of the people of southern Europe can be attributed to 
the continuing consequences of the economic and financial crisis and the political 
reforms of governments (della Porta and Mattoni 2014; della Porta 2015; Kriesi 
2016a). Since the survey was conducted in mid-2015, it can be ruled out that this 
has anything to do with the conflicts surrounding the European immigration and 
asylum policy since the summer of 2015. However, it may also be an expression 
of the political culture of these countries. For Greece, it has been shown that the 
recurring street protests with their confrontational, partly violent forms of action 
are an expression of its history because the memories of the military dictator-
ship (1967–1974) and the transition to democracy have established a “culture of 
sympathy” for resistance against the state (Andronikidou and Kovras 2012). But 
a more confrontational political culture has also been diagnosed for France and 
the other southern European countries. This is attributed, among other things, to 
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the greater mistrust towards political elites and political parties (Torcal, Gunther 
and Montero 2002). However, the reduced enthusiasm for conventional forms 
of political participation such as elections or membership in parties and asso-
ciations also plays a role (Fernandes, Cancela, Coppedge, Lindberg and Hicken 
2015). Reference is also made to the greater politicisation and ideological divi-
sions of the association system, for example, among the trade unions (Schmalz 
and Weinmann 2016). 
For our empirical analyses, these national protest rates are less important 
because this book is interested in individual protest participation and the possi-
ble factors that could explain such political behaviour. It is known from previous 
research that socio-structural circumstances and political attitudes are of central 
importance. On the one hand, the socio-economic standard model assumes that 
social inequalities contribute to unequal participation in political life, since peo-
ple with fewer resources (income, education, contacts or civic competences) 
are more often politically inactive (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Brady, Verba 
and Schlozman 1995; Schur, 2003). Concern about securing one’s lifestyle may 
be at the forefront, or there may be a lack of means, skills and experience to 
actively participate politically in protests. Research has also shown that there 
are class-specific forms of political participation (Cainzos and Voces 2010), 
e.g., a middle-class bias among participants of street protests (Parkin 1968; 
Kriesi 1989; Eder 1993). 
In addition to the socio-structural factors, research to date has also shown that 
participation in protest activities is influenced by basic political orientations. It 
can be assumed that people are more likely to take part in protests if they are 
politically interested. Political self-positioning on the left side of the ideological 
spectrum should also promote an affinity for protests because the “new social 
movements” dominated street protests for a long time and thus clearly shaped 
the protest culture (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1995; Meyer and 
Tarrow 1998). However, it must be clarified whether this still applies in the pre-
sent day because right-wing conservatives and national-populist groups are also 
claiming the streets for themselves and are now mobilising a different faction 
(Hutter 2014; Aslanidis 2016; Vorländer et al. 2018). It may, therefore, be that the 
political orientations along the left-right spectrum no longer help to distinguish 
between demonstrators and non-participants. 
It will be determined below, on the basis of the findings and assumptions pre -
sented, which of these factors encourage or inhibit protest in the countries exam-
ined. In a second step, it will then be clarified whether the European comparative 
horizon also plays a significant role. These questions are to be analysed using one 
of the forms of protest already described: participation in demonstrations and ral-
lies. It would be helpful to determine whether there are differences between the 
respondents who declared such participation and those who categorically exclude 
participation. In particular, it is important to identify the characteristics that can 
be used to distinguish these two groups most reliably. For this purpose, the factors 
that were introduced gradually in the previous chapters will be used. These factors 
can be condensed into four assumptions, which are based on explanations that 
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have already proven themselves in protest research. Firstly, three variables that 
may be able to measure a protest-inhibiting effect of socio-structural disadvan-
tage are included (income, education and subjective class affiliation). Secondly, 
it must be examined whether the perception of a serious crisis and the deteriora-
tion of the economic situation of one’s household is encouraging participation in 
demonstrations. Thirdly, variables that increase the protest-encouraging influence 
of political orientations are inserted (interest in politics and left-right locations). 
Fourthly, it is assumed that protest in recent times is also an expression of political 
alienation from the political system, which is why the model includes variables 
that measure trust or distrust in political institutions, dissatisfaction with govern-
ment work and populist beliefs. 
As in the previous calculations, control variables are also to be introduced 
here. It must be clarified whether the factors introduced above retain their 
explanatory power when socio-demographic characteristics and the different 
countries are taken into account. On the one hand, people’s affinity to protest 
is likely to be shaped by age, gender, place of residence and migration back-
ground. On the other hand, it must be checked whether protest participation 
depends above all on the (more or less protest affine) country in which the peo -
ple live. The higher protest rate in the southern European countries seems to 
suggest such a country effect. 
The regression analysis centres on the three active groups of people: those 
who participated in a demonstration only recently (i.e., in the last 12 months), 
those who took to the streets at an earlier point in their lives and those who can 
at least imagine doing so. These groups are contrasted with the notorious non-
demonstrators. Table 5.9 shows that some of the findings of previous research 
can be confirmed. Many of the effects are negative. Overall, a clear profile of 
supporters emerges: demonstrators are more likely to be male, are under 25 years 
of age and live in large cities; they are more likely to have higher educational 
attainment and count themselves among the middle and lower classes; and they 
trust political institutions, are interested in politics and are more politically leftist. 
With these factors, it makes little difference whether people started to participate 
in street protest only recently or earlier years because this profile remains largely 
unchanged. Political disenchantment and political alienation from the state and 
politics are therefore not applicable to these demonstrators. Rather, these are peo-
ple who assume that protesting is worthwhile, in part because the institutions 
can be trusted. For some factors, this profile is even more pronounced among 
the recently active (especially institutional confidence, political interest, left-wing 
orientations) than among people who were protesting a long time ago. 
The countries also play a role because protest participation is much more likely 
amongst the Greek population; on average, the probability of protest participation 
in the last year is 10.6% for Greek respondents when compared to the Swiss. Italy, 
the UK and France also show higher values. It seems that the people of Greece 
have more reason to protest, and the same could be said for Spain, Italy and 
France; perhaps the people there also have a greater affinity for protest as a whole. 
For our purposes, however, this finding is less important. Much more remarkable 
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Table 5.9 Participation in demonstrations –basic model (ordered logistic regression, aver-
age marginal effects) 
Never Conceivable At an earlier In the last 














Monthly household income 
(top third) 
Middle third −0.006 −0.000 0.004 0.003 
Lower third 0.006 −0.000 −0.003 −0.003 
No details −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subjective class affiliation 
(upper class, upper-middle 
class) 
Middle class −0.021 0.001 0.012 0.008 
Lower middle class −0.047*** 0.001 0.026*** 0.020*** 
Lower class −0.045*** 0.001 0.025*** 0.019*** 
Other, don’t know −0.023 0.001 0.013 0.009 
Economic situation of the 
household over the past 
5 years (better) 
Similar −0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Worse −0.018* −0.000 0.010* 0.008** 
Don’t know 0.042 −0.002 −0.024 −0.017 
Crisis perception (no crisis) 
Non-serious crisis 0.006 −0.000 −0.003 −0.003 
Serious crisis −0.023** −0.000 0.013** 0.010** 
No details 0.034** −0.001 −0.019** −0.013** 
Satisfaction with government 
work (mostly satisfied) 











Trust in institutions (high) 
Medium 0.036*** 0.001** −0.020*** −0.018*** 
Low 0.053*** 0.001** −0.029*** −0.025*** 
Don’t know 0.082*** −0.000 −0.045*** −0.036*** 
Political interest (not very 
interested) 




















Populist beliefs (low) 
Medium −0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
High 
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Table 5.9 Continued 
Never Conceivable At an earlier In the last 












45–64 0.076*** 0.005*** −0.041*** −0.039*** 
65+ 0.158*** −0.001 −0.088*** −0.069*** 
Migration background (no) 
Place of residence (city) 
Town (small) 













































Greece −0.199*** −0.022*** 0.114*** 0.106*** 
Cases 17.333 
Pseudo R2 0.08344 
Source: Livewhat WP4 population survey.

Note: Significance levels: * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.

is that the social and political profile of typical protest supporters across countries 
is very similar. 
Overall, it can, therefore, be said that the people taking part in street protests 
are similar in all countries. It is surprising in this context that crisis percep-
tion plays only a secondary, in some cases, even a marginal role. As shown in 
Table 5.9, crisis sensitivity is important when it comes to participating in recent 
protests. Compared with those who categorically reject participation, people who 
participated in demonstrations in the last 12 months are somewhat more often 
of the opinion that their country is going through times of serious crisis, but the 
association is not very significant. 
This finding puts the insights of protest and movement research into perspec-
tive, as the latter assumes that the protests in the crisis countries were clearly 
related to the crisis. People took to the streets to protest against the consequences 
of the economic and financial crisis and the political austerity measures and 
consolidation reforms of national governments (Schmalz and Weinmann 2018; 
Kousis 2014; della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Kouki and Fernandez 2018; Kriesi 
2016a). Our findings paint a somewhat different picture, which does not have to 
contradict the described insights. Protest and movement research looked at very 
specific mobilisation episodes, while our data measure general participation in 
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street protests. The association with the crisis is there, but it appears this associa-
tion is not a unique feature of the people demonstrating. The findings are under-
standable because people protest for many reasons, and the rallies or marches in 
which the respondents took part can be responses to a variety of grievances. 
This finding has implications for our question because if the assessment of 
the overall economic situation is not directly reflected in people’s tendency to 
protest, it is unclear to what extent the perception of unequal living conditions 
within Europe is also important. Are protests driven by the fact that people rate 
their own living conditions as worse than those in other European countries? 
Do protests therefore also have to do with a feeling of relative deprivation? The 
answer to these questions is not obvious due to inconclusive findings from previ-
ous research. On the one hand, it is not very likely that people have explicitly and 
exclusively taken to the streets to protest unequal living conditions in Europe. On 
the other hand, however, it is not far-fetched that a sense of relative deprivation 
could encourage protest. Protest research was able to provide some evidence of 
this (e.g., Dubé and Guimond 1986; Grasso and Giugni 2016). However, there are 
sceptical voices arguing that feelings of relative deprivation only increase the gen-
eral motivation to protest, but need not necessarily result in actual protest action 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; Rucht 1994). However, it is not excluded that this 
translation from dispositions into actions is more likely in times of crisis, because 
under such circumstances, feelings of relative deprivation may receive the nec-
essary (political) salience to trigger protest participation. It, therefore, appears 
necessary to review this assumption empirically. This validation has to struggle 
with one limitation because the survey asked people about their current assess-
ment of their living conditions, while the reported protest participation was in the 
past. However, it is to be expected that these comparative assessments are likely 
to have been internalised by respondents before the time of the survey, which is 
why they may at least have been relevant to recent protest behaviour. 
In order to determine the effect of the mental map of European living condi-
tions on protest behaviour, a second regression analysis (ordered logistic model) 
was conducted. As in the previous section, this analysis is based on the basic 
model (see Table 5.9) but is supplemented by comparative assessments of living 
conditions. In this case, too, the model had to be calculated separately for each 
reference country. As before, the correlation measures are compiled only for the 
nine country comparisons. All other factors of the basic model are not printed 
here, although they have been taken into account in the calculations. 
Figure 5.8 shows that protest participation does not really have to do with a 
feeling of relative disadvantage. Since the picture is repeated for all answer cat-
egories, only the results for last year’s protest participation are shown. In fact, the 
respondents who took part in street protests barely differ from those who categori-
cally refuse to take part when asked about the perception of disadvantage. 
The assumption that the protest behaviour of the population is influenced by 
the comparative assessment of living conditions in Europe can, therefore, be 
rejected, which makes it possible to confirm the assumption that the feelings 
of relative deprivation may affect the motivation to protest, but not the actual 
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relative probabilities 
similar  worse living conditions 
Figure 5.8 Demonstration participation and European living conditions – extended model 
(ordered logistic regression, average marginal effects). Source: Livewhat WP4 
population survey. 
protest behaviour (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Rucht 1994). Rather, reported pro-
test behaviour is related to the social and political profile of the people as well as 
country-specific factors. The perception and evaluation of unequal living condi-
tions in Europe is thus merely a latent motivation, which is dwarfed by a multi-
tude of other, more important factors. 
The European social space and the political
thinking and action of citizens 
In general, one must paint a differentiated picture of the political attitudes and 
actions of European citizens. Firstly, it has become clear that people still think 
and act within a national frame of reference. This national reference horizon is 
certainly set out in the wording of most of the questions of our investigation, as 
well as all the usual surveys because people are asked to take a stand on national 
matters (e.g., the severity of the crisis, satisfaction with government work, trust in 
institutions). Even the assessment of living conditions in Europe follows this pat-
tern because as has been shown, people always assess living conditions in other 
European countries from the perspective of their own country. Respondents agree 
that the standard of living in Sweden and Switzerland is better than in Poland or 
Greece. But the assessment of each individual country always varies depending 
on where people live because the Swiss situation is portrayed better in Greece 
than it is in Sweden or Germany. 
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Furthermore, people’s political thinking and actions vary considerably between 
countries. Satisfaction with government work, the extent of populist alienation 
from the political system or the degree of protest participation all depend very 
much on the country in which the respondents live. This is not surprising, as 
people live in societies with very different levels of prosperity and social welfare 
standards, and, after all, the nation state is still the primary point of reference for 
political decision-making and democratic participation. 
However, our analyses have also shown that people’s political thinking no 
longer stops at national borders. This can be seen above all in the fact that they 
have internalised a mental map of the European social space in which they locate 
and assess themselves and others accordingly. When people are asked about liv-
ing conditions in other European countries, hardly any respondents refuse this 
task. Almost all of them have formed their own judgement. Their answers create 
a tableau of European living conditions that reveals a surprising consensus. Their 
assessments – within a certain range – are remarkably consistent. People have 
in mind a mental map of the European social space in which they can locate the 
individual countries. The unanimity of the evaluations is an indication that the 
respondents have internalised similar, possibly even common, evaluation crite-
ria of what can be considered good or bad living conditions. How else would 
respondents be able to make such similar assessments? 
It was also surprising that this mental map of the European social space had a 
noticeable influence on the political perceptions and judgements of the respond-
ents. Such influences have been demonstrated on three issues: crisis perception, 
satisfaction with the work of the government and agreement with populist beliefs. 
In order to avoid jumping to premature conclusions, these influences have been 
examined using the usual explanatory models. It is known from research to date 
that people living in socially disadvantaged circumstances and/or are concerned 
about social decline are more likely to display an affinity for crises, dissatisfac-
tion with government work, agreement with a populist worldview and critique of 
the political establishment. While it was possible to confirm the validity of these 
explanation models, at the same time, however, it was shown that political think-
ing in each of these aspects has also been shaped by the mental map of Europe. 
People who rated living conditions in their own country to be worse than in other 
countries were more crisis sensitive, more dissatisfied and more distanced from 
the political establishment. 
This mental map does not override national thinking because the questions and 
assessments examined here practically encouraged the respondents to put coun-
tries in a relationship with each other. However, according to the respondents’ 
answers, these countries are part of a pan-European social space. This has con-
sequences for people’s political thinking because this social space is apparently 
also perceived as a political field of political forces in which governments, parties 
or populations struggle to shape societal and political conditions. This European 
slant proves that people are dissatisfied with their respective governments as 
soon as they get the impression that their country is worse off than others and 
that they question the political establishment for the same reasons. The fact that 
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people’s satisfaction with their own government increases as soon as they have 
the impression that living conditions in their country are comparable to those of 
other European countries also highlights that people’s horizon of judgement is 
currently more European. The equivalence of living conditions seems to be the 
compass that guides people’s political thinking. 
However, these observations must be specified and narrowed down in two 
places. On the one hand, it was shown that the respondents naturally incorporate 
Switzerland into the mental map of the European social space. This shows us 
that people are primarily looking at Europe and not at the EU in the narrow sense 
when they perceive and judge living conditions. This is because this mental map 
mainly concerns the living conditions and thus the social space of Europe. The 
question of how respondents position countries in the political field of the EU and 
how they relate these countries to each other cannot be determined on the basis 
of this survey because corresponding questions have not been taken into account. 
It was only possible to determine that people believe that national governments 
must also be held responsible for how their own country fares in comparison with 
others. Peoples’ concerns that their country could lose ground to others in times of 
crisis are tangible in our results and show that people recognise Europe, and pos-
sibly the European Union in particular, as a political force field. It appears that this 
political field is about something specific, namely the equivalence, subordination 
or superiority of living conditions between European populations, and there may 
also be lines of conflict between countries when it comes to political distribution 
issues or cut-throat economic competition. 
It must, however, be emphasised that the European reference horizon and the 
described mental map mainly influence people’s political attitudes but not their 
political actions. As shown from the example of political protest and the partici-
pation of people in these forms of protest, people’s political action is not a direct 
reflection of their political attitudes – and thus also not a tangible reflection of the 
conveyed European map of social living conditions. It would have been conceiv-
able that the perception of unequal living conditions in Europe – and the feeling 
of relative deprivations – would have increased the general willingness of people 
to take part in political street protests. But the results of our analyses have shown 
that the European reference horizon has found little resonance in protest behav-
iour. It is concrete population groups and countries that have a greater affinity for 
protest, and participation continues to be seemingly driven by concrete grievances 
and demands, which is why the large-format map of the European social space 
does not really develop any formative force. 
6
6 Social divisions and perceptions 
of the European Union 
Local and European landmarks 
For many years, people’s approval of the European integration project was seen 
as a given. In their efforts to expand economic and political cooperation, govern-
ments and European institutions saw themselves supported by a “permissive con-
sensus” that the populations of the member states seemed to share (Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970; Hix 1999: 135; Hooghe and Marks 2009). This tacit approval, 
however, was deceptive because citizens did not always prove to be support-
ive of the European project once they were asked to vote in referendums about 
their country’s accession to the EC/EU, the introduction of the euro as currency, 
the newly negotiated treaties or the draft proposal for a European constitution. 
European integration was a potentially contentious issue that was able to inspire 
criticism and political resistance under specific circumstances depending on the 
issue at stake and the constellation of political interests and powers in the various 
countries. 
Today, however, the EU has become a continuously politicised topic. 
EU-critical parties are present in all European member states (Hernández and 
Kriesi 2016; Treib 2020) and a considerable share of the population supports 
Eurosceptic opinions (Lubbers and Scheepers 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2007; 
Boomgaarden et al. 2011; de Vries 2018). The EU is being criticised by groups 
to the left and right side of the ideological spectrum (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017), 
even though right-wing populist parties have been the most successful and loudest 
political entrepreneurs in mobilising and organising Euroscepticism (e.g., Hutter 
and Grande 2014; Hong 2015; Stockemer and Barisione 2016; Kneuer 2019). 
Public opinion about the European Union is thus highly divided. 
Research has recurrently pointed to the fact that this political division is being 
fed by growing cleavages within European societies. In general terms, the divi-
sion of pro-European and Eurosceptic citizens is one that corresponds to the cleav-
age between the winners and losers of societal modernisation, Europeanisation 
and globalisation (Kriesi 2016a). These divisions have increased during the last 
decades due to continuous European crises and austerity-driven public policies 
(Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Barbieri and Cutuli 2016; Hermann 2014). According 
to these observations, Euroscepticism is nurtured by social, political and cultural 
cleavages and is thus supported by social groups and strata of the population that 
wish to confront social degradation, the decay of national sovereignty and the 
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loss of cultural identity. In more specific terms, the division between pro-Europe-
ans and Eurosceptics is co-determined by social inequalities and vulnerabilities 
(Kuhn et al. 2016; Dotti Sani and Magistro 2016; Ritzen et al. 2016). Access to 
valued resources (e.g., income, education, social capital) and unequal exposure to 
deprivations and vulnerabilities (e.g., unemployment, poverty, social exclusion or 
cultural marginalisation) seem to impact strongly on political support for the EU. 
In this chapter, I wish to engage in a systematic analysis of this potential driver 
of political opinions about the EU. Building on previous research, I will draw a 
picture that takes into consideration the various dimensions of social inequalities 
and their potential impact on pro-European or Eurosceptic attitudes. In the first 
instance, it is necessary to take a look at the effect of objective inequalities, both in 
terms of social stratifications between citizens and in regard to spatial disparities 
between countries and regions. Additionally, the analysis has to consider the sub-
jective dimension of social inequalities, here, in particular, the way citizens assess 
their position within society. Previous studies have corroborated that these dimen-
sions have an impact on the political support of the EU (Lubbers and Scheepers 
2005; Schraff 2019; Kuhn et al. 2016; Ritzen et al. 2016) but here the attempt is to 
develop an integrated account of social and spatial cleavages. Conforming to the 
field-theoretical approach introduced in Chapter 2, I wish, finally, to ponder on the 
potential effect the perceptions of different living conditions in other European 
countries can have on the support or criticism of the European Union in order to 
substantiate the assumption that the social position of European citizens (both in 
stratificational and spatial terms) conditions the degree to which they support or 
oppose the EU. The aim is to validate whether Europe as a social space is pat-
terned by discernible structures of inequalities that translate into political dissent 
in the EU and across the European continent. 
For this purpose, this chapter will draw on two separate datasets. First, it will 
take a closer look at the situation in eight European countries by means of an online 
survey conducted in the context of an EU-funded research project (TransSOL), 
given that this survey asked respondents their opinions about the EU and included 
the battery of questions mapping the perception of different living conditions 
in Europe, already used in Chapter 5 to assess their impact on national politics. 
Second, the scope of analysis will be enlarged to embrace all EU member states in 
order to check whether findings of the more restrained sample of countries apply 
to the EU at large. Additionally, the aim is to differentiate the general picture 
by disaggregating the national datasets along regional differentiations in order to 
check whether the relations between social divisions and political cleavages are 
structured along national or regional lines. For this purpose, Eurobarometer data 
will be used. 
Public support for the European Union: the
role of perceptions of inequality 
Research within the social sciences has devoted considerable attention to the 
spread of Euro-critical attitudes among the European population. Since the late 
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1990s, numerous publications, especially in the English-speaking world, have 
dedicated themselves to so-called Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2007; 
Krouwel and Abts 2007; McLaren 2007; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010; de Vries 
2018). This concept is interested in the growing unease about the European 
Union, which can be seen in doubts, criticism or even rejection of the EU and the 
European integration process. The results to date confirm that Euroscepticism 
has become a powerful force in the European political landscape, although there 
are quite distinct types and degrees of Eurosceptic attitudes (Weßels 2007; 
Rooduijn 2014). 
Numerous studies have mapped public support of the EU in its various dimen-
sions, for instance, by focusing on cognition and emotions or diffuse and specific 
attitudes (Easton 1965; 1975; Dalton 1999; 2004). On the one hand, studies have 
been interested in the general and diffuse attitudes towards the EU as an over-
all system or community, and on the other hand, in concrete forms of unease 
relating to individual European institutions, policy areas or politicians (McLaren 
2004; Krouwel and Abts 2007). With regard to the types of attitudes, research has 
mainly focused on the cognitive dimension. In this regard, studies have focused 
on whether Europeans evaluate the membership of their own country in the EU 
as a good or bad thing and whether they see any benefit of membership (McLaren 
2007; Garry and Tilley 2009). The emotional dimension has also been studied in 
relation to identification with the EU or feelings of belonging to Europe (Green 
2000; Díez-Medrano 2003; Bruter 2004). Questions of trust or mistrust in the EU 
or other countries have been treated the same way (Delhey 2007), as have citi-
zens’ fears and concerns about the EU and its expansion (McLaren 2004; Grauel, 
Heine and Lahusen 2014). 
The following analyses will be devoted to EU-related attitudes in their cog-
nitive dimension, making use of a standard question that was adopted by the 
TransSOL survey that asked respondents to give a general assessment of their 
country’s membership of the EU. The analysis will not only depict levels of sup-
port for the EU but also identify social and political determinants of EU-friendly 
and EU-sceptical responses. In line with the general objective of this study, it 
will be particularly interested in highlighting the effect of social inequalities on 
EU-related attitudes. The first step will show the levels of public support for 
the eight countries under study and engage in an analysis of the correlates of 
Euroscepticism. The net effect of social inequalities will be validated by control-
ling for the relevance of other standard predictors used to explain Eurosceptic 
opinions. In the second step, the analysis will move to perceptions of divergent 
living standards between member countries, thus taking up the argument intro-
duced in Chapter 5. As the TransSOL survey was conducted in late 2016, and 
thus 18 months after the Livewhat study, it will be necessary to confirm whether 
the perceptions of living conditions in other European countries follow the same 
patterns as in 2015 and whether they continue to have the same effects on the 
assessment of national politics. In the third step, the analysis will move back to the 
European level in order to corroborate whether the perception of social disparities 
between countries affects support for the EU. 
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Determining levels and correlates of Euroscepticism 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought that, generally speak-
ing, their country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad 
thing or neither good nor bad. The data show that public opinion is rather split in 
regard to this question, as shown in Figure 6.1. In all countries, the share of sup-
porters is bigger than the group of Eurosceptics, but the proportion of undecided 
citizens is substantial, one in four respondents, on average. Moreover, in some 
countries, the distance between supporters and critics is moderately small (e.g., 
Italy, Greece, particularly the UK). There is a clear majority in favour of EU 
membership in Poland and Germany only, followed by Denmark with a substan-
tial share of the population. In regard to Switzerland, we see that the option to join 
the EU is insignificant. As will be shown later on, these findings paint a gloomier 
picture of EU-related support than the Eurobarometer data, due most probably 
to methodological differences and the volatility of public opinions on this issue. 
These variations, however, are of less concern for the analytic purposes of this 
chapter, given that the aim is to identify those factors that make pro-European or 
Eurosceptic attitudes more likely. In this regard, the comparison of the two data 
sets will be most instructive, given that they paint a very similar picture of the 
social and political profiles of both groups. 
The identification of these profiles can build on a very well-developed 
research field. In particular, relevant factors corroborated by previous studies 
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Figure 6.1	 Opinion about the country’s membership of the EU (in %) aSwiss respondents 
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attention: the role of social inequalities and divisions and the effect of the sub-
jective perception of relative differences in living conditions across European 
countries. In this sense, it is advisable to make use of available knowledge in 
order to compile standard predictors of Euroscepticism into a basic explana-
tory model. Among these standard predictors, scholars of Euroscepticism have 
highlighted a number of political attitudes, identifications and preferences 
(Hooghe and Marks 2005). People with more traditional views of life and eth-
nocentric worldviews are more sceptical about the EU (Green 2000; Nelsen, 
Guth and Fraser 2001: 204f; Boomgaarden and Freire, 2009: 1242f.; van Elsas, 
Hakhverdian and van der Brug 2016). Additionally, populist attitudes fuel 
Euroscepticism because populism has become an expression of unease with the 
political system based on the belief that the political classes are no longer com-
mitted to the needs of people and conduct politics over which ordinary people 
no longer have any influence (Treib 2014; Hong 2015). Collective identities 
play a role, as well, given that EU-related attitudes largely depend on the extent 
to which citizens have developed a feeling of belonging to Europe, while the 
attachment to the nation state might be conducive to opposition to the EU (de 
Vries and van Kersbergen 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2005; 2007; Fligstein et al. 
2012). Finally, media consumption has a significant impact on critical attitudes 
because the mass media are actively engaged in shaping public opinions and 
tend to lean towards critical news coverage that nurtures Eurosceptic attitudes 
among their users (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Maier and Rittberger 
2008; Conti and Memoli 2017; Galpin and Trenz 2019; Adam et al. 2019). 
These standard predictors have thus been proven to convincingly explain the 
likelihood of Eurosceptic attitudes among respondents. My own ambition, how-
ever, is to test the relevance of social-structural factors – in particular, social vul-
nerability – against these standard predictors. For this reason, it is necessary to 
compile an extended model that adds a number of socio-structural factors in order 
to test their net explanatory power. In general terms, we can expect, on the basis of 
previous studies, that population groups in precarious living situations, experienc-
ing socio-structural disadvantages are more likely to be critical of the EU, while 
the socially privileged tend to support the EU and their country’s membership 
(McLaren 2004: 900; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010: 800; also Fligstein 2008). 
In regard to individual predictors, it is to be expected that income inequalities 
and precarious occupational status will boost criticism. In particular, educational 
inequalities seem to increase the likelihood of scepticism (Kuhn et al. 2016). 
Moreover, we need to validate the role of subjective perceptions of inequality 
when contrasted with objective indicators. The relevance of subjective percep-
tions would be the first indication that the cross-national assessment of inequality 
might be an important, additional factor to take into consideration. 
The empirical analysis shows that both political and social-structural predic-
tors play an important role in explaining EU-related attitudes – as summarised 
in Table 6.1. The calculation is based on a regression analysis (ordered logistic 
model), which determines response probabilities. To this end, the procedure com-
pares the groups of Eurosceptics (membership is a bad thing) and those of the 
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Table 6.1 Assessment of EU membership (ordered logistic regression, marginal effects) 
A bad thing Neither/nor A good thing 
Political factors 
Left-right orientation (left) 
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Occupational status (full-time 
employment) 
Part-time 0.023*** 0.003*** −0.026*** 









Housework, care 0.004 0.001 −0.005 
Subjective class affiliation (upper class) 
Middle class 0.029*** 0.006** −0.035*** 
Lower middle class 0.034*** 0.006*** −0.040*** 
Lower class 0.058*** 0.009*** −0.067*** 
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Table 6.1 Continued 
A bad thing Neither/nor A good thing 
Country (Denmark) 
Germany −0.028*** −0.006*** 0.035*** 
UK 0.049*** 0.007*** −0.056*** 
France 0.059*** 0.008*** −0.066*** 
Poland −0.088*** −0.028*** 0.116*** 
Italy 0.082*** 0.009*** −0.091*** 
Greece 0.033*** 0.005*** −0.038*** 
Observations 13181 13181 13181 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Source: TransSOL WP3 population survey.

Note: Significance levels: * P < 0.1., ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.

undecided (membership is neither good nor bad) with the group of supporters 
(membership is a good thing) for each of the explanatory factors listed in order 
to determine whether the Eurosceptics differ significantly from Euro-supporters 
in the characteristics studied. The average marginal effects summarised in the 
table indicate the average probability for each of the groups of people with the 
listed characteristics to voice Eurosceptic or pro-European opinions. The model 
includes four sets of factors: political characteristics, socio-demographic factors, 
the country of residence and social-structural traits. The first three sets of vari-
ables were included to corroborate the accuracy of previous research findings, but 
primarily as a means to identify the net effect of those factors that are the focus 
of this study, namely social vulnerability. The regression analysis was conducted 
without respondents answering “don’t know” to the question about EU member-
ship and also excluding Swiss respondents, as they received a rather hypothetical 
question about potential membership within the EU. 
The group of political factors includes items measuring political orientations, 
levels and forms of political involvement and EU-related attitudes. The guid-
ing assumption behind these factors is that respondents who lean towards pop-
ulism and orientations to the right of the political spectrum, are less politically 
involved, strongly attached to a national community and do not see merit in 
inner-European cooperation will be more sceptical of the membership of their 
country within the EU, while the inverse should be valid for the supporters of 
EU membership. In regard to political orientations, the assumption is validated, 
given that right-wing respondents are more critical of the EU, while leftists 
support the membership of their country. Those not sure where to locate them-
selves on the ideological axis tend to be Eurosceptic. More pronounced is the 
effect when considering populist attitudes – a simplified index that consists of 
the four items of the composite measure introduced in Chapter 5. In regard to 
political involvement, the effects are very small, even though there is evidence 
that self-reported political interest and the scope of political activities increase 
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the likelihood of being more critical about the EU.1 The choice of mass media 
outlets to “keep informed about current events” also correlates with EU-related 
attitudes, as EU-friendly respondents tend to watch television, while tabloid 
readers lean towards Euroscepticism. In regard to EU-related attitudes, it was 
to be expected that attachment to the EU drastically increases the likelihood of 
supporting EU membership, while national identities have the inverse effect. 
Respondents in favour of EU membership, finally, are convinced of the value in 
international cooperation and solidarity,2 while Eurosceptic respondents insist 
on the conditionality of intra-European aid, excluding those countries assumed 
to have misused financial help. 
These findings corroborate that opponents and supporters of EU membership 
can be distinguished by their political convictions and preferences. Eurosceptics 
are more conservative in their political orientations, share a populist mistrust of 
the political establishment, are more attached to their nation state and more criti-
cal of intra-European solidarity. They might be more alienated from the political 
institutions, but are not politically disengaged, as they report to be active politi-
cally and interested in politics. More distant from mainstream media, they tend 
to inform themselves more often via the tabloid press that is more critical of the 
EU itself. 
The relevance of these political factors is quite pronounced but does not neu-
tralise the effect of socio-structural traits. In fact, findings show that vulnerability 
is a factor to take into account when explaining EU-related attitudes. Respondents 
with lower educational credentials, being either unemployed, permanently sick or 
only partially employed subscribe more often to the statement that EU member-
ship is a bad thing, while those with full-time work and higher education creden-
tials are in favour of membership. The household income itself does not correlate 
with the assessment of EU membership, while the feeling of financial strain does. 
This observation shows that vulnerability has not only an objective dimension, 
mirrored in educational attainment and occupational status but implies a feeling 
of being socially excluded or deprived, as the self-reported class affiliation shows. 
In fact, respondents placing themselves at the lower end of the social ladder are 
more often critical of the EU when compared to those describing themselves as 
members of the upper class. This means that a weaker position within the social 
1 Respondents could name up to 14 different activities they had done during the last 5 years: contact-
ing politicians, donating money, displaying badges, signing a petition, boycotting or buying prod-
ucts, attending meetings, demonstrations, strikes or occupations, discussing via social networks, 
joining a political group, visiting the website of a political party or searching for information about 
politics online. The composite variable measures the number of items indicated. 
2 The survey asked respondents to tick whether they agreed with a set of statements about intra-
European help. “There are many reasons to state for or against financial help for EU countries in 
trouble. Which one of the following best reflects how you feel? (1) It is our moral duty to help other 
member states that are in need. (2) The European Union member states should help each other, as 
somewhere along the way every country may require help. (3) Financial help should not be given to 
countries that have proven to handle money badly” TransSOL (2016: 39). 
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structure goes hand in hand with a feeling of social vulnerability when focusing 
on those strata of the population that subscribe more openly to the EU being a 
bad thing. 
The net effect of social vulnerability is a consistent factor of Euroscepticism 
when breaking down the results by country. Figure 6.2 presents the predicted 
probability of respondents affiliated with different social classes to be critical of 
the EU for each of the eight countries. The likelihood diverges between countries, 
given that the support of the EU is much more diffused in Poland and Germany, 
while it is least developed in Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom. However, 
social class affiliation makes a difference everywhere. In Poland, upper class 
respondents approve EU membership by 73%, while support decreases to 67% 
among the lowest strata. The differences among British respondents span between 
42% and 36% and in Greece, between 43% and 36%. 
These findings reveal that support of EU membership not only correlates 
with political orientations and practices but with stratificational divisions as 
well. Objective inequalities are an important predictor of EU-related attitudes, 
particularly in regard to education credentials. More important is the subjective 
perception of vulnerabilities and deprivations. This observation, however, leaves 
unanswered the question of the frame of reference, to which these subjective per-
ceptions are tied. Eurosceptics tend to place themselves lower down the ladder of 
the stratificational hierarchy of classes, but this seems to indicate that the percep-
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Figure 6.2 Assessment of EU membership and social class affiliation (predictive margins). 
Source: TransSOL WP3 population survey. 
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the likelihood of Euroscepticism. In fact, the perception of personal deprivations 
and vulnerabilities might be nurtured by the fact that respondents compare their 
living conditions with better-off fellow citizens. However, we cannot exclude that 
the perception of inequalities is also fuelled by comparisons with living stand-
ards in other European countries. As has been shown in Chapter 5, European 
citizens do not hesitate to assess living conditions in other countries, and these 
assessments have a significant impact on the way they perceive and evaluate the 
social and political conditions in their own country. Respondents who see other 
Europeans as much better off are more critical about national politics, which 
means that the perception of inequality within Europe provides a benchmark for 
developing a judgement about the state of national politics in one’s own immedi-
ate environment. 
The continuing relevance of different living conditions in Europe 
European citizens continued to assess living conditions in other European coun-
tries when the TransSOL survey confronted them with the same battery of ques-
tions 1.5 years later. The degree of agreement is not only remarkably high and 
stable, but respondents also used these perceptions as a European benchmark to 
assess politics in their country, as their fellow citizens did many months earlier. 
This enduring relevance merits attention before we move to the impact of this 
European benchmark for EU-related attitudes. 
Table 6.2 shows that the perception of living conditions in other European 
countries has remained unchanged since the winter of 2016/17, compared to the 
results of the Livewhat survey 1.5 years earlier (see Chapter 4). The percentage 
of respondents that was unable or unwilling to assess the living conditions abroad 
remains stable, with less than 10% choosing this option. The average assess-
ment is very similar to the 2015 survey, and the ranking is the same: the northern 
European countries lead the list, while Greece is relegated to the lowest position. 
The distance between the best and worst-off countries has decreased in the second 
survey, when compared to 2015, given that Greece improved slightly, while most 
other countries are evaluated marginally less favourably (in particular, the north-
ern countries at 0.8 on an 11-point scale). These slight changes might be due to the 
first signs of economic recovery in Greece in 2016, which were widely discussed 
in the media that year. The prospect of moving beyond the fiscal and economic 
crisis apparently led respondents to put less emphasis on the gap between strong 
and weak economies. However, in relative terms, the distances are still remark-
able and stable across time, which shows that the cognitive map of living condi-
tions in Europe is still a part of European citizens’ perceptions and evaluations. 
It is also noteworthy that the cognitive map of European living conditions 
has not lost its relevance for the political opinions of Europeans and the way 
they assess the performance of their national governments. Before moving to the 
EU-related attitudes, it is worth validating whether the observation made with 
regard to the Livewhat survey for the year 2015 remains stable when consider-
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Figure 6.3	 Satisfaction with government policies and living conditions abroad (predictive 
probabilities). Source: TransSOL WP3 population survey. 
perceptions of unequal living standards in Europe continued to affect the assess-
ment of national politics also in the winter of 2016/2017. Figure 6.3 presents the 
findings in regard to the composite variable measuring dissatisfaction with gov-
ernment policies – an item that was introduced and discussed already in Chapter 
5.3 The results are based on the explanatory model tested in the regression analy-
sis, presented in Table 6.1, and thus presents the net effect of country comparisons 
when controlling for all other social and political factors. Swiss respondents were 
excluded from the analysis because they will also be disregarded when analysing 
support of EU membership. 
These data corroborate the findings based on the Livewhat data from 2015. 
Respondents reporting that living conditions in other countries are better than 
their own are significantly more often dissatisfied with government policies 
when compared to those who see themselves in a better situation than people in 
other countries. Similar living conditions seem to reduce the likelihood of being 
3 The index comprises variables measuring satisfaction “with the way in which the government is 
dealing with”: the economy, poverty, education, unemployment, employment, healthcare, immigra-
tion and the refugee crisis. A factor analysis and reliability test demonstrated that the various items 
basically measure the same item: levels of general satisfaction with government performance (alpha 
0.93). 
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dissatisfied with one’s government, thus suggesting that citizens tend to expect 
national politics to guarantee comparable living standards in Europe (Simpson 
2019). The effect is significant in regard to all countries; however, nation states 
placed higher on the ranking of living conditions are a more relevant benchmark 
when assessing the performance of national governments. This conforms with the 
findings of previous research, as it testifies that upward comparisons are socially 
more consequential than downward comparisons (see, e.g., Delhey and Kohler 
2006; Boyce et al. 2010). Hence, the overall picture painted by the earlier survey 
from 2015 (see Figure 5.4 above) has not changed, thus suggesting that percep-
tions of unequal living conditions are a pervasive factor patterning opinion about 
national politics. 
The perceptions of spatial disparities and Euroscepticism 
These findings raise the question of whether the cognitive map of European living 
conditions has a similar effect on EU-related attitudes, in particular, on the likeli-
hood of seeing the EU membership of one’s country as a good or bad thing. Given 
the lack of previous studies and findings, it is necessary to avoid overhasty infer-
ences because the relationship between the perception of spatial disparities and 
Euroscepticism is far from being self-evident. On the contrary, three scenarios are 
equally plausible. First, we might expect that the perception of strong inequali-
ties between living conditions in European countries might encourage criticism 
of the EU, given that the EU is committed to the aim of ensuring similar living 
conditions across Europe. Member state citizens might make the EU accountable 
for not complying with this mission and thus not being effective in eliminating 
or reducing existing inequalities in national living standards. Second, it is also 
plausible to assume that the perception of unequal living conditions in Europe 
might – on the contrary – boost public support for membership in the EU. Citizens 
affirming that living conditions are much better in other European countries might 
think that their own country’s membership is a good thing, exactly because the 
EU proclaims to be engaged in developing more equal living standards across 
Europe. Sharing membership with wealthier countries (e.g., Sweden, Germany, 
the UK) might nurture the conviction that the EU is beneficial for all the other 
countries, including one’s own. In this case, Euroscepticism would be linked to 
the inverse comparison: citizens seeing themselves as worse off than Europeans 
from weaker countries (e.g., Greece, Italy or Spain) might believe that member-
ship of the EU is beneficial for others, at the expense of their own country’s pros-
pects, thus nurturing the preference of leaving a union that benefits others. Finally, 
a null hypothesis can also be formulated when considering that the perception of 
unequal living conditions in Europe might be fully unrelated to EU-specific atti-
tudes. This is highly probable because European citizens might perceive signifi-
cant differences between countries without relating these inequalities to their own 
situation. Moreover, the European Union might not be held accountable for these 
differences. As the previous analysis has shown (Chapter 5), respondents attrib-
ute responsibility to their own government, which means that the perceptions of 
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European inequalities might only impact how national politics is evaluated, not 
European. 
In order to examine these propositions, I conducted an extended regression 
analysis that added the comparative assessments of living conditions in the 
nine reference countries onto the baseline model that was discussed earlier (see 
Table 6.1). Also, in this case, various observations were excluded from the analy-
sis: respondents not answering the question about EU membership (about 1,100 
respondents preferring a “don’t know”) and participants of the Swiss survey were 
excluded, given that they were only asked to report whether “joining the EU” 
would be a good or bad thing. However, the comparisons with living standards 
in Switzerland were included in the model as an explanatory factor because the 
option to consider Switzerland as part of the cognitive map of European liv-
ing conditions could not be excluded. Switzerland is not a member of the EU, 
but part of various treaties (e.g., the Schengen Treaty, the European Free Trade 
Association and the European Economic Area), which means that citizens might 
consider Switzerland as a relevant reference point for the formation of political 
opinions about the EU. 
The findings highlight that upward comparisons increase the likelihood of sup-
porting the EU membership of one’s country (Figure 6.4). Comparing living con-
ditions in Germany seems to be the most consequential because it accounts for 
an estimated difference of 21%. Respondents that rank German living standards 
higher than their own are 13% more likely to see membership as a good thing 
and 9% less likely to rank it as a bad thing. Also, the perception of similar liv-
ing standards ensures support for the EU because these respondents are more 
often in support (+10%) and less often against (−8%). It is noteworthy that those 
respondents that place their own living standards above the German standards do 
not report significant differences in their support of EU membership, although the 
supportive attitude outweighs the critical one by 9%. 
The effect is significant for the three leading countries on our list (Switzerland, 
Denmark and Germany), while the assessment of the living conditions in the 
intermediate group (UK, France and Poland) has no significant impact on support 
of the EU. Comparisons with the countries at the lower end of European living 
conditions are rather associated with Euroscepticism. Citizens that believe that the 
Greeks are living better than themselves are 7% more likely to see EU member-
ship as a bad thing and 12% less likely to be among those that cherish it as a good 
thing. A comparison with inferior living conditions does not seem to encourage 
enthusiasm for the EU, as it might lead to resentment or bitterness about others 
benefitting at the expense of oneself. 
The relevance of European living conditions is corroborated when breaking down 
the findings for each of the six countries that compare their own living standards 
with those in Germany. As shown in Figure 6.5, we see that the level of approval or 
disagreement depends largely on the provenience of respondents. Polish respondents 
are, in general, the most supportive of their country’s membership, thus relegating 
Eurosceptics to the margins. A similar observation is true for the Danish respond-
ents. In the other countries, supporters and critics are more evenly distributed, thus 
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Figure 6.4 Membership in the EU and living conditions in Europe (predictive margins). 
Source: TransSOL WP3 population survey. 
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Figure 6.5	 EU membership and living conditions in Germany (predictive probabilities). 
Source: TransSOL WP3 population survey. 
representing 30% to 40% of the sample, along with approximately 25% of undecided 
respondents. The relative strength of supporters and critics changes, however, when 
taking the assessment of living conditions in Germany into account. Respondents 
arguing that German living conditions are below their own situation are more likely to 
have a negative view of EU membership (e.g., particularly among the British, Italian 
and Greek respondents), while those seeing Germans in a similar or better position 
are clearly more often supportive of their country’s EU membership. In estimated 
percentages, the better-off British respondents are more often critical of EU member-
ship (42%), while those citizens seeing Germans in a better position are supportive of 
the EU (40%). Similar indications are true for all the other respondents, even though 
majorities are more clearly defined in Denmark and Poland. In most countries, how-
ever, the assessment of European living standards seems to make a difference whether 
the majority decides for or against the EU. 
The evidence thus confirms that the comparative perception of living conditions 
in other European countries affects the support of the EU among EU citizens.4 The 
4 This general observation is corroborated when looking at the assessments among Swiss respond-
ents, which can be considered a control group given that they are not formally members of the 
EU. Swiss respondents were asked to give their opinion about the idea of “joining the EU”. Only 
a minority thinks that this is a good thing (8.5%), while two-thirds are convinced that this would 
be a bad idea (67.3%). A further 17.7% are undecided. Separate calculations based on the regres-
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latter seem to presuppose that the added value of membership of the EU resides in 
the strength of the other members belonging to the union. Countries with higher liv-
ing conditions operate as a benchmark or role model of what European living stand-
ards could or should be for all members of the community. In this sense, European 
citizens tend to reaffirm the belief and mission of the EU in aiming for comparable 
living standards everywhere in Europe. This perception is one that might make a 
difference when Europeans are asked to assess whether membership in the EU is a 
good or bad thing and whether they might favour remaining or exiting the union in 
the event of a referendum. In fact, respondents evaluating the EU membership of 
their country as a bad thing are more often inclined to leave the EU, while the sup-
portive respondents are for a remain – as indicated in Figure 6.6. As the wording of 
the various answers is not identical to the assessment of the EU membership (see 
Figure 6.1), more citizens have opted against a clear answer for or against member-
ship. Given the share of undecided citizens, who opted for “don’t know” or “would 
not vote”, it would be difficult to foresee whether a referendum would favour exit-
ing or remaining. Only Germany and Poland show a substantial majority. In other 
countries, a “remain” is most probable, given the size of this group when compared 
to supporters of exiting (e.g., Denmark, France, and Italy). A stable split is still true 
for the United Kingdom, but also in Greece, public opinion is divided equally. 
The dividing line between “remainers” and “leavers” is strongly patterned by 
the social and political factors already identified in the previous analysis. This is 
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Figure 6.6 Voting in a referendum on EU membership (in %). 
sion analysis and its model specifications of Table 6.1 and Figure 6.5 indicate that the likelihood of 
evaluating an accession to the EU as a good thing is not affected by the perception of higher living 
conditions in Germany. The probability of agreeing to a membership is only 2% higher among those 
respondents who see Germany in a better position when compared to the others – and the effect is 
statistically not significant. 
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analysis (see Table 6.1). Figure 6.7 presents the findings by concentrating on a 
number of social and political factors that are particularly indicative. A number of 
variables were suppressed because they were of minor importance (e.g., political 
activities and interest, income, citizenship) or highly interrelated (e.g., attachment 
to the EU, country). The figure presents the regression model with the effect of the 
perceived German living conditions. 
The findings confirm the picture painted by the previous analysis, given that 
the dividing line between those viewing the membership of their country as a 
good or bad thing is also the one marking the difference when identifying remain-
ers and leavers. Leavers tend to lean towards the political right and share popu-
list orientations, while remainers are more oriented towards the left. The former 
make more use of tabloids, while the latter watch mainstream TV. “Exiteers” are 
more often exposed to vulnerabilities in terms of education and labour market 
inclusion; they feel aggrieved by financial difficulties and see themselves at the 
lower end of the social stratification, while those who wish to stay in the EU are 
socially better off. For leavers, inner-European help should be conditional on the 
behaviour of receiving governments, while remainers highlight that governments 
are bound by shared duties and common interests. 
The perception that other member states – in this case, Germany – have bet-
ter living standards than oneself seems to encourage respondents to pledge for a 
remain. Superior living conditions are thus an incentive to stay within the EU, and 
German living conditions: similar 
better 
political orientation:          centre 
right
don't know
populist orientation: moderate 
strong
don't know
mass media usage:              tabloids
TV 
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Figure 6.7 EU referendum: leave versus remain in the EU (logistic regression, average 
marginal effects). Source: TransSOL WP3 population survey. 
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the perception of sharing the EU with stronger countries is an attenuating factor 
that reduces Euroscepticism across all social strata. The calculation of predictive 
probabilities shows that among the respondents affiliating themselves with the 
lower class, the likelihood of opting for a remain is 18% higher when German 
living conditions are lauded to be better, and among those associating themselves 
with the upper classes, the probability is 17%. Respondents affiliating themselves 
with different social classes might thus be divided in their inclination to reaf-
firm EU membership, but everybody seems to draw the same lessons from the 
European map of living conditions. 
This shows that respondents do not seem to blame the EU for unequal living 
conditions in Europe. On the contrary, the EU still seems to be a community that 
is associated with the promises of ensuring equal living conditions for everybody. 
Apparently, the pressure lies on the shoulders of national governments, which 
are held accountable for their low performance in attaining this goal. The cogni-
tive map of European living conditions thus has a nuanced effect on political 
attitudes. The perception of inequalities tends to support the idea of a European 
Union and its common mission, while it encourages public demands stipulating 
that governments must live up to expectations by contributing to the reduction of 
cross-national divisions. 
Stratification and spatial inequalities across the EU 28 
Social divisions impact the perception and assessment of the European Union, 
given that social vulnerability increases the likelihood of critical attitudes towards 
the membership of one’s country within the community and encourages prefer-
ences for leaving the EU, even though the perspective of sharing membership 
with stronger countries with higher living standards attenuates Euroscepticism. 
The previous analysis, however, has been restricted to a limited number of 
European countries, albeit covering a diversity of socio-economic, political and 
cultural contexts. Additionally, attention was directed at countries, assuming that 
living conditions – with their stratificational differentiations – are similar across 
national territories. In this chapter, I wish to move beyond these limitations by 
expanding on and differentiating the analysis. On the one hand, it is necessary to 
validate whether the main finding of the previous analyses, namely that social 
divisions influence political cleavages to a significant degree, also applies to the 
European Union with all its member states in 2016, and thus to all European 
citizenry as such. On the other hand, it is advisable to look inside the various 
countries to disaggregate the picture along regional divisions in order to examine 
whether EU-friendly and EU-sceptical attitudes are patterned by spatial differ-
ences in living conditions at national and regional levels. Both aims are inter-
related because it is necessary to test what the role of horizontal divisions along 
spatial inequalities is in shaping EU-related attitudes, and whether these horizon-
tal divisions are as significant as the vertical divisions along the stratification of 
social class. 
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Social divisions and political dissent: 
Euroscepticism as a social fault line 
These analyses will make use of Eurobarometer survey data from late 2016 to 
match the previously used TransSOL survey results. As discussed earlier (see 
Chapter 1), this dataset is not without limitations and needs to be used with care, 
particularly in regard to the support of EU membership as findings from the 
Eurobarometer survey deviate from the TransSOL data presented before, given 
that the former paints a picture of a more supportive public opinion when com-
pared to the TransSOL findings. In both cases, we should abstain from taking 
the data at face value, given that the level of support or criticism of EU member-
ship is volatile, reacts to contextual circumstances at the time of fieldwork and is 
influenced by sampling and data collection methodology. For the purposes of this 
study, however, it is less relevant to identify the exact level of support or criti-
cism. The main objective differs because the intention is to detect determinants of 
EU-related attitudes. In this regard, both surveys provide instructive data, given 
that they identify the individual correlates of supportive or critical opinions. As 
will be shown in this chapter, findings between both datasets are very similar. 
The rates of support for the EU might diverge, but correlates and determinants 
of support or criticism do not, thus suggesting that the evidence generated by the 
statistical analyses is robust. 
Figure 6.8 summarises the answers of respondents from all member states 
to the question about EU membership of their country. The share of support-
ers and critics diverges considerably between the countries, with the Benelux 
and Scandinavian countries indicating greater sympathy toward the EU than the 
British, Italians or the Greeks. According to this data, 15 countries, a clear major-
ity, support EU membership, and in a further 12 countries, the supporters outnum-
ber the outspoken critics. Only in Greece is disapproval slightly more diffused 
than approval for the EU. Additionally, it is important to highlight that less sup-
portive countries not only share a more outspoken criticism of the EU member-
ship but tend to have more citizens indicating that EU membership is a good and 
bad thing at the same time. 
This map of EU-related attitudes is to be taken with care, as already men-
tioned, given the volatility of public opinion on this matter. Since the beginning 
of the Eurobarometer survey, the share of supporters of EU membership across 
all countries has seen times of generalised support (e.g., the late 1980s with up 
to 66% of all respondents in the EU 12) as well as dwindling enthusiasm (e.g., 
the early 2010s with less than 47% supporters in the EU 27). Additionally, low 
rates of outspoken EU critics (a bad thing) seem to convey a seductive confidence 
because it distracts from those respondents opting for “neither a good nor a bad 
thing”, that indicate clear reservations towards EU membership and might opt 
against it in the event of a referendum. In fact, the experience of a referendum 
on the membership of the United Kingdom teaches us that citizens with reserva-
tions against the EU might easily opt for leave. For instance, the share of British 
supporters of EU membership in the Eurobarometer survey of 2016 (i.e., 47%, 
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Figure 6.8	 Membership of the EU: a good or bad thing (%). Source: Eurobarometer 86.1 
(ZA6697). 
if “don’t knows” are not counted) largely conforms to the number of “remain” 
votes in the Brexit referendum from July of the same year, and this figure has 
been confirmed by opinion polls (e.g., YouGov 2016). This means that citizens 
opting for leave are recruited not only from among those respondents evaluating 
EU membership as a “bad thing”, but also from those having reservations (neither 
good nor bad), making up 51.5% of all British respondents to the Eurobarometer 
survey. Both questions are not strictly interrelated, given that the assessment of 
EU membership does not necessarily predetermine voting in a referendum. What 
the comparison shows is that the intermediate category is used by respondents to 
stress that the EU has its good and bad sides, and thus seems to mirror a position 
of tentative Euroscepticism. 
The data on EU membership can thus be used to identify those groups that 
lean towards tentative and/or outspoken Euroscepticism. The fact that the 
Eurobarometer data identifies a smaller share of outspoken EU critics (a bad 
thing), when compared to the TransSOL survey presented above, is an asset for 
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the explanatory purposes of this chapter because it helps to paint a more focused 
picture of those social and political characteristics that seem to be associated with 
an outspoken EU-critical posture. Additionally, the Eurobarometer data highlights 
even more forcefully than the TransSOL survey that EU-related attitudes diverge 
considerably between countries. The findings thus help to highlight spatial divi-
sions between countries and thus to analyse the extent to which EU-related atti-
tudes are determined by place of residence and thus by the social and political 
context in which respondents live. 
The following analysis wishes to validate whether EU-related attitudes are 
conditioned by horizontal stratifications within society and by spatial divisions 
along countries and regions. First, I wish to identify the relevance of stratifica-
tional traits (objective features and subjective assessments), when controlled for 
political perceptions and orientations. For this purpose, two regression analyses 
were calculated: the first calculations focus on political attitudes and orienta-
tions that have testified to explain the likelihood of Eurosceptic views, the second 
reduces the number of political factors to the main predictors, while at the same 
time introducing the social-structural characteristics of interest in this study in 
order to check their net explanatory power. 
Table 6.3 summarises the findings of the first regression analysis, focusing 
exclusively on political predictors. It introduces three sets of factors identified in 
previous studies as highly relevant determinants: self-reported levels of political 
efficacy, ideological orientations and EU-specific attitudes. The first set of fac-
tors assumes that scepticism, determined by the citizen’s perceptions of their own 
political efficacy (Pollock 1983; Madsen 1987), is high among those people who 
are not convinced about their own political competences in terms of knowledge or 
skills (internal efficacy) and who believe that the political institutions (in particu-
lar, the EU) ignore or disregard their own interests (external efficacy). The results 
confirm these assumptions. The decisive factor is the assessment of external effi-
cacy, i.e., the opinion that political institutions do not listen to respondents. Those 
who feel that they are not being heard in their own country or the EU are 7% more 
likely to be against their own country’s membership of the EU, while the prob-
ability of believing it to be a good thing is 13% lower. Interestingly, the feeling of 
lack of influence at home is more crucial for Eurosceptics than a lack of voice in 
the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Ares et al. 2017). Eurosceptics seem to believe 
that their own government does not take their concerns sufficiently into account, 
particularly when negotiations at EU level are about representing national inter-
ests and wishes. The finding that Eurosceptics are not politically disinterested is 
also in keeping with this because they talk more often about European politics 
than those in favour of the EU. Those who talk less often about European politics 
tend to opt for a more diplomatic “both” when it comes to assessing their coun-
try’s EU membership. 
The second set of factors relates to political orientations. Previous studies have 
shown that Euroscepticism is closely linked to populist criticism of the ruling pol-
itics and the established parties, highly relevant for voting behaviour at European 
elections (Hix and Marsh 2007; Hong 2015; Stockemer and Barisione 2016). 
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Table 6.3	 Country’s membership of the EU, political factors (ordered logistic regression, 
average marginal effects), 2016 
A bad thing Neither/nor Good thing 
Political efficacy 
Discuss national political matters with 
friends or 









Discuss European political matters with 
friends or 









Can convince others of my opinion 
(ref. rarely to never) 
My voice counts in my country (ref. agree) 











Political self-positioning (ref. left) 
Centre 0.006* 0.006* −0.012* 
Right 











Rise of anti-elite parties (ref. cause for 
concern) 
National media trustworthy (ref. yes) 
National media free from political or 
commercial pressure pressure (ref. yes) 










Similarities larger than differences (ref. agree) 
Disagree 
Don’t know/not specified 




















Culture −0.019*** −0.017*** 0.037*** 
Greatest challenges of the EU (ref. no answer) 
Immigration, security 
Social inequalities, unemployment 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
Age (ref. 15–24 years) 
25–39 years 
40–54 years 
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Table 6.3 Continued 
A bad thing Neither/nor Good thing 
Gender (ref. male) 
Place of residence (ref. country or village) 













Pseudo R2 0.127 
Source: Eurobarometer 86.1 (ZA6697).

Note: Significance levels: * P < 0.1., ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.

The results show that Euroscepticism cannot be clearly placed on the ideological 
spectrum. It is particularly interesting that those respondents who do not know 
or even refuse to provide a political self-positioning, lean most clearly towards 
Euroscepticism, which may be an indication that Eurosceptics cannot or do not 
want to be clearly positioned on the traditional party spectrum. This insight is sup-
ported by research findings because populist parties and electorates come from all 
parts of the political spectrum (Mudde 2004; Rooduijn 2014). Rebellion against 
the political establishment is the hallmark here. 
The third set of political predictors is more tightly linked to the EU, reflecting 
previous studies that link Eurosceptic attitudes with the perception of the EU and 
its policies (e.g., Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) and with cognitive and affective 
evaluations of the EU (Hooge and Marks 2005; Boomgaarden et al. 2011). In 
our model, we assume that a negative assessment of EU membership is stronger 
among those who stress challenges and problems with which the EU is confronted 
(e.g., inequalities and unemployment), see more divisions than commonalities 
between European people and are less convinced that there are identifiable char-
acteristics that give rise to a European identity. The findings corroborate these 
assumptions by highlighting that Eurosceptic respondents refer much more 
frequently to unresolved social problems (inequality and unemployment) than 
EU supporters. Complementary to this, it is striking that respondents who find 
more divisive than unifying elements are 14% more likely to be of the opinion 
that EU membership is a bad thing and 24% less likely to acknowledge that this 
membership is good. The fact that such an opinion leads to more scepticism or 
opposition is an indication that the EU is perceived as a battlefield of competing 
(national) interests rather than a union of different countries. In the face of this, 
Eurosceptics tend to omit the fact that a community is built on a shared identity. 
Finally, in addition to these results, regression analysis has also identified socio-
demographic characteristics of the respondents as relevant explanatory factors. 
For the following analyses, it is interesting to highlight that EU opposition is less 
pronounced in metropolitan areas than in rural areas, thus exhibiting spatial dif-
ferences within countries. 
Findings so far show that Euroscepticism is accompanied by a feeling of 
political marginalisation. Critics of the EU insist on having little influence on 
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political life and feelings of greater detachment. This sentiment seems to motivate 
Euroscepticism because these respondents see the EU as a battlefield of com-
peting national interests. Not being heard politically by one’s government must 
thus be quite a serious issue for EU citizens. Considering that these people attrib-
ute more disadvantages than benefits to the EU and perceive the union as more 
divisive than unifying, makes it possible to understand why the lack of political 
influence is motive enough for being opposed to EU membership. Distribution 
conflicts within the EU are lost to people if their respective governments do not 
take their interests into account. Criticism of political conditions at national and 
European levels is interrelated and, therefore, has the potential to contribute to the 
fundamental alienation of people from the political status quo. 
These findings thus corroborate that opponents and supporters of EU member-
ship can be distinguished by their political convictions and preferences. However, 
they do not clarify the question of whether these groups also have special char-
acteristics with regard to their socio-structural position in society. Here one can 
refer to numerous findings of previous research. Studies have been able to show 
that population groups in precarious situations and experiencing socio-structural 
disadvantages are more likely to be critical of the EU, while the socially privi-
leged tend to support the EU and their country’s membership (McLaren 2004: 
900; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010: 800; Fligstein 2008; Kuhn et al. 2016). These 
precarious living conditions are linked to certain socio-cultural attitudes because 
people with more traditional views of life, materialistic orientations and ethno-
centric worldviews also tend to regard the EU with more scepticism (Green 2000; 
Nelsen et al. 2001: 204f.; Boomgaarden and Freire 2009: 1242f.; de Vries and van 
Kersbergen 2007; Hooghe et al. 2007: 329). 
To test the relevance of social-structural characteristics in general, and the role 
of social vulnerabilities in particular, a second regression analysis was computed, 
which lists a number of related factors, while controlling for those political atti-
tudes that have proven to be important predictors. The Eurobarometer survey of 
2016 sets some limits to such an analysis since the basic socio-structural data are 
collected in a simplified form. However, it provides sufficient information for the 
analyses. It includes data on the level of education, as respondents were asked to 
indicate their age when they completed their full-time education. Additionally, 
it gathered evidence on the respondents’ occupations,5 thus offering an approxi-
5 The Eurobarometer survey can only provide clues, since questions on the occupation focus solely on 
the type of employment. The group of employees is especially heterogenous. However, according 
to the classification by Oesch (2006), I have allocated them as follows: the groups of housewives/ 
househusbands, students, the unemployed and pensioners remain unaffected; the self-employed 
have been divided into lower middle class (farmers, fishermen and shopkeepers/craftsmen) and 
middle class (liberal professions and entrepreneurs); the employees have been divided into lib-
eral professionals in an employment relationship, the upper management and middle management 
employees into the management group; the qualified office and administration employees and civil 
servants also include employees in the service sector (including social and health); the low-qualified 
workers consist of master craftsmen and foremen, skilled workers and other workers. 
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mate insight into occupation-specific income situations and status groups. Finally, 
the data also provide us with information on self-reported social disadvantage: a 
measure of financial strain (self-reported difficulties in paying bills) and subjec-
tive class affiliation. 
The correlation measures listed in Table 6.4 indicate the (percentage) likeli-
hood that the persons with a negative or deliberating opinion will occupy a less 
privileged social position with regard to the characteristics mentioned. The refer-
ence group consists of people who have had a long education, are employed as 
managers, never have difficulties paying their bills and feel they belong to the 
upper middle class or upper class. In this model, too, the effect of the respondents’ 
country of origin has been included as a control variable but is not listed in the 
table for space reasons. 
The findings paint a very clear picture, as they confirm the link between 
Euroscepticism and social disadvantage. It is surprising that this finding can 
be proven for the European population virtually across all member states. This 
is an indication that EU citizens are exposed to similar social influences with 
regard to their opinion of the EU. In particular, the findings show that the likeli-
hood of seeing EU membership as a bad thing is 8% higher among people with-
out a completed education than among those who left school or university at the 
age of 20 or later. The likelihood of a positive assessment of EU membership 
is reduced by 15% on average. The effect of the other socio-structural features 
repeats this picture. There is a slight tendency towards Euroscepticism among 
non-employed persons (housewives and househusbands, as well as the unem-
ployed) and among qualified office and administrative employees. Opposition is 
much more pronounced among the low-skilled workers and the self-employed 
in the lower middle class segment, who are noticeably more sceptical than the 
senior managers. After all, Eurosceptics are more often people with financial 
difficulties, who are more likely to locate themselves in the lower middle or 
working class. 
When adding the other attitude-specific characteristics, the effects of which are 
also confirmed in this extended calculation, it is possible to describe the opponents 
and supporters of EU membership as two opposing groups. On the side of the 
sceptics, one frequently encounters socially disadvantaged people who do not feel 
politically heard and who feel that there is more that divides than unites people in 
the EU. Conversely, it can be seen that among the supporters of EU membership, 
there are far more well-off people who feel they are taken seriously politically 
and emphasise what is common in the EU and also include several character-
istics suggestive of a European identity. These results show that in the support 
or rejection of the EU, a distinction must be made between privileged and non-
privileged groups of people, between winners and losers in the social and politi-
cal environment. This finding corresponds to the picture drawn to date (Hooghe 
and Marks 2005; Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky 2002; Koopmans 2007; Fligstein 
2008), although its clarity is surprising. Moreover, assessment criteria seem to 
deviate as well because supporters and opponents seem to introduce ideational 
values or material benefit into the deliberations. Eurosceptics link their rejection 
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Table 6.4	 Country’s membership of the EU, social factors (ordered logistic regression, 
average marginal effects), 2016 
A bad thing Neither/nor A good thing 
Socio-structural characteristics 
Education, age of completion (ref. >20) 
16–19 years 
Less than 15 years 























Self-employed, lower middle class 
Self-employed, middle class 
Office/administrative employees 
Low-qualified workers 
Difficulties paying bills (ref. almost never/ 
never) 
Occasionally 



















Subjective class assignment (ref. upper 
class/upper middle class) 
Middle class 0.027*** 0.029*** −0.056*** 
Lower middle class 0.040*** 0.040*** −0.080 
Working class 0.044*** 0.044*** −0.088*** 
Political attitudes and orientations 
My voice counts in my country (ref. agree) 
My voice counts in the EU (ref. agree) 























Rise of anti-elite parties (ref. cause for 
concern) 







Attitudes towards the EU 
Similarities larger than differences 
(ref. agree) 
Disagree 
Don’t know/not specified 
European identity: characteristics 



















Culture −0.018*** −0.016*** 0.034*** 
(Continued) 
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Table 6.4 Continued 
A bad thing Neither/nor A good thing 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
Age (ref. 15–24 years) 
25–39 years 
40–54 years 
55 years and older 
Gender (ref. male) 
Place of residence (ref. country or village) 





















Pseudo R2 0.139 
Source: Eurobarometer 86.1 (ZA6697).

Note: Significance levels: * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.

to considerations of usefulness. Membership should pay off but fails to do so. For 
those in favour of Europe, usefulness is certainly also an issue. However, idea-
tional factors, in particular belonging to a Europe based on commonalities, play 
a much greater role for them. In this regard, we can follow Bourdieu’s thinking 
(1988; 1990: 122–34; 1998: 75–91). The socially privileged pursue a strategy of 
“disinterested interest” – in our case, in the EU – since their interest is primar-
ily in the matter itself, as opposed to considerations of usefulness. The socially 
disadvantaged, however, display their personal sensitivities and interests openly, 
where they risk losing political legitimacy if Europe is about larger contexts and a 
common good spanning particular interests. The strategy of indifference promises 
advantages in terms of reputation and legitimacy, precisely due to the fact that the 
socially privileged already benefit much more from this very union than their – 
socially disadvantaged – counterparts. 
From a sociological perspective, we thus see that the political cleavage about 
EU membership is closely related to a social divide between privileged and 
less privileged social groups. This raises the question of whether the political 
dissent of the population is to be understood ultimately as an implicit class con-
flict across the member states. In this sense, we would speak of a transnational 
cleavage between supporters and opponents that in itself conforms to a transna-
tional division between well-off and vulnerable groups of the population. This 
provocative thesis must be critically verified. In fact, our findings have been 
able to show that social divisions between privileged and non-privileged groups 
are relevant across all countries. However, the analyses have been unable to 
show that divisions between social strata or classes have an identical impact 
on EU-related attitudes and that it is possible to speak about transnational divi-
sions with identical positions towards the EU. It is advisable to be cautious 
because country differences are substantial, which means that stratificational 
positions are not strictly comparable when considering the material situation of 
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privileged or non-privileged strata in western or eastern, northern or southern 
European countries. Additionally, we have seen that the likelihood of support-
ing or criticising the EU varies strongly between countries, thus implying that 
privileged citizens and vulnerable groups are not exclusively supportive or criti-
cal, respectively. 
The relationship between stratificational and spatial divisions and their effect 
on EU-related attitudes should thus be more complex than the simple hypoth-
esis of transnational class division implies. This assumption can be tentatively 
validated when breaking up the results of our regression analysis (see Table 6.4) 
for one of the determinants measuring social inequalities: educational careers. In 
this regard, it is useful to statistically determine the probability of a Eurosceptic 
attitude among educationally disadvantaged persons for each country (so-called 
predictive margins). Figure 6.9 summarises the results in graphic form. The x-axis 
lines up the four educational groups (from older than 20 years, 16–19 years and 
15 years or younger to no full-time education), the y-axis indicates the level of the 
respective probabilities. It is first of all striking that the national climate of opinion 
makes a significant difference for all four education groups because, in Europe-
friendly countries, people with a low level of education are also highly likely 
to be in favour of EU membership, while the opposite is the case in countries 
with a generally Eurosceptic climate of opinion. For example, in countries such 
as Luxembourg or Ireland, which are characterised by an overall pro-European 
public opinion, it can be seen that all educational groups are highly likely to join 
the chorus of supporters. The likelihood of people with long and short educational 
biographies seeing membership as a good thing is 85% and 76%, respectively, for 
Luxembourg, and 79% and 67%, respectively, for Ireland. In Eurosceptic coun-
tries, it is the other way around, because in Austria, the predictive probability of 
a positive assessment is considerably lower for all Austrians. Among the social 
classes with higher and lower levels of education, the proportion of people in 
favour is only 40% and 29%, respectively. In Greece, the figures are as low as 
32% and 22%, respectively. 
Although the climate of opinion rubs off on respondents’ attitudes, it is remark-
able that education makes a certain difference in all countries. Everywhere, it is 
less likely that people from less educated backgrounds see their country’s EU 
membership as a good thing, and everywhere it is more likely that they see mem-
bership as something bad. The differences between educationally disadvantaged 
and advantaged groups are similarly large everywhere; the probability of a posi-
tive assessment is 9% to 16% lower among the respondents with lower levels of 
education, and the probability of negative evaluations is 4% to 9% higher when 
compared to the respondents with longer educational careers. A similar picture 
emerges for other socio-structural characteristics, such as subjective class affili-
ation, or for difficulties in making ends meet with disposable household income. 
Social disadvantage always reduces the likelihood of seeing EU membership as 
a good thing. However, the probability varies only slightly, while the differences 
between countries are much greater. As these individual results do not provide 
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Spatial disparities: multilevel causation along 
the regional and national levels 
Overall, our evaluations show that the thesis of a pan-European line of conflict 
between supporters and opponents of EU membership and a class-specific line 
of division between privileged and non-privileged people is not true in its sim-
plicity. While it is true that social position tangibly influences the respondents’ 
attitude towards the EU, the differences between the respondents were even more 
pronounced in terms of residence, as the likelihood of Eurosceptic attitudes and 
the distribution between supporters and opponents of EU membership seem to 
reflect country-specific conditions. These observations, however, raise a num-
ber of unanswered questions. If spatial differences are a highly relevant factor in 
explaining rates of Euroscepticism among respondents, then what are the driving 
forces behind these differences? In part, national differences might just mirror 
different socio-economic contexts and living standards. If the availability of edu-
cation, employment and income seems to influence the assessment of the EU, as 
the analysis of vertical divisions along the stratificational inequalities has shown, 
then we might assume that national differences in public opinion reflect socio-
economic performance. Following the sociological perspective, countries should 
display different social conditions (e.g., prosperity levels, income levels) that 
shape the living conditions of individuals and their political views. This would 
mean that the social positioning of the individual has a double effect on the sup-
port of EU membership. It could be assumed that the socially disadvantaged from 
structurally weak countries are more likely to be among the opponents of the EU 
when compared with the socially disadvantaged from the economically wealth-
ier and more stable countries. Conversely, socially privileged respondents from 
the socio-economically better-off countries would most frequently be among the 
proponents. 
Diverging rates of Euroscepticism in different countries might, however, not 
be conditioned exclusively by socio-economic conditions. Previous studies have 
highlighted that these differences in public opinion are strongly conditioned by 
political factors specific to each of the European member states. Political condi-
tions, such as, for instance, those established by national party systems, play an 
important intervening role. These include anti-European parties, some of them 
populist, that are mobilising against their country’s membership of the EU and are 
thus also shaping public opinion (Hutter and Grande 2014; Hong 2015; Stockemer 
and Barisione 2016; Treib 2020). Furthermore, reference is made to the role of the 
mass media, which in many countries report critically on the EU and can often 
also spread Eurosceptic opinions among the population and thus also reinforce 
them (Hooghe et al. 2007: 341; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010; Fligstein et al. 2012; 
Conti and Memoli 2017). Finally, it is pointed out that approval of the EU also 
depends on identities, as countries with a dominating sense of national belonging 
and identification with their own country have less room for European identi-
ties and a lower willingness to support the EU, even in times of public criticism 
(Hooghe and Marks 2005; Fligstein et al. 2012). 
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Research, therefore, assumes that European attitudes are not only shaped by 
the living conditions of individual citizens but also by the socio-economic and 
political contexts in which they live. An in-depth analysis of explanatory factors 
must, therefore, look at both dimensions at the same time. This requires a multi-
level analysis because this statistical procedure aims to determine the explanatory 
power of individual and contextual factors, simultaneously. For these reasons, 
previous research has already used multilevel analysis on several occasions. For 
example, it has been shown that people who identify exclusively with their coun-
try do not necessarily hold Eurosceptic attitudes. This connection exists only in 
countries where the clash between pro-EU and anti-EU parties politicises col-
lective identities and thus pits national identities against European identities 
(Hooghe and Marks 2004). The role of party political constellations in a country 
has been repeatedly confirmed (de Vries and Edwards 2009; Armingeon and Ceka 
2014), but also the role of the economic situation and the consequences of the eco-
nomic and financial crisis, when differentiating between Eurosceptic and friendly 
respondents (Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Braun and Tausendpfund 2014; van Erkel 
and van der Meer 2016). 
The analysis of contextual factors, however, cannot stop at the national level 
but needs to break down countries into regions. Previous studies have high-
lighted already that levels of Euroscepticism diverge between regions (Lubbers 
and Scheepers 2005; Schraff 2019; Schoene 2019). For analytic purposes, the 
analysis of the regional level is important because social conditions within nation 
states vary considerably, for example, with regard to economic performance, 
household income or social inequality structures (Heidenreich and Wunder 
2008; Geppert and Stephan 2008; Petrakos, Kallioras and Anagnostou 2011; 
Heidenreich 2016a). EU-related attitudes should be shaped by these regional 
differences, insofar as the living conditions and socio-economic realities will 
impact on the residents’ satisfaction or confidence with political institutions 
(van Erkel and van der Meer 2016). 
The relevance of the regional level can be easily evidenced when observing 
EU-related attitudes and grouping the opinions of respondents about EU mem-
bership along the regional place of residence. The Eurobarometer survey allows 
us to break down national rates into regional units, the so-called NUTS regions 
(nomenclature of territorial units for statistics). Figure 6.10 compiles the average 
approval values for each of the 245 NUTS regions in regard to two questions: the 
assessment of a country’s own EU membership (1, good; 2, neither nor; 3, bad) 
and whether the country had benefitted from membership (1, yes; 2, no). For the 
sake of clarity, the average values of the regions are presented only as a grey point 
cloud in the background to highlight two countries as examples. The choice fell 
on the German federal states and the Greek regions, as these countries tend to be 
among the most EU-friendly and EU-sceptic member states. 
It can be seen from the grey point cloud that people in the majority of regions 
tend to view EU membership positively. And although approval is weaker in a 
number of regions, regional differences are rather gradual. Only a few are aligned 
with the more sceptical averages. The German and Greek regions occupy different 
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Figure 6.10 Attitudes to EU membership (mean values, region). Source: Eurobarometer 
86.1 (ZA6697). 
positions in this point cloud because the German federal states are more approv-
ing of the country’s membership of the EU, while opinion in the Greek regions is 
rather ambivalent or even negative. However, the scatter of averages in Germany 
and Greece is remarkable. On the x-axis, along which people rate membership as 
good or bad, there are clear differences between most (western) German states 
and the Greek regions. However, Thuringia and Saxony are two federal states that 
are more in line with the values in the Greek regions. The scatter is even more 
pronounced for the question of whether the countries have benefitted from EU 
membership. Here, only the people from the northern and western German federal 
states have a positive opinion, while the new federal states of the former German 
Democratic Republic are just as ambivalent about the situation as the population 
in Thessaly, the Peloponnese, central Macedonia, Athens and central Greece. 
The German and Greek regions thus cover the entire spectrum of opinions. 
This finding shows that although political attitudes towards the EU vary between 
countries, this seems to be rather a statistical artefact, given that national averages 
level out differences within the countries. Hence, political preferences appear to 
be clearly determined by the regional context. For this reason, it makes sense to 
carry out a multilevel analysis that takes into account different grouping levels: 
the individual, the regional and the national levels. This multilevel modelling has 
two objectives. On the one hand, it is necessary to identify which level of analysis 
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is the most relevant in explaining EU-related attitudes and diverging rates of 
Euroscepticism, in particular. Are regional differences more important in predict-
ing Euroscepticism than national variations? On the other hand, the aim will be to 
identify the explanatory factors impacting EU-related attitudes. For the individual 
level, a number of predictors proven to be significant in Table 6.4 were adopted. 
Social-structural features are included because it is assumed that Euroscepticism 
is more likely for those with little educational capital, a precarious job and the 
subjective affiliation to the lower social classes. In addition, political attitudes that 
have been proven to explain Euroscepticism (i.e., perceptions of political efficacy 
and European identity) have been added, alongside two control variables, which 
record age and gender. 
For the regional and national levels, several factors have been included in 
the modelling that measure different societal contexts: socio-economic perfor-
mance, mass media exposure and collective identities, which all tend to vary 
strongly between regions. The first set of indicators has been included because it 
is assumed that the socio-economic conditions in the regions have an impact on 
political attitudes. As studies to date have shown, the impact of these conditions 
is rather complex, given that Euroscepticism can flourish in countries that are on 
the “have” or “have not” side in terms of prosperity, trade integration or financial 
transfers (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; McLaren 2004; Braun and Tausendpfund 
2014; van Erkel and van der Meer 2016). For our purpose, we will centre on 
economic performance indicators. Euroscepticism should be more widespread in 
regions characterised by low gross domestic product and lower economic growth 
between 2008 and 2015.6 Furthermore, this opinion should be more widespread 
in regions with low household incomes (per capita, purchasing power parity) and 
higher unemployment. These variables were all standardised to generate coeffi-
cients that are directly comparable across factors and levels. 
Beyond socio-economic conditions, the importance of the mass media in 
spreading Eurosceptic attitudes is an important factor to take into consideration, 
since previous studies have referred to this same mediating actor (de Vreese and 
Boomgaarden 2006; Maier and Rittberger 2008; Conti and Memoli 2017). Since 
it is not possible to include any media content in the analyses at this point, this 
effect is to be determined indirectly via variables measuring the regional patterns 
of media use. To this end, data from Eurobarometer 86.2 (November 2016) was 
used to review the importance of different media as a source of information about 
the EU in the respective regions. Television is the most important medium, as on 
average, 55.2% of the local population in all regions use this medium to inform 
themselves about European affairs. This is followed by the internet (13.6%), the 
6 Both GDP figures are per capita and purchasing power parity. The change over time is measured as 
a percentage of GDP in 2015 compared to the pre-crisis year, 2008. The figures range from regions 
with a shrinking GDP (79.3% of the level in 2008 in eastern Macedonia and Thrace in Greece) 
to regions with considerable growth (162.5% as in the Border Region, the Midlands and Western 
Ireland). 
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press (9.6%), radio (6.8%) and social media (3.2%). However, the regions dif-
fered considerably in media use, as can be illustrated through the example of the 
most popular medium, television. In Castilla–La Mancha the share is only 7%, in 
the Algarve, over 88%. This data should help us to verify whether the different 
extent of regional media use has an influence on Eurosceptic attitudes. 
Finally, a measurement value was determined by the strength of a region’s col-
lective identities. To this end, a question from the aforementioned Eurobarometer 
survey on the degree of perceived attachment to one’s country or the European 
Union was used. Based on this information, it is possible to calculate for each 
region the average proportion of the population that feels attached to their own 
country or the EU. The figures give us insight into the regional climate of opinion. 
On average, all regions have a very strong attachment to their own country, with 
a 3.51 on a 4-point scale from “not at all” to “very attached”. However, the values 
vary greatly between regions. Regions with a low degree of attachment include 
the autonomous regions of Spain (Basque Country, Navarra, Catalonia and 
Valencia, with values of 2.5–2.8), those with a high degree include the Austrian 
region of Carinthia or the Greek region of Western Macedonia (4.0). By contrast, 
the average regional population feels much less attached to the EU (2.47). Here 
too, the figures vary between the French Limousin (1.0) and the Croatian county 
of Požega-Slavonia (3.25). It can be assumed that Eurosceptic attitudes are more 
widespread in regions where attachment to one’s country is higher, with lower 
rates of attachment to the EU. 
Finally, we also included indicators at the country level. Here, in particular, we 
aim to measure the effect of the political and institutional context on EU-related 
attitudes. The general assumption reflects previous research and assumes that the 
nation state and national politics are used by citizens as proxies, benchmarks or 
yardsticks to assess European politics (Anderson 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2005; 
Muñoz et al. 2011; Desmet et al. 2012; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Guinjoan 
and Rico 2018; de Vries 2018). For this reason, three indicators of this political 
context have been included. First, it is highly probable that the contentiousness 
within the political party systems of European member states has a direct impact 
on Euroscepticism, given that political parties are active in forming and mobilis-
ing public opinion for their demands. In the first instance, we might expect that the 
heterogeneity and polarisation of national party systems will increase the likeli-
hood of Eurosceptic attitudes among the population, given that citizens in these 
countries might feel more at ease in expressing outspoken criticism, also against a 
perceived mainstream. For this purpose, I rely on data from the Manifesto Project 
that gathered data on election programmes of all parties participating in national 
elections, here, in particular, composite data on the divergence of issues with 
emphasis across parties (heterogeneity) and the left-right polarisation of the party 
system. Given that elections took place at different times, mean coefficients for the 
period 2010 to 2017 were calculated and included in the modelling. Additionally, 
it has been highlighted that the existence of Eurosceptic parties must be consid-
ered, as these groups express fundamental criticism of their country’s member-
ship of the EU in an attempt to influence public opinion (de Vries and Edwards 
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2009; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Treib 2020). For our 
purposes, a variable measuring the proportion of votes (in %) for anti-European 
political parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections for each country was 
included. The focus was on the political party that, according to a typology by 
Hernández and Kriesi (2016), was most anti-European – regardless of whether the 
positioning was right-wing nationalist or left wing. Finally, we also control for the 
effect of perceived governance effectiveness, as measured by the World Bank’s 
indicator (World Bank 2020). For countries with higher rates of satisfaction, we 
might expect less discontent with established political institutions, membership 
within the EU included. 
Table 6.5 shows the results of this multilevel analysis. The question of the 
assessment of the respondents’ country’s membership of the EU has been reduced 
to two manifestations, to simplify the analysis, contrasting only those people who 
see membership as a “good” or “bad” thing. The exclusion of those who see 
membership as neither good nor bad reduces the number of cases by about 8,700 
respondents. Due to the binary structure of our dependent variable (attitudes on 
EU membership), a multilevel logistic regression was used, and variables for the 
individual, regional and national levels were introduced successively. The cal-
culations reside in a nested random-effects model, where regions were nested in 
countries in order to account for the assumption that the regional economy, media 
consumption and levels of attachment to the nation and Europe are embedded in 
a national context. 
The results show that all three levels contribute to the explanation of 
Euroscepticism, albeit to a different degree. The first column presents the basic 
intercept model estimating the percentage of explained variance for each level 
(see the variance of regions and countries and the intraclass correlation coeffi-
cient, ICC). The proportion of the variance explained by the regions and countries 
is low with countries accounting for 10% and regions adding 7%. This means that 
individual-level factors are decisive in understanding Euroscepticism, as argued 
by previous studies (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2004; Braun and Tausendpfund 
2014; Schoene 2019). The second model summarises the effect of individual-
level predictors. Findings show that people’s personal living conditions influence 
their political attitudes in the expected way. Also, the perception of low politi-
cal efficacy and conflicting interests within the EU increases the likelihood of 
Eurosceptic attitudes, even when controlled by region and country. These indica-
tions corroborate that social vulnerability and feelings of political marginalisation 
are decisive factors across the entire EU. 
New insights are provided by the third model, which breaks down the regional 
level into the contextual variables introduced earlier. The socio-economic fac-
tors paint a differentiated picture because the assumption that Euroscepticism 
is more prevalent in regions from an economically disadvantaged position can-
not be maintained. On the one hand, the results show that a higher GDP tends 
to reduce a region’s probability of criticism of EU membership. More decisive, 
however, is economic development, because countries that are currently charac-
terised by higher economic growth than in 2008 are also those regions in which 
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Table 6.5	 Euroscepticism and its determinants – multilevel logistic analysis (average mar-
ginal effects) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual attributes 
Education, age of completion 
(no full-time education) 
15 years or younger 
16–19 years 
20 years and older 
Subjective class affiliation (Worker) 













Middle class −0.046*** −0.045*** −0.045*** 
Upper middle class 




Self-employed, lower middle class 
Self-employed, middle class 
Qualified administrative employee 
Manager 
My voice counts: Country (yes) 
My voice counts: EU (yes) 
Europe: more divisive elements 











































Gross domestic product per capita 
Economic growth (2008/2015) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Per capita income 









TV 0.011* 0.010 
Press 0.009 0.008 
Internet 0.005 0.004 
Attachment to country (none to very 
strong) 















No. of observations 16031 16031 16031 16031 
No. of groups 
SD_cons 
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Table 6.5 Continued 












Source: Eurobarometer 86.1 (ZA6697).

Note: a) Standardised variables, Significance levels: * P < 0.1., ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.

the likelihood of criticism is lower. The reverse applies to regions with declining 
economic output: regions that have had lower growth rates since the crisis year 
2006 are more strongly against EU membership. It is not the low economic output 
as such, but the drop in output that seems to make the difference. 
It is surprising, however, that high regional unemployment rates have a mod-
erating effect on Euroscepticism and that, conversely, regions with a higher per 
capita income seem to promote Euroscepticism, even if the effects are not statisti-
cally significant. These findings suggest that it is not the absolute structural weak-
ness of the region that inspires Euroscepticism, but a relative weakness. People 
living in regions with a higher average household income seem to have more 
reason to criticise membership in times of deteriorating economic performance, 
as their personal situation could also deteriorate. And a similar effect could be 
behind the negative effect of regional unemployment rates on Euroscepticism. It 
tends to be regions with lower unemployment rates that fuel people’s concern that 
EU membership could increase the economic risks for the region and burden the 
regional labour market in times of economic downturns. 
Media consumption contributes only slightly to Euroscepticism. The wider the 
use of various mass media within the regional population is, the greater the likeli-
hood that respondents see their country’s membership of the EU as a bad thing. 
Television, newspapers and the internet are not only the media most used by the 
regional population to learn about European affairs; they are also the media that 
encourage the likelihood of Eurosceptic attitudes. However, the effect is statisti-
cally significant only for TV consumption. Feelings of belonging also influence 
Eurosceptic attitudes at regional levels. However, it is only the feeling of belong-
ing to the EU that matters; regions where this attachment is more prevalent are 
friendlier towards the EU. 
The third model, finally, adds the national level predictors measuring the role 
of political and institutional contexts. Perceived governance effectiveness tends 
to reduce the probability of Eurosceptic attitudes, as was to be expected, but the 
effect is not statistically significant. The structure of the national party systems has 
a much stronger effect, even though the mere heterogeneity of issues promoted by 
parties does not necessarily nurture Euroscepticism significantly. It is the stronger 
polarisation of the party system along the left-right divide and the stronger repre-
sentation of overtly anti-European parties that fuels criticism of EU membership, 
even though the latter is not statistically significant. The existence of political 
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parties with Eurosceptic programmes and demands is important, but apparently, 
the ideological polarisation adds an important component to public opinion by 
fuelling more outspoken criticism of the EU. The introduction of these factors 
does not diminish the explanatory power of the individual and regional level fac-
tors, with the exception of the mass media, indicating that it is not necessarily the 
mass media itself, but the political parties influencing news coverage and public 
opinion. 
The multilevel analysis suggests that there are cumulative effects of social vul-
nerabilities on EU-related attitudes. In fact, respondents in a vulnerable situation 
living in vulnerable regions seem to have a much higher probability of criticising 
their country’s membership of the EU, while residents of economically prosper-
ous regions living in privileged circumstances will more often positively value 
the membership. This assumption can be validated when comparing rates of 
Eurosceptics among occupational groups in regions with prospering and shrink-
ing economies (i.e., the variable measuring GDP growth between 2008 and 2015 
in the model) when grouped in deciles. Of the low-skilled workers living in the 
lowest decile – the recessive regions – 24.5% think that EU membership is a 
bad thing compared to 13.8% of those residing in the highest decile – the most 
prosperous regions with growth rates beyond 30%. The share of critical execu-
tive employees in the weakest regions (12.2%) is slightly below the latter group 
of critical workers and decreases further to 5.6% among those living in the most 
prosperous regions. 
These descriptive findings do not control for the effect of the other variables 
included in the multilevel regression model (Table 6.5). If the predictive prob-
abilities on the basis of this model are calculated, we still see the same cumulative 
effects of social vulnerability: low social status and weak economic performance 
in the regions augment Euroscepticism. Figure 6.11 summarises the findings for a 
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Figure 6.11	 Cumulative effects of vulnerabilities on Euroscepticism (predictive 
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The likelihood of criticising EU membership is estimated to be 27% and 19% 
for low-skilled workers, depending on whether they live in the economically 
weakest or strongest regions, respectively, while the probability among executive 
employees in weak regions is only slightly higher (21%) than the latter group of 
low-skilled workers, and decreases further to 14% for managers living in the most 
prosperous decile. The group of the unemployed respondents follows the same 
path of the low-skilled workers, as they have a stronger disposition to criticise 
the EU, even in the most prosperous regions. Among the jobless living in less 
favourable economic conditions, this EU-sceptic opinion is more widely diffused. 
Conclusion: political attitudes and the European social space 
The European Union has become a subject of political debate between supporters 
and opponents of the EU, right down to the level of the European population. Our 
analyses have shown that these disputes run along structures of social inequality, 
as people develop political attitudes towards the EU that reflect their position 
within the European social space. Low-skilled workers have everywhere a worse 
opinion about their country’s membership of the EU than managers. These differ-
ences are even more pronounced when considering spatial disparities between and 
within countries. Managers living in prosperous regions (e.g., Bavaria, Bratislava 
or Dublin) have a substantially better opinion about EU membership than low-
skilled workers from the worst-off regions (e.g., Greek Macedonia, Andalusia or 
Cyprus). It is, therefore, possible to speak of a cumulative effect of social divi-
sions on Euroscepticism. The question of EU membership is a source of con-
troversy between supporters and opponents, but this controversy is sparked by 
social relations between advantaged and disadvantaged population groups and 
advantaged and disadvantaged regions. The EU thus becomes an arena of political 
contentions in which social divisions shape political conflict lines and cleavages. 
While the findings paint a clear picture, it is necessary to remind ourselves that 
these are only statistical probabilities. In no way does unemployment necessarily 
and automatically lead to Euroscepticism, belonging to the upper middle or upper 
classes does not necessarily imply support and even living in a prosperous region 
does not automatically go hand in hand with EU-friendly opinions. Political atti-
tudes are individual and thus reflect an array of personal convictions, hopes and 
fears. However, the social situation of people does seem to define the position 
from which they look at political issues, events or actors and how they perceive 
and evaluate them. The EU offers them ample opportunity to do so because it has 
established a political field embracing different actors, positions and opinions, and 
this field enables people to locate themselves according to the social and political 
positions they hold. 
In fact, the analyses have shown that people who see their country’s mem-
bership of the EU as a good thing or a bad thing tend to live in different soci-
etal conditions. On the one side, Eurosceptics have been identified as a group of 
people who more often remain in socially disadvantaged situations and live in 
regions whose economies are stagnating or shrinking. Unemployment rates are 
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not necessarily higher per se; it appears that unemployment seems to be perceived 
rather as a looming risk in times of economic downturn. The European economic 
and financial crisis seem to have had a significant impact on the overall mood. 
EU-friendly people, on the other side, are better placed in society. They live in 
stable conditions when considering class, income levels and educational capital 
and live in regions that emerged unscathed from the economic and financial crisis 
and may even have emerged from this crisis stronger. 
However, this line of social division is not the only source of EU criticism. 
Euroscepticism is also nurtured by political divisions. On the one side, Eurosceptic 
citizens are those who assume that they are politically voiceless and ineffective 
and who emphasise what separates them in the EU; they also tend to regard EU 
membership as a losing deal. On the other side are the EU-friendly people who 
talk about their own political effectiveness, emphasise what is common within the 
EU and see advantages in membership. The conclusion that socially disadvan-
taged people from structurally weak regions regard the EU as a structural fight 
for distribution, which can only be avoided by terminating membership, is just as 
logical as the view of socially advantaged people from structurally strong regions 
who feel that the EU is based on common ground that brings advantages for their 
own country – and for all others. 
The discontent, however, is also nurtured by political entrepreneurs within 
European member states. This argument has been discussed and empirically 
proven by political science research on Europe, as it was possible to show that 
political parties - and thus also the political disputes between rival parties - influ-
ence people’s political opinions, judgements and demands. Eurosceptic opinions 
are more widespread in countries where anti-European parties have achieved 
decisive electoral success and are represented in parliaments (Hooghe and 
Marks 2005; Hutter and Grande 2014; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Hong 2015; 
Stockemer and Barisione 2016; Treib 2020). Mass media contribute to the encour-
agement and mobilisation of discontent because they offer political actors a public 
stage on which to publicise their pro- or anti-European opinions and demands and 
they shape the public opinion about the EU through a certain type of reporting 
(Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Statham and Trenz 2013; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 
2006; Maier and Rittberger 2008; Zschache 2016; Galpin and Trenz 2019; Adam 
et al. 2019). 
Criticism of the EU, however, is attenuated by the fact that European citizens 
have broadened their viewpoints. They are not only able to assess living condi-
tions in other European countries, their agreement across countries is also con-
siderable and tends to hint at an implicit consensus. Apparently, Europeans have 
developed a sense of how it is to live in Europe, both in their own country and 
abroad. And this European map of living conditions provides them with a broader 
framework to assess the social and political life around them. The comparative 
analysis of nine countries has shown that this cognitive map of Europe increases 
the sensitivity to threats to the national economy in terms of crisis perceptions, 
it decreases the satisfaction with government performance and encourages a 
populist criticism of the political establishment. European citizens seem to hold 
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national institutions accountable for the fact that their own living conditions are 
significantly below those standards common in other countries. It is remarkable, 
however, that the perceptions of spatial inequalities in living conditions nurture 
and, at the same time, support the EU. European citizens seem to believe that it 
is good to be in a political union with stronger countries, given that this upholds 
the promises of the common European project to strive towards more equal living 
conditions between all Europeans. 
7
7 The political (dis)
integration of Europe 
The European integration process has shaped the living conditions of the 
European population and has also influenced the way Europeans perceive and 
assess the social and political reality around them. Evidence presented in this 
book has shown that the nation state remains an important point of reference for 
people’s political interests, identifications and ideas. However, this does not make 
Europe in any way irrelevant, as an empirical analysis in nine European countries 
has evidenced. On the one hand, it has shown that Europeans think in European 
dimensions. They have not only formed a more or less clear opinion about the EU 
but more importantly, have become accustomed to locating the social and politi-
cal conditions in their immediate vicinity – and elsewhere – within a European 
frame of reference, evaluating them from this perspective. That is, they not only 
perceive and assess the EU from a national perspective, but they also perceive and 
assess their national governments from a European perspective. On the other hand, 
this study was particularly interested in assessing the relevance of social inequali-
ties – both in terms of social stratification and spatial disparities – in nurturing 
political dissent in public opinion about national governments and the European 
Union. Also in this regard, the analyses showed that cross-national patterns of 
social inequalities across European countries affect people’s political attitudes. 
In objective terms, social inequalities along stratification and spatial disparities 
(e.g., social class and interregional differences) translate into divergent attitudes 
towards national politics and the EU. In subjective terms, the perception of being 
worse off than other countries in terms of social living conditions encouraged a 
more sceptical opinion about the socio-economic situation in one’s own country 
and the performance of national governments. 
European integration thus leads to an amalgamation of perspectives. People 
perceive the European Union through a national lens, as various studies have tes-
tified (Anderson 1998; Muñoz et al. 2011; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Guinjoan 
and Rico 2018; de Vries 2018). However, they also comprehend national politics 
through a European lens. This relational perspective can be clearly traced empiri-
cally and has implications for the European integration process, given that it sen-
sitises for both integrating and disintegrating energies. In fact, Europe has become 
a common horizon of perception for the entire European population, meaning that 
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social inequalities and divisional structures tend to translate into political lines of 
conflict within and across European member states. 
Horizontal Europeanisation of public opinions 
People’s political thinking has indeed opened up and “Europeanised” across 
borders. The view is not only upwards to the European institutions in Brussels, 
Strasbourg or Luxembourg, but also sideways to the other member states. This 
broadening of the political horizon corresponds with what has been described in 
specialist literature as “horizontal Europeanisation” (Beck and Grande 2007; Mau 
2009; Heidenreich 2019). In cognitive terms, this Europeanisation implies two 
things: it can be assumed that people perceive and evaluate political and social 
conditions in other countries and that they implicitly or explicitly use these reali-
ties as a yardstick or benchmark for assessing political facts, persons or institu-
tions in their own country. 
This broadening of the political horizon presupposes a cross-border, mass 
media communication and information flow because, without this, it would be 
more difficult for people to assess life in other countries and use appropriate com-
parisons in the formation of political opinions. The existence of such a cross-bor-
der communication space within the EU has been proven by numerous research 
projects (Pfetsch et al. 2006; Lahusen 2009; Statham and Trenz 2013; Zschache 
2016; Eisele 2017; Segesten and Bossetta 2019). The evaluations in the course of 
this study have also confirmed these findings, although the focus was even more 
on the question of whether public debates in the mass media are indeed horizon-
tally open and interrelated between the individual member states. The analysis of 
media coverage of the European financial and economic crisis between 2006 and 
2014 has shown that such an opening did indeed occur for the nine countries 
surveyed (Germany, France, Greece, the UK, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland 
and Spain). Not only did EU institutions have their say in the national newspapers 
and were addressed by national actors, on a horizontal level, it was also possible 
to see that actors from other countries had their say in the reporting of the member 
states examined and that domestic actors also referred to the political and social 
conditions in other countries. 
These European elements do not necessarily diminish the role of the nation 
state. Public debates are tightly linked to a national frame of reference when look-
ing at the topics discussed, the persons quoted and the actors addressed. Although 
we are dealing with a global or European economic and financial crisis, it has 
mostly been discussed in its national forms and implications. Discussions focused 
on company closures and short-time work, unemployment and wage reductions, 
public debt and savings in public spending and social benefits at home. Only one 
in ten comments raised the crisis issue in its European dimension, and just as many 
spoke of its global dimensions. These cases mostly concerned macro-economic, 
monetary and fiscal issues. European actors were mainly involved in the public 
debates in Greece and Germany. Such comments were rarer in other countries. 
Finally, it should be noted that the vertical penetration of public debates was more 
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pronounced than the horizontal one, as the EU institutions and their staff appeared 
three times more frequently than actors from other member states. At just under 
2%, this share was very low. These findings show that even international develop-
ments, such as the global and European crisis, are processed and communicated 
along national relevance structures (Kutter and Jessop 2015; Zamponi and Bosi 
2016; Sommer et al. 2016; Monza and Anduiza 2016). This pertains to language 
areas and nationally patterned mass media systems. Additionally, mass media 
reporting is clearly geared towards social elites because it favours statements by 
governments, parties or associations (Bennett 1990; Boomgaarden et al. 2013; 
Skogerbo et al. 2016). This practice creates a dominant national focus, as political 
elites are also bound to a national electorate or membership base. As a conse-
quence, they primarily address national agendas, action plans or responsibilities. 
However, these findings by no means imply that national debates are not inter-
spersed with or open to European aspects. After all, within a sample of 9000 claims 
covered in national newspaper in the nine countries understudy, every tenth state-
ment contained European references (topics, actors, addressees), which meant 
that these explicitly European debates kept moving over time. More importantly, 
the national discourses were interconnected across borders; national actors talked 
about European issues, and European actors spoke on national issues. In one-third 
of these cases, national actors addressed European or global issues, just as global 
and European actors talked about national issues or addressed their European and 
global dimensions. 
The public debates about the crisis thus reveal that one should not speak of an 
integrated public media but transnationally interwoven discourses. This horizon-
tal element has to do with the importance of political or economic elites within 
the mass media as well. The latter addressed national audiences and thus were 
inclined to frame the (global or European) issues in national categories. However, 
they were also actively involved in cross-national negotiations and debates on the 
European economic, monetary and financial crisis. This did not leave national 
debates untouched. It is particularly surprising that the discussions in the national 
media were dominated by similar topics and groups of actors. There was certainly 
disagreement between the government and the opposition, business representa-
tives, trade unions, institutes and non-governmental organisations on individual 
issues and measures. However, the vast majority of public statements supported 
the opinion that the reforms agreed at the EU level to contain the crisis were right 
and important. The voices of those who wished for a fundamental departure from 
the agreed austerity policy and also addressed similar topics and arguments were 
barely audible in the overall discourse. There was thus a dominant discourse – and 
a marginalised counter-discourse – that spread across borders and streamlined 
the debates in the respective countries. For the most part, both discourses were 
equally timed. 
These empirical findings show that the European Union has become a pub-
licly relevant arena for political deliberation and decision-making. National and 
European actors are part of a common political field, meaning that they observe 
the positions of other actors and react to them. This relational positioning was 
184 The political (dis)integration of Europe 
evident in our newspaper data. The strict austerity policy stance of the German 
government, which was supported by the majority of representatives of German 
banks and entrepreneurs, trade associations and research institutes, is difficult to 
understand unless it is put in relation to Greek demands for greater flexibility 
in growth policy programmes (e.g., government investment or demand-oriented 
tariff or social policy), which were also supported in other countries (especially 
Italy and France). 
This evidence raises questions about the integrating and disintegrating con-
sequences of these interlocked public debates. On the one hand, it can be seen 
that the European Union has, to some extent, interlinked and integrated the 
debates conducted by the mass media. The EU has established a political field 
that involves political and economic elites from the member states in common 
discourses, and these debates reveal a surprising consensus on the correct diag-
nosis of the problem and the appropriate solutions. Additionally, political conten-
tions are not necessarily a disintegrative force per se, given that political conflicts 
have been an important incentive and instrument for defining and constructing the 
European Union throughout its history (Eder 2004; Trenz 2008; Vobruba 2012). 
The flipside, however, is that public debates are subject to a growing political 
contentiousness that also has disintegrative tendencies. Even if public debates are 
horizontally interrelated, (published) public opinion still has a primarily national 
audience in mind. National actors raising their voice in the media do know about 
each other and speak to each other, but ultimately, they discuss problems, needs, 
interests and demands primarily within a national framework. This only partially 
integrated European public sphere carries risks because national actors talk less 
to each other than about each other (Mylonas 2012; Papathanassopoulos 2015; 
Caiani and Guerra 2017; Adam et al. 2019). Even if they agree on the percep-
tion and assessment of the economic and financial crises, public debates seem to 
be guided by the discomfort that the actor’s host country is not receiving its fair 
share. 
Public dissent about national politics
in an integrated social space 
The perceptions and opinions of European citizens impressively reflect this 
national segmentation of Europe. Europe remains nationally segmented, not 
only because its political attitudes are strongly linked to the nation state, but 
also to social inequalities, which take centre place in this study. Living stand-
ards not only diverge between countries when taking macro-economic indica-
tors into account (e.g., the economic performance in GDP, household income, 
material deprivations). People also recognise that the social conditions in this 
common Europe diverge very strongly along national borders. However, these 
perceptions are also possible because Europe has become a mental map that 
allows people to distinguish between good and bad living conditions. Above all, 
it offers them a grid for assessing the conditions in their own country in light of 
this map. 
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The previous chapters validate this proposition because they show that 
European citizens in the nine countries under analysis had no great difficulty in 
assessing living conditions in other European countries. People seem to be as 
familiar with living conditions elsewhere as they are with those in their own coun-
try. These assessments are undoubtedly abstract, as respondents were asked to 
assess living conditions in a number of countries on an 11-point scale, from very 
poor to very good living conditions. It is likely that respondents used approxima-
tions of national averages as a basis for their assessment. The willingness with 
which people answered these questions, however, shows that they do not find 
such abstractions absurd. It also reveals that people use countries as relevant ref-
erence groups to perceive and evaluate themselves and their environment. This 
had already been confirmed by earlier research studies (Kapteyn et al. 1978; Frey 
and Stutzer 2000; Böhnke 2008). In this context, it could be shown that the com-
parison with other countries also has concrete consequences because it influences 
people’s degree of satisfaction with their lives and their environment (Delhey 
et al. 2002; Delhey and Dragolov 2014; Lahusen and Kiess 2019). 
People’s political thinking is influenced by these comparisons. Respondents 
have no difficulty in assessing the living conditions of other member states, but it 
was particularly surprising that their assessments were largely consistent across 
national borders. This suggests that the European population shares a mental map 
of living conditions in Europe, and thus also common ideas about what should 
be considered good or bad living conditions. It has also been shown that these 
assessments have political consequences because people often tend to see their 
country in a serious crisis when they perceive living conditions in other countries 
to be much better than their own. The same applies to satisfaction with one’s 
government. The proximity to populist attitudes and criticism of the political elite 
and the political establishment is also similarly related to the comparison of liv-
ing conditions in Europe. In this respect, our findings confirm the assumption of 
the theories of relative deprivation (Runciman 1966; Olson, Herman and Zanna 
1986; Merton and Kitt 1950), above all with regard to the frequently confirmed 
influence of a perceived disadvantage on political attitudes such as populism 
(Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Decker, Kiess and Brähler 2016). Deprivation also 
has an effect on the motivation to protest (Dubé and Guimond 1986; Rucht 1994), 
as our own evaluations with regard to the fundamental willingness to participate 
in street protests have shown. Only political action itself does not seem to be 
directly affected by this mental map because people who took part in street pro-
tests were not characterised by more pronounced feelings of social disadvantage. 
This conforms to research findings that testify that feelings of relative deprivation 
do not translate directly into protest but require resources, opportunities and moti-
vations (Bernburg 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2016). 
These findings sensitise us to the integrative and disintegrative tendencies that 
are inherent to this mental map of Europe. On the one hand, our results show 
that the European population as a whole has internalised congruent assessments 
of living conditions in European countries and thus seems to base what can be 
considered a good or bad life on similar parameters. From a cognitive point of 
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view, the EU seems to have come very close to its core objective of unifying and 
communitising Europe because people have adopted the EU’s objective that the 
European project should achieve equal living conditions throughout Europe. Our 
evaluations do at least show that political dissatisfaction is reduced when people 
perceive equality among living conditions, while the perception of social disad-
vantage increases criticism of political conditions. The associations are logical 
when taking into account the fact that the integration process is intended to reduce 
socio-economic differences between people and population groups, countries and 
regions and expand social cohesion (EU Commission 2008; 2009; Council of 
Europe 2004; 2010). This objective requires a constant comparison of the living 
conditions of countries and people, which is why the EU has launched a whole 
series of measures (e.g., the Open Method of Coordination or the European 
Semester of the Europe 2020 Strategy) that provide data and procedures (Hodson 
and Maher 2001; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Jessoula 2015; Copeland and 
Daly 2018). In this respect, people seem to have internalised the goals and self-
image of the European integration project and taken them seriously. 
It is precisely this common evaluation horizon that also unfolds disintegrating 
forces, as it sets in motion a programmatic comparison of living conditions and 
thus necessarily also identifies the winners and losers of the integration process. 
This already applies to the crisis sensitivity of the European population because it 
appears that the interpretation of a given situation as a crisis refers back to com-
parisons; it takes root where people feel left behind compared to other countries. 
The same applies to political dissatisfaction because it also requires people to 
regard their government as more incompetent than the political leaders of other 
countries. Finally, the mental map of Europe also seems to have contributed to the 
dissemination of populist beliefs because the EU offers people a matrix for locat-
ing their personal situation in a European social space that is perceived by people 
as eminently unequal. The subjective perception of social inequalities and lines 
of division seems to encourage concerns about social decline, and these concerns 
are particularly significant for people in insecure or precarious living conditions. 
The fact that people live in times of crisis and that they are not satisfied with the 
government and the establishment has to do with the fact that people see them-
selves and their country as socially and politically left behind. This view can – 
under populist auspices – promote the belief of distributional conflict, according 
to which the conditions in one’s country are curtailed by those of other countries. 
In this respect, the mental map of the European social space contains dynamite for 
political life. After all, it must be considered that populist beliefs have become a 
pan-European phenomenon, paving the way for parties and groups in all member 
states to enter parliaments (Taggart 1995; 2004; Mudde 2004; Kriesi et al. 2006; 
Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Kneuer 2019). 
Social divisions in Europe – political dissent about Europe 
Opinions on the European Union are divided. In addition to the strong supporters 
and opponents of the EU, one in three believes that their country’s membership 
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of the EU is neither good nor bad. Generally, however, political developments 
seem to drive the population towards a clear position. This politicisation of the EU 
has been a trend for several years (Hooghe and Marks 2009; de Wilde and Zürn 
2012; Kriesi 2016b) but public controversies have increased in scope and sever-
ity since 2008 in the wake of the economic and financial crisis and the waves of 
political mobilisation and protest directed against the austerity policies of the EU 
and its governments (Schmalz and Weinmann 2016; Kousis 2014; della Porta and 
Mattoni 2014; Kouki and Fernandez 2018; Kriesi 2016a). Before this backdrop, 
we seem to witness the emergence of a new political cleavage that runs across all 
member states (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi 2016b; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Zeitlin 
et al. 2019; Kneuer 2019; Treib 2020). 
Given this growing contentiousness, it is hardly surprising that people differ 
as to whether the EU is a good or bad thing. These conflicts are not unrelated to 
social inequalities, as the previous chapters have highlighted (Kuhn et al. 2016; 
Simpson 2019; Lauterbach and de Vries 2020). The political dissent about the 
EU runs along the social divide between disadvantaged and privileged population 
groups, regions and countries. The European Union has given the living space 
of the European population a common political constitution and outline that pro-
vides people with a political reference point for their demands, desires and fears. 
Social inequalities and divisional structures, which may only be of statistical sig-
nificance within the European social space, are thus transferred into a European 
field of politics and translated into political lines of conflict. 
The verdict that people have reached about the EU seems to depend on the con-
crete position of people in the social space of Europe. This realisation is not surpris-
ing from a sociological point of view because the social sciences fundamentally 
assume that people’s political thinking and actions are shaped by society. People 
form their political attitudes and opinions from the position they occupy within 
the social fabric, and this position is determined by two dimensions of inequality. 
Firstly, the social situation is defined by the position of the individual within the 
hierarchically structured social space along the social classes and strata. Secondly, 
the European social space also has a horizontal territorial component because the 
place of residence and the affiliation of people to a country and/or a region also 
determine people’s living conditions and opportunities. Both assumptions could 
be validated in regard to a sample of eight European countries (Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, United Kingdom), and were con-
firmed for the EU’s 28 member states on the basis of Eurobarometer data. 
With regard to the horizontal axis, in the previous chapters, it was possible to 
demonstrate that the opinion climate differs considerably between member states, 
but also between regions, because living conditions diverge considerably within 
countries, just as rates of Eurosceptic citizens do. In fact, EU-related attitudes are 
shaped by social and political factors located at the regional and national levels 
alike. Europe-friendly regions stand opposite regions that are sceptical of Europe. 
Factors affecting the general climate of opinion include the experience of an eco-
nomic recession in the wake of the economic and financial crisis in 2008 and 
beyond. The mass media also have an influence on this polarisation because 
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Euroscepticism is more widespread in regions where more people use mass media 
to inform themselves about European affairs. This may be due to reporting that 
is fundamentally critical of Europe (Mylonas 2012; Papathanassopoulos 2015; 
Caiani and Guerra 2017; Adam et al. 2019). However, media reporting may play 
a role simply because it informs people about social and political conditions in 
other member states. The media, therefore, offer a matrix for the comparative 
perception and evaluation of living conditions within Europe and thus also for 
the development of feelings of social disadvantage or deprivation. At the national 
level, the ideological polarisation of the party system and the mobilising power 
of populist parties also play a notable role in shaping EU-related attitudes. In fact, 
polarised party systems and higher electoral success of anti-European sentiment 
parties tend to encourage EU-sceptic opinions within the public sphere. 
People’s political attitudes towards the EU, however, not only vary between 
countries and regions. From a vertical point of view, hierarchical structures 
between social strata remain highly relevant for the shaping of Eurosceptic or 
Eurofriendly attitudes. What is particularly interesting is that these hierarchical 
structures are relevant across national borders. Similar living conditions lead to 
similar political preferences throughout Europe, which is why the divisional struc-
tures of the social space also feed lines of conflict within the political field. This 
is a strong indication that, objectively speaking, people live in a common social 
space because the concrete social position they occupy within this social area 
also seems to shape political positions in the EU field. Everywhere, the socially 
privileged are more often of the opinion that membership of the EU benefits the 
country and that concept unites the people of Europe more than it divides them. 
And everywhere, it is the socially disadvantaged who are far less often able to 
recognise these advantages and highlight what divides rather than what unites. 
People thus hold the EU jointly responsible for the societal conditions in which 
they live. 
The territorial component and social stratification both have an effect on 
EU-related attitudes; both divisive structures are intertwined. This seems to con-
tribute to a differentiation of the Eurofriendly and Eurosceptic opinion camps. On 
the one hand, it is possible to show that vertical and horizontal structures seem to 
have a mediating effect on each other. The socially privileged, who normally turn 
more towards the EU, tend to be much more Eurosceptic when they live in regions 
sceptical of Europe. By contrast, in regions with a Eurofriendly climate of opinion, 
the socially disadvantaged are much more likely to support their country’s mem-
bership of the EU, even if they tend to be Eurosceptics in general. An intervening 
context effect can, therefore, be assumed. The socio-economic and political con-
ditions in the region and the country influence people’s attitudes towards the EU 
(Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Braun and Tausenpfund 2014; van Erkel and van der 
Meer 2016) without necessarily changing the relationship between the strata. One 
can speak of an elevator effect because Euroscepticism fluctuates greatly in the 
regions but varies everywhere between better-off and worse-off people. 
These findings, however, need to be qualified in regard to one factor at the 
centre of this study: the perception of social inequalities in other European 
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countries. European citizens living in vulnerable conditions might be more criti-
cal of national governments and the EU. And the perception that other Europeans 
are more fortunate in their living standards might increase their dissatisfaction 
with national politics. But the perceptions that living conditions are much better 
in other EU member states when compared with their own household situation 
encourages citizens to support their country’s membership of the EU. These per-
ceptions even attenuate Euroscepticism among those groups of the population that 
exhibit higher rates of criticism of the EU and would prefer to leave the union if 
asked in a referendum. These findings corroborate that European citizens have 
developed a common understanding and norm of comparable living conditions. 
This norm of equality seems to guide their political assessments because they 
judge politics in their ability to conform to it. The perception that social reality 
deviates from this norm when comparing living standards in Europe seems to feed 
discontent with national politics. That is, European citizens make their national 
governments accountable for the fact that their living standards are below this 
European norm. The same perception, however, seems to reassure Europeans in 
their conviction to remain within the EU, given that they share membership with 
stronger countries. Better living conditions abroad seem to uphold the promises of 
the common European project in its aim to secure equal living conditions among 
all Europeans. 
Europe as a political field 
The political thinking of the European people bears a clear European signa-
ture. However, as our empirical analyses have repeatedly shown, this cognitive 
Europeanisation is not at the expense of the national element. Research to date has 
impressively documented this fact; because people are much more interested in 
national politics, they identify more strongly with the nation state, and they also 
participate much more regularly in national elections. The European Union places 
second politically in many respects (Reiff and Schmitt 1980; Hix and Marsh 2007; 
Hobolt and Wittrock 2011; Boomgaarden et al. 2016). Moreover, people assess 
the EU and their country’s membership from the perspective of their immediate 
reality and national affiliation, using national polities and politics as a proxy, a 
yardstick or a benchmark to assess the EU, as this relational element has previ-
ously been termed (Anderson 1998; Kritzinger 2003; Muñoz et al. 2011; Desmet 
et al. 2012; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; de Vries 2018). In addition, European 
citizens might have formed an opinion on living conditions throughout Europe 
as a second yardstick or benchmark for assessing national and European politics. 
However, these assessments and comparisons ultimately run along national cat-
egories. This is not surprising, as people live in societies with very different levels 
of prosperity and clearly divergent social welfare standards. After all, the nation 
state is still the primary point of reference for political deliberation, decision-
making and democratic participation. 
In spite of these observations corroborating the ongoing importance of the 
nation state, research has moved beyond a purely national framework of analysis. 
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Political science studies have taken this fact into account when calling the politi-
cal entity a vertical multilevel system (Marks et al. 1996; Bache and Flinders 
2004) that consists of a variety of political arenas at the same time (municipal, 
regional-federal, nation state and supranational European arenas). These arenas 
are assigned different political responsibilities, but as they mutually refer to each 
other, highly complex and interwoven processes of political deliberation and deci-
sion-making develop (Scharpf 1997; Kohler-Koch 2003; 2005; Zürn and Joerges 
2005). This reference to the multilevel structure makes sense from the perspective 
of political systems, as it is a matter of distinguishing institutionalised arenas of 
politics (bodies, procedures and staff). For a sociological research agenda that is 
not only interested in the institutional constitution of politics but also takes the 
social constitution of everyday life into account, a field-theoretical concept is able 
to contribute additional insights into the horizontal element of the European social 
space and the Europeanised field of politics. As shown in the conceptual chapter 
(Chapter 2) of this study, politics is to be understood as a political field of inter-
related forces in which actors vie for political opinions and decisions. The EU has 
extended the political field to a pan-European area (Georgakakis and Weisbein 
2010; Cohen 2011; Kauppi and Madsen 2013) insofar as it has acquired compe-
tence and thus made political issues the subject of joint decision-making. Political 
actors in the respective member states have to reckon with other member states 
and EU bodies (Commission, Council of Ministers or EU courts, for example) 
in various areas of regulation, and often use the pronouncements or decisions of 
these bodies to hone their own positions and/or to push forward their own pro-
jects – with or against the EU. 
In regard to our study, the EU has proved to be a very powerful force in commu-
nitising political disputes. This applies to negotiations and conflicts between the 
governments of the member states but also representatives of social interest groups 
and associations. This political communitarisation seems to be very effective on a 
cognitive level, as public policy analyses have impressively shown (Hodson and 
Maher 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Radaelli 2003; Checkel 2007; Favell and 
Guiraudon 2011). Such cognitive communitarisation has also been demonstrated 
in the analysis of mass media debates (Pfetsch et al. 2006; Lahusen 2009; Trenz 
2016) because the EU seems to be able to successfully occupy issues and put 
them on the agenda of the mass media of all member states. But this process also 
affects people’s political opinions. Citizens have internalised Europe and the EU 
as a common frame of reference and orientation for their thinking, which is why 
they perceive and evaluate society and politics in a European way. People observe 
and judge social living conditions on a Europe-wide scale, which also means that 
they perceive Europe as a social area with different living standards, and thus as 
a hierarchical order of advantage or disadvantage. They also observe and assess 
political conditions on a Europe-wide scale. On the one hand, people judge the 
EU from the specific situation of their country and from the perspective of their 
personal living conditions, but on the other hand, they also judge politics in their 
country from the perspective of the European social space with its unequal liv-
ing conditions. The national and the European elements cannot be considered as 
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separate entities (system, institutions), but must be seen as elements of a common 
political field with European contours and national segmentation. 
A fundamental directional decision? 
Following this line of argument, Europeans may not be so concerned about the 
right balance between the EU and their nation state and shift or relocation of 
competences to the EU or the member states. The findings presented in this study 
suggest that Europeans have internalised a normative idea of equal living con-
ditions within Europe, which they use as a yardstick to assess national politics 
and the EU. If the reality differs from this normative standard of comparable liv-
ing standards, dissatisfaction with national and European politics is voiced. Both 
sides seem to be in the same boat. While national governments are more strongly 
held accountable for a lack of performance, European citizens seem to regard both 
sides as political actors who share responsibility for the unfulfilled promise of the 
European integration project (EU Commission 2009; Council of Europe 2010). 
The fact that Europeans have internalised these normative ideas of equivalence 
or equality has been corroborated by many studies. It has been pointed out that the 
majority of people in European countries believe that all Europeans should have 
equal rights, for example, with regard to access to the national labour market and 
associated social rights (Gerhards and Lengfeld 2013; 2015). This belief is closely 
linked to implicit norms of distributive justice because the European population 
has repeatedly subscribed related demands when asked in surveys. This applies, 
for example, to income inequalities, since a large majority of people in European 
countries argue that it is important to reduce these, not only within European 
countries but also among them (Kaltenthaler, Ceccoli and Gelleny 2008; Lahusen 
and Grasso 2018; Gerhards et al. 2019). Recent survey data also show that the 
majority of the population in a number of countries are convinced that the mem-
ber states should be committed to mutual assistance in times of crisis. This con-
cerns financial transfers or aid measures (fiscal solidarity) between governments, 
but respondents would also welcome European social protection and redistribu-
tion programmes (Gerhards, Lengfeld and Häuberer 2016; Baute, Meulemann 
and Abts 2018; Gerhards et al. 2019). In this sense, normative ideas of equal-
ity translate into demands for solidarity among Europeans. This solidarity is not 
categorical because redistribution is often conditional on the target group, the 
specific needs and the target group’s perceived behaviour or attitude. Moreover, 
the support of solidarity is unevenly distributed among the European population, 
as in this respect, too, approval depends on the social situation, collective identi-
ties and political allegiances (Mau 2005; Baute et al. 2019; Kuhn, Nicoli and 
Vandenbroucke 2020; Lahusen 2020). But the general orientation is quite clear, 
given that equality and solidarity are widely shared norms. 
The European population thus seems to agree that more equality is a political 
goal to work towards. The problem, however, is that they have different views 
on how to deal with existing disparities and inequalities. It is precisely this com-
mon cognitive frame of reference, which encourages people to think and evaluate 
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social situations and political conditions in pan-European categories, that seems 
to nurture a pan-European line of conflict that is tightly interrelated with social 
divisions. The empirical evidence presented in this study shows, for example, 
that socially better-off people assume that their voices will be heard, that they 
are satisfied with the national government and that they express less criticism 
of their country’s political establishment and membership of the EU. Evidently, 
these people do not worry that they or their country could be socially left behind 
and that they or their country are being politically ignored within the EU. From 
their perspective, they perceive the positive effects of the European integration 
process for themselves and their country. The feeling that there are no fundamen-
tal distribution conflicts in the EU then also prevails. When there are disputes over 
political goals and the distribution of scarce resources, these people assume that 
these disputes can be resolved because they are firmly convinced that the dividing 
factor within the EU is far less decisive than the uniting factor. 
The social disadvantage seems to nurture the opposite view, and this view is 
driven by the conviction that social and political life is shaped above all by antag-
onistic struggles for distribution. As the findings have shown, Euroscepticism, 
dissatisfaction with one’s government and criticism of the political establishment 
come together to form an opinion that assumes that politics does not listen to 
the interests of the disadvantaged. This complaint is thus directed not only at the 
EU but primarily at national policymakers who are held politically responsible 
for these issues. This overall assessment reflects a social situation characterised 
by multiple disadvantages and thus produces a view of social reality based on a 
consistently unequal distribution of goods, resources and opportunities. As far as 
Europe is concerned, this disenchanted view resides in feelings of social vulner-
ability and political marginalisation and assumes that there are no gifts to be had 
from the EU. In accordance with this viewpoint, there is a fundamental conflict 
over the distribution of scarce resources, which is why the profits of individual 
countries and regions mean losses for other member states. From this perspec-
tive, belief in a European Union seems to be farcical because what is common 
between people, regions and countries is clearly eclipsed by what divides them. 
Against this background, cancelling the country’s membership seems to be the 
only option. 
These conflicting views place the social question on the EU and its member 
states’ agenda. After all, the future of the European project seems to depend very 
much on the resolution of social divisions and complementary political lines of 
conflict. The social issue has also become an urgent problem because the EU itself 
has promised to work for the improvement and harmonisation of social prosperity 
and thus to achieve comparable living conditions between people and countries. 
People evidently take this promise seriously and have accepted it as a yardstick 
for assessing social and political conditions in Europe. 
In principle, this conflict between ambition and reality could be resolved by 
the EU withdrawing from this promise. Following the results of our analysis, 
Eurosceptics assume that this promise is not the best in times of economic, politi-
cal and social crises, tough interest policy and interstate conflicts and that this 
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claim has degenerated into mere lip service. However, it will not be so easy to 
banish the expectations and requirements of a fair and just Europe from people’s 
minds. For this reason, the EU seems to have no choice but to find an answer to the 
social question. Member states and EU institutions must make a more concerted 
effort to meet the public desire for equal opportunities and comparable living 
conditions for all Europeans. The way to achieve this goal is not mapped out and 
requires political decision-making. In principle, however, two alternatives seem 
conceivable. First, the established responsibilities could be maintained, which is 
why the national welfare state would remain responsible for combating social 
divisions and ensuring social redistribution, social cohesion and justice. The 
homework to be done would thus be primarily national. Supplementary meas-
ures at the EU, however, would be necessary in order to assist and/or encourage 
member states in harmonising the employment situation and the social security 
standards in their countries. Second, a stronger communitarisation of inequality-
relevant policy areas could be a possible option, albeit not very likely politically. 
Agreement on more ambitious instruments of a European social union would have 
to be reached between the member states. They could include minimum require-
ments for national employment and social policies, the promotion of collective 
bargaining and social partnership agreements and solidarity-based redistribution 
measures between countries and European social security programmes. All in all, 
the EU institutions and the governments of the member states must recognise that 
the future of the European integration process depends on the responses they pro-
vide to the existing social inequalities and divisions within Europe. Ultimately, 
people will judge the policies of the EU and its member states based on the rel-
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